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Previous empirical research on US Supreme Court nominations has largely overlooked the 
influence of the departing justice. But the theory of reference dependence suggests that the 
departing justice may serve as a reference point for persons considering a nomination to the 
Court. Analysis of Supreme Court nominations between 1953 and 2006 provided evidence for 
the theory. Senators were substantially more likely to oppose a nomination the more the 
nomination had the potential to move the ideological ideal point of the vacant seat from the 
senator. The Senate Judiciary Committee chair was also more likely to delay confirmation 
hearings the more unfavorable a seat change was to him. However, presidents did not appear to 
constrain their nominations based on the ideology of the departing justice, and justices did not 
appear to systematically retire from the bench for political reasons, indicating that the influence 
of the departing justice is not always present or strong in each stage of the appointment process. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In 1967, Thurgood Marshall joined five fellow Democrats and a liberal Republican Chief Justice 
on the US Supreme Court. Marshall penned liberal majority opinions that expanded the First 
Amendment to cover possession of obscene materials (Stanley v. Georgia, 1969), forced states to 
reconsider their capital punishment procedures (Furman v. Georgia, 1972), and required prisons 
to assist inmates in preparing and filing legal papers through access to law libraries or other 
means (Bounds v. Smith, 1977).  
 But over the next decade, a succession of retirements during Republican administrations 
shifted the Court in the conservative direction. After William Brennan left in 1990, Marshall’s 
lone Democratic colleague was JFK appointee Byron White, who had been one of two justices in 
the Roe v. Wade (1973) minority and who had dissented in Miranda v. Arizona (1966). 
 Marshall claimed that it was a “double barreled lie” (Lewis 1991) that he was leaving the 
Court in “mounting anger and discouragement as he watched the ascendancy of a conservative-
dominated bench” (Rosenthal 1991). The 82-year-old asserted that his decision to retire had been 
made in consultation with a doctor, but when pressed for a specific medical reason Marshall 
stated only that he was “getting old and falling apart” (Lewis 1991), a claim that was somewhat 
corroborated by his mistaken preliminary vote in favor of a capital sentence in Lankford v. Idaho 
(1991) and his confusion about long-standing Court opinion assignment rules (Ward 2003: 205). 
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 Marshall’s 1991 retirement was clearly not for political reasons: it was announced under 
an opposite party president with approval ratings higher than 70 percent, and became effective 
fewer than 13 months before the next presidential election. But President George H.W. Bush was 
not completely unconstrained in his choice to replace Marshall, given that the Senate was under 
Democratic control and that the retirement had left the Court without any African American 
members. Moreover, less than five years had passed since the Democratic Senate rejected the 
nomination of conservative Robert Bork, a “watershed” event (Resnick 2001) that “clearly 
established a firm precedent for ideological inquiries and for the rejection of judicial nominees, 
at least in some instances, on purely ideological grounds” (Viera and Gross 1998: 247).  
 President Bush’s previous nominee, David Souter, had been characterized as “stealth” by 
Senator Howell Heflin at Judiciary Committee hearings, with little track record in terms of 
political views, and was confirmed rather easily, 90 to 9. But Bush’s nominee to replace 
Marshall – Clarence Thomas – had a clear conservative ideology that clashed with both the 
median senator and the departing justice. Less than two years prior, Thomas, the former head of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, had been confirmed as a federal appeals judge 
by voice vote, with only two senators registering opposition (Dewar 1990). But in July 1991, 
Thomas stood alongside the president in Kennebunkport, Maine, as a Supreme Court appointee 
who would face one of the most contentious nomination battles in American history.  
 Thomas initially stated that he “looked forward to the confirmation process” (Greenburg 
2007b), but later remembered his hearings to be a “high-tech lynching” (Marlantes 2007), as 
accusations surfaced that he had sexually harassed an EEOC employee and had a penchant for 
pornography. Thomas would also later claim that “[Senate Judiciary Chairman Joe] Biden’s 
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smooth, insincere promises that he would treat me fairly were nothing but talk” (Thomas 2007: 
236). 
 The president’s short list for Marshall’s replacement reportedly contained the names of 
Thomas and multiple Hispanics, whites, and women (Wines 1991). Bush would have preferred 
to nominate Thomas to replace a white justice, and he worried that the “optics” of a Thomas-for-
Marshall swap would be interpreted as deference to a racial quota (Greenburg 2007a), but the 
second nomination of an African American to the Supreme Court was nonetheless opposed by 
the Congressional Black Caucus and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People. 
 On October 15, 1991, the Senate voted to confirm 43-year-old Thomas as the 165th 
United States Supreme Court justice by a 52 to 48 vote. Like Thurgood Marshall before him, 
who had promised that his would be a “lifetime appointment” (Goldman and Gallen 1992: 159), 
Thomas anticipated a long tenure on the Court: “I’m going to be here for 40 years. For those who 
don’t like it, get over it” (Biskupic 1994). 
 
--- 
 
Previous research on the Supreme Court has suggested that departing justices retire strategically 
to influence the future of the Court. This political retirement theory proposes that justices 
prolong their tenure on the Court, sometimes past their prime or even their usefulness, to delay 
retirement until the election of a president with a similar ideology or before the election of a 
president with conflicting policy preferences. But studies have been mixed on the presence of 
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systematic evidence for such political retirements (see Peretti and Rozzi 2008: 28, for a review), 
and the departure of Thurgood Marshall represents an unambiguous counter-example. 
 But the influence of the departing justice on the next natural Court may be broader than 
simply providing the president with an opportunity to nominate a like-minded replacement. 
Political retirement is a purposeful act, but the Thomas episode suggests another avenue by 
which a departing justice can indirectly affect the process of selecting and confirming a 
successor: by providing a contrast with the nominee that some institutional players will perceive 
as a gain and others will interpret as a loss. The theory of the departing justice implies that 
Clarence Thomas may have benefitted from the fact that he was chosen to replace an extreme 
ideologue, because – as conservative as Thomas was – he still fell closer to the median senator 
than did Thurgood Marshall, the justice he was replacing. Therefore, for most senators – and for 
the median senator in particular – Thomas presented a closer approximation of their ideology 
than the justice who had just retired; that proxy may have been imperfect for most senators, but it 
nonetheless represented an improvement.  
 This suggests what may appear to be a counterintuitive recommendation, namely that – 
all else equal – nominations of extreme conservatives will be better received when the departing 
justice is an extreme liberal than when the departing justice is a moderate liberal. The 
conventional wisdom for presidents attempting to “move the median” (Krehbiel 2007) may be to 
lessen the distance between the nominee and the departing justice and thus to delay appointing 
an ideologue until a moderate retires. But this logic neglects the fact that such a replacement 
would be perceived as a loss by most senators, including the median senator. However, if a 
conservative ideologue is tapped to replace a liberal ideologue, then the perceived loss for many 
senators will be lessened.  
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 More generally, presidents and senators may view a nomination through the prism of the 
previous Court – with the departing justice as the reference point – which may explain variation 
in the president’s choice of a replacement, delay in processing the nomination by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the Senate Majority Leader, and the decision of a senator to support or 
oppose the nomination. 
1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION 
The US Supreme Court is a powerful political institution with the ability to strike down actions 
of the other branches of government (e.g., the Civil Rights Cases, 1883), to reverse decisions of 
lower federal (e.g., Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007) and state courts (e.g., 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 1990), and to provide the decisive interpretation of 
federal statutes and the Constitution (e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1803; Cooper v. Aaron, 1958). 
The Court has used its authority to order the desegregation of public schools (Brown v. Board of 
Education, 1954), to grant women the right to an abortion (Roe v. Wade, 1973), and to invalidate 
laws imposing a minimum wage (Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1923) or prohibiting child labor 
(Hammer v. Dagenhart, 1918). The Court has often been vigilant in defending civil liberties, 
evidenced by its willingness to issue rulings protecting the rights of Nazis (National Socialist 
Party v. Village of Skokie, 1977), animal sacrificers (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah, 1993), and child pornographers (Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 2002). 
Congress can override Supreme Court interpretations of statutes simply by passing new 
legislation (e.g., the Jencks Act). However, King (2007) found that the Court is more likely to 
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strategically base its interpretations on constitutional grounds, and not statutes, when there is a 
high probability of Congress attempting to overrule the Court.  
This is likely because the lone formal check on a Supreme Court exercise of judicial 
review when the Court bases its decision on the Constitution is the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment, a long and difficult process that has occurred only four times in American history. 
The Eleventh Amendment, ratified after 340 days, barred suits against a state by citizens of 
another state or a foreign country, overruling the Court in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793); the 
Sixteenth Amendment, ratified after 1,302 days, permitted the federal government to implement 
an income tax, after the Court held such a tax unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and 
Trust Co. (1895); and the 26th Amendment, ratified after 100 days, overruled Oregon v. Mitchell 
(1970) to extend the franchise to eighteen-year-olds.  
The most consequential of the four, though, was the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified 
after 757 days, which overruled the Court’s Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) decision that denied 
civil rights to blacks. However, in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) and in United States v. 
Cruikshank (1875), the Court “effectively nullified” (Lawrence 2007: 4) the centerpiece of the 
amendment – the privileges or immunities clause – by holding that it did not incorporate the Bill 
of Rights to the states, as its primary framer, John Bingham of Ohio, had intended, and as the 
ratifiers in Congress and the states had interpreted the amendment’s purpose (Lawrence 2007: 
18-27). Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment – carefully constructed in the wake of the Civil 
War and ratified by the necessary 28 states, after nine states had explicitly rejected it and two had 
rescinded ratification – had its central provision negated by five Supreme Court justices. 
Empirical scholarship on the Court suggests that such judicial decisions are not controlled 
by legal norms like precedent (Segal and Spaeth 1996) but are instead largely influenced by the 
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justices’ policy preferences (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 2002), with personal 
attitudes playing an even larger role in highly salient cases (Unah and Hancock 2006). As Segal 
and Spaeth (1993: 65) note, “Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely 
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal.” 
Perceived departures from the Constitution based on such suspected political motivations 
have led to allegations that the liberal (Levin 2005) and conservative (Dionne 2001) justices 
practice judicial activism. The Court has developed entire areas of constitutional law, like the 
right to privacy (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965), and prophylactic restrictions, like the 
exclusionary rule (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961), that lack an explicit textual basis in the Constitution, 
and the justices have invented doctrines like substantive due process that some of their brethren 
call “a contradiction in terms” (Scalia 2005). The Court has received criticism from its own 
justices that its landmark abortion rulings were “an improvident and extravagant exercise of the 
power of judicial review” (dissent of Byron White in Doe v. Bolton, 1973) and that Roe v. Wade 
(1973) was a “heavy-handed judicial intervention [that] was difficult to justify” (Ginsburg 1985). 
Such dubious decision making is not absent from conservative justices: Antonin Scalia’s 
majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) – “the most explicitly and self-
consciously originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court” (Sunstein 2008: 246) – 
could easily be read as “an exposé of original intent as a theory no less subject to judicial 
subjectivity and endless argumentation as any other” (Wilkinson 2009: 256).  
Court decisions have also exhibited some questionable constitutional readings that betray 
the political preferences of their authors: for example, Earl Warren was unable strike down 
segregation in District of Columbia schools on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, as the Court did 
in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) for schools in the several states, because the Equal 
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Protection clause applies only to the states; however, the Chief Justice nonetheless papered over 
this “embarrassing textual gap” (Lessig 1995: 409-410) in Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) with a theory 
that has come to be known as reverse incorporation (Primus 2004). But, again, transparently 
ideological opinions are not the exclusive province of liberal Courts: the per curiam Bush v. 
Gore (2000) decision was derided as “the single most corrupt decision in Supreme Court history, 
because it is the only one…where the majority justices decided as they did because of the 
personal identity and political affiliation of the litigants” (Dershowitz 2001: 174). And extra-
constitutional actions by the Court can also transcend ideological divisions, like in 1974 after 
William Douglas became infirm: over the objections of Byron White, who noted the Court’s 
actions were nowhere sanctioned by the Constitution, seven justices decided to disregard 
Douglas’ vote in 4-4 cases (Lazarus 1998) and to assign majority opinions without his input in 
cases in which the decision fell to him (Ward 2003: 187-188). 
Even decisions about whether to rule on the merits of a case are colored by judicial 
preferences. The justices’ caseload is almost entirely discretionary, and voting to grant or deny 
cert – i.e., to take or not take a case – is influenced by ideology (Perry 1991). The Court is free to 
sidestep controversial issues by defining them as non-justiciable on the basis of standing, 
mootness, or their nature as political questions that another branch of government should decide. 
For example, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004), a pledge of allegiance case, 
was dismissed because the plaintiff was a non-custodial parent and therefore, in the majority’s 
view, lacked standing. Conservatives were short handed for the case, since Scalia had recused 
himself, and, as Clarence Thomas noted in his concurrence, “as a matter of our precedent, the 
Pledge policy is unconstitutional.” Faced with the choice between a backlash from removing 
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“under God” from the pledge and a backlash for reversing course on its Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, the Court elected to punt. 
This lack of judicial restraint and constraint, coupled with the shelter of tenure during 
good behavior, grants justices wide latitude in decision making. Therefore, the most direct way 
to change the direction of the Court’s jurisprudence is to change the identity of its members. 
Political actors understand the critical nature of Court vacancies, and the resignation of Sandra 
Day O’Connor provided an example of the importance of what William Brennan termed “the 
Rule of Five,” namely that: “You can do anything you want at the Supreme Court with five 
votes” (Garbus 2003: 283). 
Partisan advocates painted O’Connor’s retirement in stark terms: “the most important 
resignation and nomination…in our lifetime and probably more than that.”1 Language became 
even graver after a conservative federal appellate judge was nominated as her replacement: 
confirmation of Samuel Alito “can tip the balance on the Supreme Court radically away from 
constitutional checks and balances and the protection of Americans’ fundamental rights”2 and 
“threatens the very existence of core legal rights that Americans, especially women, have relied 
on for decades.”3
                                                 
1 Jay Sekulow of the American Center for Law and Justice, quoted in Baker (2005). 
 Subsequent decisions suggested that disquiet about O’Connor’s replacement 
may have been warranted: Alito drafted the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision rejecting a gender 
pay discrimination claim (Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 2007) and provided the fifth vote in favor of a 
federal partial birth ban (Gonzales v. Carhart, 2007), contrasting the previous 5-4 ruling joined 
by O’Connor that struck down a similar Nebraska prohibition (Stenberg v. Carhart, 2000). 
2 Senator Patrick Leahy (2006). 
3 Marcia D. Greenberger (National Women’s Law Center 2005).  
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Therefore, the importance of each vote on the nine-member Court makes Supreme Court 
appointments consequential events whose outcome may influence US policy for decades. 
1.2 SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 
The three branches of American government intersect regularly only for Supreme Court 
appointments. The Constitution sketches minimal guidelines for the process, investing the 
president with the power to appoint Supreme Court judges “by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate” (Article II, Section 2). But despite this lack of detail, a highly institutionalized 
appointment procedure has developed. 
 The first, less institutionalized phase is the nomination, in which the president selects a 
candidate and submits the nomination to the Senate. The president is constitutionally 
unconstrained in constructing a list of names and in the ultimate choice of a nominee, although 
past presidents have sought advice from senators, representatives, administration officials, 
justices, interest groups, and organizations like the American Bar Association (Rutkus 2005: 8-9, 
12). Short lists are often made public, or at least salient characteristics of potential nominees are 
leaked. 
The background of short list candidates is probed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
which handles personal finances, and by administration and Justice Department officials, who 
review public records (Rutkus 2005: 12). Nominees must also prepare and submit responses to 
an extensive Senate Judiciary Committee questionnaire; the completed questionnaire for recent 
nominee Sonia Sotomayor totaled 173 pages, and she still received criticism for failing to cite a 
1981 memo opposing capital punishment that she had signed (Bendavid 2009). 
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 In the second phase, the Senate considers the nomination. The Judiciary Committee has 
served as a filter since 1868, handling all but a handful of nominees, with hearings held 
intermittently before the practice became standard in 1955 (Rutkus 2005: 17, 19). Hearings 
provide a formal opportunity for senators to question candidates, and in recent decades questions 
about the nominees’ prior judicial decisions have grown both in number and in negative tone 
(Williams and Baum 2006). Preparation time for the hearings has also expanded, from an 
average of one week for nominations between 1938 and 1954, to an average of 44 days for 
nominations between 1981 and 2006. Recent nominations have also seen the advent of television 
coverage, from the 1981 O’Connor appointment forward, as well as the institutionalization of 
interest groups presenting testimony or petitioning the public to pressure their senators to support 
or oppose a nomination.  
Once hearings have completed, the Judiciary Committee reports the nomination to the 
full Senate with a recommendation that is favorable or unfavorable, or with no recommendation 
at all. The nomination is then placed on the Executive Calendar, and floor debate is scheduled. 
Finally, senators indicate their preferences on the nomination in a roll call or voice vote, or the 
nomination is derailed with a filibuster, a rare occurrence that has resulted in only one 
withdrawal of a nomination (the 1968 chief justice nomination of Abe Fortas). 
1.3 THE THEORY OF THE DEPARTING JUSTICE 
Research has tended to treat Supreme Court appointments in a vacuum, whether analyzing 
confirmation voting of the Senate (Segal 1987) or individual senators (Epstein et al. 2006), 
presidential statements in favor of a nominee (Johnson and Roberts 2004), public support for a 
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nomination (Caldeira and Smith 1996), or interest group mobilization for or against an 
appointment (Caldeira and Wright 1998). A handful of articles have accounted for the departing 
justice (Ruckman 1993; Krehbiel 2007) or the median ideology of the interim eight-member 
Court (Lemieux and Stewart 1990, 1991; Moraski and Shipan 1999; Nokken and Sala 2000), but 
these studies have only concerned the potential impact of an appointment on the Court median. 
The theory of the departing justice considers more than the median, though, proposing 
that the context of the current nomination includes the member being replaced. The two 
appointments of President George W. Bush provide anecdotal evidence that the departing justice 
influences senator opposition to Supreme Court nominations.  
The resignation of Sandra Day O’Connor and death of William H. Rehnquist in the 
summer of 2005 created a rare double vacancy on the Supreme Court. Nominees John Roberts 
and Samuel Alito faced an identical institutional context: both were nominated and confirmed in 
the 109th Congress, Republicans controlled the Senate with 55 members, and presidential 
approval was 45 percent for the Gallup poll immediately prior to the Roberts confirmation vote 
and 43 percent for the Gallup poll immediately prior to the Alito confirmation vote. The two 
nominees also had similar qualifications and ideology: Roberts’ Segal-Cover perceived 
qualifications score was 0.970 (where 0 is the lowest score and 1 is the highest), and his Segal-
Cover perceived ideology score was 0.120 (where 0 is the most conservative score and 1 is the 
most liberal); respective scores for Alito were 0.810 and 0.100. But liberal interest groups spent 
three times as much to defeat Alito’s nomination,4
                                                 
4 Liberal interest groups spent $454,456 for television advertising against the Roberts nomination, and $1,365,857 
against the Alito nomination (Brennan Center at the New York University School of Law 2006). 
 the Senate Judiciary Committee took nearly 
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three weeks longer to send Alito’s nomination to the floor,5
Considerations of the departing justice may explain the varying levels of support afforded 
the Roberts and Alito nominations. Roberts was perceived to be an ideological clone of the 
conservative justice he was scheduled to replace,
 senators threatened to filibuster the 
Alito nomination, and twenty more senators ultimately voted against Alito’s confirmation, with 
Alito only garnering a 58-42 vote that placed his nomination in danger of being defeated by a 
filibuster proposed by Massachusetts senators John Kerry and Edward Kennedy. 
6 so moderate or liberal senators could support 
his confirmation by rationalizing that the Court would be no worse for them than before. But no 
such justification was possible for the replacement of moderate O’Connor with conservative 
Alito,7
 This dissertation investigates the extent to which such variation in opposition can be 
attributed to the departing justice acting as a reference point in evaluating a nomination in the 
four main arenas of Supreme Court replacements: the president’s choice of a nominee, the 
Senate’s speed in processing the nomination, senator opposition to the nomination at a 
confirmation roll call vote, and a justice’s decision to retire. 
 providing anecdotal evidence that the increased resistance to the Alito nomination may 
have been driven by the attempted replacement of “the pivotal middle justice on a divided court” 
(Dinh 2005). 
                                                 
5 The Roberts nomination was referred to the Judiciary Committee on July 29, 2005, which favorably reported the 
nomination 55 days later on September 22, 2005, while 75 days were necessary for the Alito nomination (November 
10, 2005, to January 24, 2006). The July 29 date for Roberts’ nomination is for his associate justice nomination and 
not his subsequent chief justice nomination on September 6, 2005. 
6 e.g., “Judge Roberts is viewed as a sort of political clone of Chief Justice Rehnquist” (Waldmeir 2005). 
7 e.g., “The Roberts-for-Rehnquist nomination would not affect the court’s balance, but Bush could force an 
ideological shift to the right when he replaces O’Connor” (Associated Press 2005). 
 14 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is structured as follows. Literatures on Supreme Court nominations and 
reference dependence are reviewed, providing a foundation for the departing justice theory, from 
which hypotheses are drawn in three areas: senator opposition to a nomination, delay of a 
nomination in the Senate, and presidential selection of a nominee (Chapter 2). Research designs 
to test hypotheses in each of the areas are then described (Chapter 3), and subsequent chapters 
report results for the analyses of senator opposition to Supreme Court nominations (Chapter 4), 
the timing of Senate confirmation benchmarks (Chapter 5), and presidential choice of nominee 
ideology (Chapter 6). A final analysis is described and reported on political retirements from the 
Court (Chapter 7), followed by a summary of findings, unanswered questions, and suggestions 
for future research (Chapter 8). 
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2.0  THE DEPARTING JUSTICE 
This chapter reviews previous research on Supreme Court nominations, discusses the theory of 
reference dependence from the marketing and psychological literature, applies the reference 
dependence theory to construct the departing justice theory, and then derives hypotheses to test 
the theory in three areas: senator opposition to a nomination, delay of a nomination in the Senate, 
and presidential selection of a nominee. 
2.1 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON CONFIRMATION VOTING 
Much previous empirical research on senator confirmation voting has conceptualized 
nominations as simple additions of a new justice, without reference to other members of the 
Court or to the departing justice. Cameron, Cover, and Segal (1990; hereafter CCS) introduced 
what has become the standard confirmation voting model, which formed the core of updates in 
Epstein et al. (2006) and Shipan (2008). The CCS model explained confirmation voting with five 
variables: 
1. nominee qualifications, 
2. partisanship, operationalized as a senator belonging to a different political party 
than the nominating president, 
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3. presidential strength, with strong presidents not being in the fourth year of their 
term and belonging to the political party that controls the Senate, 
4. the squared distance between the ideal point of the senator and the ideal point of 
the nominee, and 
5. an interaction term between qualifications and ideological distance. 
None of these variables concern the departing or continuing justices, but other research 
has addressed the possibility that the balance of the Court has some bearing on the confirmation 
process. Lemieux and Stewart (1990) found the Senate less likely to confirm a nomination with 
the potential to alter the Court median, and Lemieux and Stewart (1991) developed a similar 
theory at the individual level, claiming that senators would be less likely to approve a nomination 
that would move the Court median further from their ideal point.  
Ruckman (1993) proposed that senators attend to “critical nominations” involving a 
partisan replacement on the Court that would lead to a one-member partisan split, would change 
control from one party to the other, or would create a partisan deadlock. But the critical 
nomination operationalization of ideology is overly broad and can be improved with better 
measures.  
The first improvement is methodological, replacing partisanship with more precise and 
dynamic ideological measures that have become available since the early 1990s. Party 
identification is a fuzzy gauge that essentially dichotomizes ideology, and, in any event, Supreme 
Court justices’ political preferences drift (Segal, Timpone, and Howard 2000; Epstein et al. 
2007b), sometimes to such an extent that their partisan labels become misleading; after all, 
Republicans wrote the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade (1973) and voted to strike down school-
sponsored prayer (Engel v. Vitale, 1962).  
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Epstein et al. (2007b: 1520) found that the ideological preferences of only four of 26 
confirmed nominees since 1937 remained stable; in fact, according to Martin-Quinn scores 
(Martin and Quinn 2002a), two of the four most liberal justices in each term between 1994 and 
2006 have been Republicans. Building a critical nominations measure on partisanship alone may 
therefore lead to incorrect estimates about the timing of a credible threat to change the ideology 
of the Court median; the recent confirmation of Samuel Alito to a Court with only two 
Democratic members demonstrated that – even in the absence of a partisan replacement – a 
nomination can significantly alter the Court median, or at least set the stage for a major shift. 
 Therefore, the second innovation to the critical nominations literature is to consider 
nominations more broadly than threats to change the Court median. The median has occupied a 
central role in judicial politics research (Martin, Quinn, and Epstein 2005: 1276-1278), but 
evidence from the psychological and marketing literatures suggests that senators may also be 
influenced by considerations about potential changes to the ideology of the seat being vacated by 
the departing justice. 
2.2 REFERENCE DEPENDENCE 
Research has found that variance in responses to identical stimuli can be attributed to orthogonal, 
often temporal, considerations that are referred to as reference points (Fiegenbaum and Thomas 
1988), anchors (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), or adaptation levels (Helson 1964), depending on 
the study and the particular nuance of the effect. Experimenters have observed that rural 
residents judged a city as noisier and more polluted than did persons from urban areas (Wohlwill 
1974), that male college students rated a target woman in a photograph as less physically 
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attractive while watching an episode of “Charlie’s Angels” than while otherwise occupied 
(Kenrick and Gutierres 1980), and that persons described a landscape as more exciting after they 
were exposed to a gloomy scene than after they had viewed a control photograph (Russell and 
Lanius 1984). 
Social attitudes can be affected by reference phenomena, as well. Eibach and Ehrlinger 
(2006) found that differences in ratings of racial progress were a function of reference points: 
African Americans compared contemporary race relations with an ideal situation, while white 
Americans compared race relations to the past. Strack, Schwarz, and Gschneidinger (1985) 
observed that persons judged their current life satisfaction to be at higher levels after they were 
prompted to remember negative events than after they were asked to recollect positive events. 
Cowan et al. (2002) uncovered a similar effect with regard to hate speech, conceived as a clash 
between values of free speech and equality, reporting that asking respondents to brainstorm 
disadvantages of restricting one of those values (e.g., “Please list some of the costs of censoring 
speech”) influenced respondents to tip the balance in favor of that value. 
Reference dependence has also been extensively applied in marketing research as a 
reference price (Erickson and Johansson 1985), in which consumer choice is influenced by an 
anchor; studies have found consumer attitudes to be influenced by anchors, operationalized as 
the advertised “regular” price of the brand (Biswas and Blair 1991), previous prices of the brand 
(Briesch et al. 1997), or the price of the most recently purchased brand (Hardie, Johnson, and 
Fader 1993). The marketing literature is unsettled on which of these prices serves as the primary 
reference point for consumers, but the departing justice is the most obvious anchor for Supreme 
Court nominations.  
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2.3 REFERENCE DEPENDENCE ON THE DEPARTING JUSTICE 
The ideological relationship between the departing justice and the nominee is salient in the media 
(e.g., “Alito Leans Right, Where O’Connor Swung Left,” Lane 2005) and among senators. At 
confirmation hearings, Senator Herb Kohl grilled nominee Alito about his relationship to the 
departing justice, asking “How will you be different from her, Judge Alito?...And how are you 
like or not like Justice O’Connor as a judge?...Do you see yourself as a justice, if you’re 
confirmed, who in many ways will fill the same role as Justice O’Connor has filled?”  
 If such considerations are as present in confirmation voting as they are in the prelude to 
the roll call vote, then a senator’s attitude toward a nominee should be influenced by the 
senator’s attitude toward the departing justice. Such reference dependence suggests that senators 
perceive the movement of a seat from the departing justice to the nominee: if this movement is 
toward the senator, the nomination is considered a gain; but if the movement is away from the 
senator, the nomination is considered a loss. Therefore, all else equal, liberal senators should be 
happier with a moderate replacing a conservative than with a moderate replacing a liberal, 
conservative senators should be happier with a moderate replacing a liberal than with a moderate 
replacing a conservative, and moderate senators should be happier with a moderate replacing an 
ideologue than with a moderate replacing a moderate. 
This reference dependence on the departing justice can be presented formally. Consider 
Figure 2.1, with nominee N and senators S1 and S2 of the same political party, ordered on an 
ideological continuum, where N’s confirmation would produce no change in the Court median: 
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Figure 2.1. Senator ideological considerations without the departing justice 
Extant empirical models (e.g., Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990; Epstein et al. 2006) that 
only incorporate ideology directly through the ideological distance between a senator and the 
nominee or indirectly through political party membership would predict equal support from S1 
and S2, since both senators belong to the same party and lie the same distance from the nominee. 
But consider Figure 2.2, which incorporates departing justice JD, who serves as a reference point 
for judging the ideological impact of the nomination: 
 
Figure 2.2. Senator ideological considerations with the departing justice 
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Both senators still equally approve of N in partisan and in absolute ideological terms, but 
the nomination has the potential of moving the ideology of the open seat closer to S1 and away 
from S2, suggesting that S1 would be more likely than S2 to vote for the nominee.  
The above example is fashioned in terms of senators who advise and consent to a 
nomination, but it can be generalized to other institutional actors, such as the president, and to 
outside influences, like interest groups and members of the public. Therefore, empirical research 
into Supreme Court nominations may have overlooked an important dynamic. 
2.4 HYPOTHESES DERIVED FROM THE THEORY 
The departing justice theory was tested on a number of phenomena related to Supreme Court 
appointments. The following sections derive hypotheses in the areas of confirmation voting, 
confirmation delay, and presidential choice of nominee. 
2.4.1 Senator confirmation voting 
The outline of the theory above was placed in terms of the influence of the departing justice on 
senators’ confirmation roll call voting. The first hypothesis is expressed in these terms: 
H1. Senators are more likely to oppose a nomination the greater the 
potential the nomination has to move the ideology of the vacant 
seat away from their ideal point. 
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2.4.2 Confirmation delay 
Most Supreme Court appointments are confirmed, but not all are confirmed quickly: between 
1938 and 2006, the Senate rejected only four of the forty nominations on which it conducted a 
final confirmation or cloture vote, but the length of time between Senate receipt of a nomination 
and its final vote ranged from the same day (James Byrnes in 1941) to more than four months 
(127 days for John Harlan in 1954), with a median duration of about one month (30.5 days). 
Recent studies of confirmation delay have analyzed executive branch appointments in 
general (McCarty and Razaghian 1999) or focused on nominations to particular independent 
regulatory agencies (Nixon 2001; Nixon and Bentley 2006) or to the lower federal courts 
(Martinek, Kemper, and Van Winkle 2002); few, though, have dealt with Supreme Court 
nominations. Shipan and Shannon (2003) provided an initial foray, replicating results from the 
lower courts literature for factors like divided government (Bell 2002) and time remaining in a 
congressional session (Binder and Maltzman 2002), and identifying several factors relatively 
unique to the Supreme Court, such as chief justice nominations.  
Senators have two fundamental motives for delaying confirmation votes on Supreme 
Court justices. A sincere reason is that a longer process permits senators and their agents to 
collect more information and to more thoroughly vet candidates. But senators also have a 
strategic reason to delay nominations of which they disapprove, since a longer process typically 
keeps the nominee from participating in Supreme Court conferences, voting on cases, and 
writing opinions,8
                                                 
8 The two major exceptions to this are recess appointments and cases that a shorthanded Court decides to rehear. 
 and also increases the likelihood that a nomination will fail from a gaffe or an 
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embarrassing personal discovery.9
Another innovation to the confirmation delay literature would be to introduce separate 
confirmation stages: previous scholarship has tended to treat judicial confirmation as a single 
process, but the process contains at least three distinct parts: preparation for Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings, the time from the committee hearings to the final committee report, and the 
time between the final committee report and the chamber roll call vote. All three phases are 
positively correlated, but not at particularly high levels, suggesting something to be gained from 
separate models.
 Shipan and Shannon (2003) provided evidence that ideology 
may influence the timing of confirmation benchmarks, with delay increasing for critical 
nominations defined by the Ruckman (1993) criteria. 
10
The length of the first two stages is largely controlled by the chair of the Judiciary 
Committee, who usually sets the dates for the headings and for the committee vote, and who 
determines the number of rounds a nominee may receive at the hearings (Rutkus 2005); the first 
two phases, under the control of the Judiciary Committee chair, are therefore collapsed into one 
stage. The length of the third phase is essentially determined by the Senate Majority Leader, who 
schedules the consideration of the nominee and may place a time limit on debate, typically 
through a unanimous consent request (Rutkus 2005). Therefore, modeling separate components 
of the judicial confirmation process, and paying particular attention to the key procedural player 
in each stage, suggests the following hypotheses: 
 
                                                 
9 The duration of the confirmation process is strongly and positively correlated with the percentage of roll call votes 
against the nomination (r = 0.67, p < 0.001). Causality, of course, may be reciprocal or reversed. 
10 For the 37 nominations between 1938 and 2006 for which committee hearings were held, the time spent preparing 
for the Judiciary Committee hearings correlated at 0.06 with the temporal length of the hearings themselves and at 
0.15 with the time between the final committee report and the roll call vote; the temporal length of the hearings 
correlated at 0.23 with the time between the final committee report and the roll call vote. 
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H2a. Delay in the scheduling and completion of hearings on a 
nomination increases the greater the potential a nomination has to 
move the ideology of the vacant seat away from the chair of the 
Judiciary Committee. 
H2b. Delay in the scheduling and holding of a floor roll call vote on 
a nomination increases the greater the potential a nomination has to 
move the ideology of the vacant seat away from the Senate 
Majority Leader. 
The lengths of these two stages are expected to be governed by different factors. Strategic 
factors like ideological distance should be more influential in the Judiciary Committee phase 
because the Judiciary Committee chair has ready justifications for delaying a nomination, like 
the need to conduct background checks or to assess a candidate’s record or to permit extra 
rounds of questioning at a hearing or to invite additional witnesses. These factors are absent in 
the roll call phase, given that the information-gathering and interview phases have been 
completed, so the Senate Majority Leader has less cover for postponing a vote and therefore less 
ability to delay a nomination for strategic reasons. 
In addition, fewer explanatory variables should reach statistical significance in the roll 
call phase relative to the Judiciary Committee phase simply for statistical reasons: the length of 
the roll call phase is much more brief than the Judiciary Committee phase, so the lower amount 
of variation in the length of the second phase relative to the first should make it more difficult to 
identify statistically significant relationships between explanatory variables and the length of 
delay. 
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2.4.3 Presidential appointments 
Because non-recess appointments to the Court must secure Senate approval, strategic presidents 
should at least consider the preferences of those who handle and vote on the nominations; this 
may, in some circumstances, require presidents to restrict their choices to those nominees who 
can be confirmed. Consider the following senator statements: 
America is a better and freer Nation than Robert Bork thinks. Yet, 
in the current delicate balance of the Supreme Court, his rigid 
ideology will tip the scales of justice against the kind of country 
America is and ought to be. 
 
− Senator Edward Kennedy11
 
 
If [John Roberts] is a Rehnquist, that would not be cause for 
exultation; nor would it be cause for alarm. The Court’s balance 
will not be altered. But there is a reasonable danger that he will be 
like Justice Thomas, the most radical Justice on the Supreme 
Court...Because if he is a Justice Thomas, he could turn back the 
clock decades for all Americans. The Court’s balance may be 
tipped radically in one direction and stay that way for too long. 
 
− Senator Chuck Schumer12
 
 
Political science models of presidential constraint in terms of Supreme Court nominations 
have tended to focus on the pivotal senator’s reaction to the potential impact of the nomination 
on the Court median (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005; Rohde and Shepsle 
2007). References to “tipping” in the above statements of Edward Kennedy and Chuck Schumer 
appear to reflect this concern, but the nominations under discussion had little potential to alter 
the location of the Court median: John Roberts was considered an ideological clone of his 
predecessor (e.g., Waldmeir 2005), and, for the Robert Bork nomination, there was little 
                                                 
11 July 1, 1987, Senate floor remarks from the Congressional Record, p. 18519. 
12 September 28, 2005, Senate remarks from the Congressional Record, p. S10540. 
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difference in the voting records of retiring median justice Lewis Powell and potential new 
median Byron White.13
The Kennedy and Schumer statements are more consistent with a conception of balance 
in terms of the Court mean. This interpretation reflects results from confirmation voting research, 
which has found that senators are more likely to oppose a Supreme Court nomination the further 
the ideological ideal point of the nominee is from the ideological ideal point of the senator 
(Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990; Epstein et al. 2006; Shipan 2008), even controlling for the 
potential impact of the nomination on the ideology of the Court median (see results presented in 
Chapter 4). Models of presidential selection of Supreme Court nominees may therefore benefit 
from incorporating senator consideration of potential changes to the Court mean. 
 
Models of presidential constraint that are presented below presume that presidents, 
senators, justices, and nominees are motivated by single-peaked symmetric policy preferences 
that are known to all other actors and that can be represented on a unidimensional liberal-
conservative continuum (cf. Rohde and Shepsle 2007); ideology is presumed to be the sole 
motivation of presidents, justices, and nominees, but some models permit senators to be 
influenced by considerations of partisanship. 
 The first model presumes that presidential choice of nominee ideology is constrained by 
the potential impact of the nomination on the distance between the pivotal senator and the seat 
being vacated by the departing justice, such that the pivotal senator will oppose an attempt to 
move the ideology of the seat away from his or her ideal point. Subsequent models presume 
alternate considerations that may constrain the president. 
                                                 
13 The 1987 Bailey estimated ideal points for Powell and White were 0.32 and 0.38, respectively, compared to -1.78 
for Thurgood Marshall and 1.17 for William Rehnquist. 
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2.4.3.1 Departing justice constraint 
Congleton (2002) notes an important, but often overlooked nuance of median theorems, namely, 
that claiming that decisions are acceptable to the median is not equivalent to claiming that 
decisions will coincide with the median’s preferences. Non-median members of deliberative 
bodies can influence outcomes (Caplin and Nalebuff 1991; Ma and Weiss 1993; Chappell, 
McGregor, and Vermilyea 2004), and non-median members are especially important on the 
Supreme Court because a single justice may act as a “catalyst” beyond the simple vote in a case 
by altering the basis of a decision or by articulating a broader interpretation of the Constitution 
(Tribe 1985, 35-36).  
Majority opinions are the primary vehicle by which justices influence policy (Segal and 
Spaeth 2002: 357), and non-median justices wield some control over the ideological content of 
the majority opinions they write (Lax and Cameron 2005; Bonneau et al. 2007; Carrubba et al. 
2007). More ideologically extreme justices should therefore be expected to produce more 
ideologically extreme majority opinions than would be the case if the majority opinion were 
written by the median justice.  
Non-median justices with opinion assignment authority possess a particularly strong 
potential influence over Court decisions. In Dickerson v. United States (2000), for example, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, a longtime critic of the Miranda decision, joined the coalition to uphold 
Miranda, assigned himself the majority opinion, and crafted an opinion that kept Miranda but 
also retained every exception to Miranda that had accumulated over the years. Katz (2006) 
speculated that, because only two other justices supported repeal of Miranda, Rehnquist’s vote 
was a maneuver to keep opinion assignment control from the next most senior justice, John Paul 
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Stevens, who had a history of opposing Miranda exceptions and may have written a majority 
opinion that fell even further from Rehnquist’s policy preference than the one that became law. 
The collegial nature of the Court also contributes to the importance of each member. 
Justices try – and can – influence one another (Woodward and Armstrong 1979; Greenhouse 
2005; Meinke and Scott 2007); for example, in a case discussed in his initial conference, 
Clarence Thomas’s dissent convinced three other justices to change their vote (Greenburg 
2007a). But the influence of a new justice can be more subtle, emboldening other members to 
craft more ideologically extreme opinions, as Sandra Day O’Connor’s replacement of Potter 
Stewart appeared to have done with the Court’s conservative wing (Cameron, Park, and Beim 
2008-2009: 1868). 
Byron White observed that, “Every time a new justice comes to the Supreme Court, it’s a 
different court” (Greenhouse 2007). Presidents may therefore expect the pivotal senator to 
oppose an attempt to move the vacated seat away from his or her ideal point. If presidents 
constrain their Supreme Court nominations because of this consideration, then a nominee is 
expected to be as close to the presidential ideal point as possible while falling within the pivotal 
senator’s departing justice winset. 
Figure 2.3 depicts the ideal points of the departing justice and the pivotal senator. The 
large circle represents the pivotal senator’s departing justice winset, i.e., the area within which a 
new justice will be closer than the departing justice to the pivotal senator. 
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Figure 2.3. Departing justice constraint 
Note: Figure depicts the ideal points of the departing justice and the pivotal senator. The large circle represents the 
pivotal senator’s Court departing justice winset, i.e., the area within which a new justice will be closer than the 
departing justice to the pivotal senator. P1 and P2 represent possible locations of the presidential ideal point. 
 
 If P1 is the presidential ideal point, a nomination at P1 would be opposed by the pivotal 
senator because the pivotal senator lies further from P1 than from the departing justice; in this 
case, the president is expected to nominate someone at the ⊗ symbol, the edge of the pivotal 
senator’s departing justice winset closest to the presidential ideal point. But if P2 is the 
presidential ideal point, then the president is expected to nominate at P2 because the pivotal 
senator lies closer to P2 than to the departing justice. 
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2.4.3.2 Court mean constraint 
Pivotal senators may also object to nominations that move the mean ideology of the Court away 
from their ideal point. The pivotal senator lies a particular distance from each Supreme Court 
justice, and may oppose any attempt to move one of those justices in an unfavorable direction 
through a nominee-for-departing-justice replacement.  
2.4.3.3 Court median constraint 
The median justice exerts a great deal of influence over the vote on the merits of a case 
(Carrubba et al. 2007), so presidents may expect the pivotal senator to oppose a nomination with 
the potential to move the Court median further away from the pivotal senator’s ideal point 
relative to the prior Court median. If presidents constrain their Supreme Court nominations 
because of this consideration, then a nominee will be as close to the presidential ideal point as 
possible while falling within the pivotal senator’s Court median winset, where the edges of the 
winset denote a nomination in which the Court median falls as close to the median senator after 
the nomination is approved as the median senator fell from the median of the prior nine-member 
Court.14
                                                 
14 Several models of the presidential appointment process include considerations of the median of the eight-member 
Court after a vacancy (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Nokken and Sala 2000; Rohde and Shepsle 2007). But the median 
justice of the nine-member Court prior to a vacancy may be a more plausible conceptualization. Eight-member 
policy-making Courts have been relatively rare in recent decades. Most recent vacancies have resulted from 
retirement or resignation, and these retirements have often not disrupted Court business because they tend to occur 
during the Court’s summer recess: ten of the twelve confirmation votes since Potter Stewart’s 1981 retirement have 
occurred in July, August, September, or October, resulting in little or no disruption to the Court’s business, which 
begins the first Monday of October and ends in late June or early July. The most recent extended eight-member 
Court occurred when President Ronald Reagan attempted to replace Lewis Powell in the 1987 term, after the 
rejection of Robert Bork, the withdrawal of Douglas Ginsburg, and eventual confirmation of Anthony Kennedy. 
Senators therefore do not have occasion to observe an eight-member Court, so it is likely that their reference point 
when evaluating a nomination is the nine-member Court prior to the vacancy; and even in an extended period of an 
interim eight-member Court, it is unclear how much influence an intangible midpoint between two middle justices 
would have on senator conceptions of the Court, relative to a flesh-and-blood median justice who had likely enjoyed 
a high profile as a swing justice and most likely is continuing to serve on the Court as the nomination is processed. 
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2.4.3.4 No constraint 
Presidential deference to senator ideology may be ill-advised, given that four of the five Supreme 
Court nominations rejected since 1895 have been derailed for non-ideological reasons: racially 
insensitive remarks (John J. Parker in 1930), acceptance of private stipends (Abe Fortas in 1968), 
conflict-of-interest allegations (Clement Haynsworth in 1969), or a lack of credentials (G. 
Harrold Carswell in 1970). Even Robert Bork may have been confirmed had his opponents not 
been able to marshal public opinion against his nomination (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2008: 
27-28). 
Offering ideological concessions is even more imprudent if the Senate is more likely to 
confirm a subsequent nomination for fear of receiving blame for obstructing a president’s 
proposal (Johnson and Roberts 2005). To test if senators defer to the president after a rejected 
nomination, the main confirmation voting models of Epstein et al. (2006) and the main 
confirmation model that appears in Chapter 4 of this dissertation were re-estimated with a 
dichotomous variable for nominations on which the Senate conducted a roll call vote after a 
Senate-rejected Supreme Court nomination; this variable was coded 1 for the nominations of 
Warren Burger, G. Harrold Carswell, Harry Blackmun, and Anthony Kennedy, i.e., the 
nominations that followed Senate rejections of Abe Fortas, Clement Haynsworth, G. Harrold 
Carswell, and Robert Bork. The dependent variable is roll call confirmation vote, coded 1 for yea 
and 0 for nay.15
                                                 
15 Lee Epstein provided an updated dataset (Bork3.dta) for Epstein et al. (2006) on her website, which was retrieved 
on September 21, 2008, from 
 
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/Bork.html. The updated dataset differed 
from the original Epstein et al. (2006) dataset by including the Alito nomination, using Common Space scores from 
the 109th Congress, and correcting the Segal-Cover perceived ideology score for Clarence Thomas. The estimation 
presented in Table 2.1 differed from the Epstein et al. (2006) estimation by clustering standard errors by nomination 
(cf. Shipan 2008). 
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Results for the re-estimation of Epstein et al. (2006) are presented in Table 2.1. The 
coefficient for the post-rejection nomination variable was statistically significant and positive, 
indicating that senators were more likely to vote in favor of confirmation after a rejected 
nomination, holding other model variables constant. Predicted probabilities calculated with 
Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001) indicated that a 
rejection can substantially reduce senator opposition: for different party senators and a weak 
president, with all other variables at their mean, the predicted probability of a yea vote after a 
successful confirmation vote was 76 ± 13 percent, but rose to 95 ± 4 percent after a rejected 
nomination. 
Table 2.1. Senator voting on Supreme Court nominations (1937-2006) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Ideological distance -2.18 (0.41) 
-2.31 
(0.42) 
Lack of qualifications -2.21 (0.37) 
-2.44 
(0.37) 
Same party 0.73 (0.22) 
0.76 
(0.23) 
Strong president 0.55 (0.28) 
0.74 
(0.30) 
Nomination after a rejection --- 1.03 (0.30) 
Constant 1.86 (0.29) 
1.79 
(0.30) 
Number of observations 3809 3809 
Number of clusters 41 41 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.39 
Percent correctly predicted 91 91 
Percent modal category 87 87 
Percent reduction of error 28 28 
 
Note: Dependent variable is dichotomous senator roll call voting on Supreme Court nominees between 1937 and 
2006, with 1 coded as a vote in favor of confirmation or cloture. Models were estimated with probit, with robust 
standard errors clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). Percent reduction of error 
statistics were derived from the precalc utility designed by Frederick J. Boehmke 
(http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html). 
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Table 2.2 presents results from the re-estimation of the Chapter 4 model that included 
senator considerations of potential mean and median changes. The dependent variable was coded 
1 for senator opposition to a Supreme Court nomination, and 0 for senator support.  
 
Table 2.2. Senator opposition to Supreme Court nominations (1968-2006) 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
0.43 
(0.14) 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
0.28 
(0.64) 
Increased ideological distance 0.97 (0.22) 
0.97 
(0.21) 
Lack of nominee qualifications 3.69 (0.57) 
3.84 
(0.61) 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
3.01 
(1.62) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
1.16 
(0.15) 
Nomination after a rejection --- -1.07 (0.34) 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
-1.29 
(0.81) 
Number of observations 1883 1883 
Number of clusters 19 19 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.57 
Percent correctly predicted 0.89 0.90 
Percent modal category 0.78 0.78 
Percent reduction of error 0.52 0.56 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a Supreme Court nomination over the seventeen Supreme Court 
nominations between the 1968 Fortas chief justice nomination and the 2006 Alito associate justice nomination, with 
1 coded as opposition and 0 as support. Models were estimated with probit, with robust standard errors clustered by 
nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). Percent reduction of error statistics were derived from the 
precalc utility designed by Frederick J. Boehmke (http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html). In Model 4, 
fifteen failures and zero successes were completely determined.  
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As in the Epstein et al. (2006) model, evidence suggests that senators have treated post-
rejection nominations differently than regular nominations. The predicted probability of 
opposition from an opposite party senator with all other model variables set at their mean was 13 
± 7 percent for a nomination after a successful appointment, but fell to 2 ± 1 percent after a 
rejection. 
Presidents have reasons to hope that the Supreme Court appointments game does not 
continue beyond a single period, like a loss of political capital and time costs in getting a 
nominee to the Court (Moraski and Shipan 1999). Above results, though, suggest a level of 
Senate deference that should embolden presidents to select a nominee at the presidential ideal 
point. Models of constraint, after all, presume that the pivotal senator would oppose a 
nomination that represented only a trivial ideological loss, but senators may save their objection 
for those nominations that represent a substantial loss, or senators may condition their opposition 
on factors other than ideology. Predictions are more fuzzy under such assumptions, with a 
nominee expected anywhere between the presidential ideal point and the indifference point of the 
pivotal senator, but a few permutations can be proposed and tested. 
2.4.3.5 Conditional deference: partisanship 
Partisanship moderates the impact of ideology on senator voting on Supreme Court nominations, 
substantially influencing senators of a different party than the president, but not same-party 
senators (Shipan 2008). Presidents may therefore expect same party senators to defer to 
nominations, but feel constrained by opposite party senators. In this case, presidents are expected 
to nominate at the presidential ideal point if the pivotal senator belongs to the president’s party, 
and to nominate on or within the pivotal senator’s departing justice, Court mean, or Court 
median winset if the pivotal senator belongs to an opposition party. 
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2.4.3.6 Conditional deference: partisanship and nominee extremism 
Moderate Democratic Senator Howell Heflin voted to confirm four of Ronald Reagan’s five 
Supreme Court appointments that received a floor vote, opposing only the 1987 Robert Bork 
nomination. Heflin fell to the liberal side of retiring median justice Lewis Powell and closer to 
Powell than he did to conservative nominee Robert Bork,16
I am in a state of quandary as to whether this nominee would be a 
conservative justice who would safeguard the living Constitution 
and prevent judicial activism or whether, on the other hand, he 
would be an extremist who would use his position on the Court to 
advance a far-right, radical, judicial agenda (quoted in Viera and 
Gross 1998: 168). 
 so the Bork appointment had the 
potential to move the Court mean and Court median away from Heflin. But the senator still 
expressed some ambivalence about the nomination: 
Announcing his opposition, Heflin stated, “when in doubt, don’t” (Massaro 1990: 188). If 
Heflin’s ambivalence about his confirmation vote on the Bork nomination reflects the thought of 
senators, or at least of moderate opposition party senators, then a president may simply refrain 
from nominating an ideologically extreme candidate when the pivotal senator belongs to an 
opposition party. In this case, presidents are expected to nominate at the presidential ideal point 
when the pivotal senator belongs to the president’s party; but when the pivotal senator is a 
member of an opposition party, the expected location of the nomination is as close to the 
presidential ideal point as possible without falling outside the mainstream of the Court. 
                                                 
16 Bailey ideal points for Senator Heflin and Justice Powell in 1987 were 0.28 and 0.32, respectively, representing a 
moderate ideology; William Rehnquist’s ideal point was 1.17 as a point of comparison (Bailey and Maltzman 2009). 
Bork received a conservative Segal-Cover nominee perceived ideology score of 0.095, where 0 is the most 
conservative score and 1 is the most liberal score. 
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2.4.3.7 Review of possible constraints 
Summarizing the present section, Table 2.3 presents expected ideal points of a Supreme Court 
nominee based on the discussed constraints and the possibly of no constraint. 
 
Table 2.3. Predicted locations of nominee ideology for various constraints 
Model Location of nominee ideology 
Departing justice As close to P as possible while falling on or within the departing justice winset of the pivotal senator 
Court mean As close to P as possible while falling on or within the Court mean winset of the pivotal senator 
Court median As close to P as possible while falling on or within the Court median winset of the pivotal senator 
No constraint P 
Partisanship & 
Departing justice 
If the pivotal senator is of the same party as the president: P 
If the pivotal senator is of a different party than the president: as close to 
P as possible while falling on or within the departing justice winset of 
the pivotal senator 
Partisanship &  
Court mean 
If the pivotal senator is of the same party as the president: P 
If the pivotal senator is of a different party than the president: as close to 
P as possible while falling on or within the Court mean winset of the 
pivotal senator 
Partisanship &  
Court median 
If the pivotal senator is of the same party as the president: P 
If the pivotal senator is of a different party than the president: as close to 
P as possible while falling on or within the Court median winset of the 
pivotal senator 
Partisanship & 
Nominee extremism 
If the pivotal senator is of the same party as the president: P 
If the pivotal senator is of a different party than the president: as close to 
P as possible while falling at or within one standard deviation of the 
Court’s mean ideology 
 
Note: P refers to the presidential ideal point. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed previous studies of Supreme Court nominations, noting that little research 
has included the departing justice in models of the confirmation process. But psychological and 
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marketing research suggests that the departing justice may be an influence if senators and other 
actors use the departing justice as a reference point with which to judge the nominee. Formal 
models and anecdotal evidence were offered to illustrate the plausibility of this idea. To provide 
a systematic test of the departing justice theory, several hypotheses were derived, in domains 
ranging from senator voting to confirmation delay to presidential selection of a nominee. The 
next chapter describes the research designs used test each of these hypotheses.  
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter presents the research designs for testing the hypotheses proposed in the previous 
chapter. This section describes the metric employed in the analyses, and subsequent sections 
concern the measures and models for individual-level senator roll call voting on nominations, the 
length of time the Senate considers a nomination, and presidential choices for nominee ideology. 
Selection of a metric for ideology presents a concern for testing the hypotheses. Previous 
research has assumed a bridging mechanism between some combination of Segal-Cover nominee 
scores (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005; Epstein et al. 2006), Americans 
for Democratic Action (ADA) scores (Cameron, Cover, and Segal; Moraski and Shipan 1999), 
DW-Nominate scores (Johnson and Roberts 2005), and Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein 
et al. 2006; Shipan 2008).  
One method has been to assume equivalence between senator and nominee metrics, for 
example, between ADA presidential scores and Segal-Cover nominee scores (Moraski and 
Shipan 1999) or between DW-Nominate and Segal-Cover scores (Johnson and Roberts 2005). 
However, ADA scores are culled from only twenty “key” votes, so they suffer more than other 
measures from selection problems, missing votes, and strategic positioning. In fact, since these 
twenty identified votes are on highly salient and politically charged issues, ADA scores may 
exacerbate partisan differences; in 2008, for example, only nine senators fell within the moderate 
33-to-67 percent range: some of these senators had reputations as moderates, such as Mary 
 39 
Landrieu, Gordon Smith, and Arlen Specter, but others, such as Ted Kennedy, Elizabeth Dole, 
and Robert Byrd, did not.  
DW-Nominate scores reflect a larger sample of votes than ADA scores, but the 
assumption that the Nominate metric is the same as the Segal-Cover metric means that no 
senator has or will ever fall to the right of Antonin Scalia (who earned a 0.00 Segal-Cover 
nominee score, but voted to permit flag-burning in Texas v. Johnson, 1989) and no senator has or 
will ever fall to the left of Robert Jackson (who earned a 1.00 Segal-Cover score, but voted to 
uphold a so-called heckler’s veto in dissenting from Terminiello v. Chicago, 1949). 
Segal-Cover scores are imperfect proxies for justice ideology, as well, because they are 
time-invariant, so that Harry Blackmun is always treated as a conservative, despite his “near 
complete flip, from one of the Court’s most conservative members to among its most consistent 
civil libertarians” (Epstein et al. 2007b: 1494). Moreover, Segal-Cover scores should only be 
employed in their intended issue area of civil liberties and not in other issue areas or across time 
(Epstein and Mershon 1996). 
Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007a) provide an attractive alternative, 
because they are dynamic and available in annual increments (and therefore able to reflect 
ideological drift) and because they place senators, presidents, and justices on the same metric. 
Common Space scores are problematic for this analysis, though, since their bridging mechanism 
assumes a relationship between presidents and justices based on the logic of Moraski and Shipan 
(1999), namely, that unconstrained presidents select a nominee at the presidential ideal point 
(2007a: 309). This mechanism bridges the presidential score on the Common Space metric and 
the nominee score on the Martin-Quinn metric (operationalized as the first available score for a 
justice), but this poses a theoretical problem for the hypotheses that test for an ideological 
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relationship between presidents and their nominees, since a particular relationship was assumed 
in the creation of the bridged ideological scores.  
Another problem may be even more critical: Johnson and Roberts (2005) suggested that 
most presidents are constrained, given the location of the Senate filibuster pivot, who wields 
control over a cloture vote, so the Common Space bridging assumption fails to hold in most 
cases. Further, the bridging assumption has little face validity on two fronts: first, assuming that 
all of an unconstrained president’s nominees have the same ideology (O’Connor and Scalia, for 
example, or Powell and Rehnquist), and, second, assuming that Republican Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s unconstrained nominations of liberals Earl Warren and William Brennan mirror 
the ideology of the appointing president, especially given Eisenhower’s regret about the Warren 
nomination (Eisler 1997) and his de-emphasis on nominee ideology, as described in his memoir 
(Eisenhower 1963: 226-230).  
Therefore, to avoid Common Space scores and the attendant bridging assumptions about 
the ideological relationship of a president to his nominees, all ideological measures were drawn 
from estimated ideal point data from Bailey and Maltzman (2009). Bailey estimated ideal points 
do not assume a direct relationship between institutional actors; their construction instead uses 
statements and behavior on cases and issues for which information was available on the 
preferences of multiple institutional actors, like a solicitor general brief in a case decided by the 
Supreme Court, or Congressional Record statements by senators on Court decisions.  
Bailey estimated ideal point scores are available for presidents from 1950 to 2008, for 
senators from 1951 to 2008, and for Supreme Court justices from 1950 to 2008.17
                                                 
17 Bailey estimated ideal points were retrieved from personal correspondence with Michael Bailey (September 28, 
2009). For the confirmation voting chapter, senator scores were drawn from the year in which the confirmation or 
cloture vote occurred; however, scores were not available for a few senators in those years if a senator only served a 
 Scores were 
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not available for Supreme Court nominees, so nominee ideology was instead proxied as the first 
available Bailey estimated ideal point for a justice, which only required the assumption that 
senators have information about the potential voting behavior of a nominee, at least in the 
justice’s first year on the Court.18
Although first-year justice scores for confirmed nominees highly correlate with Segal-
Cover scores, these first-year scores are not available to senators at the time of the confirmation 
vote. Segal-Cover perceived nominee ideology scores, though, are based on newspaper editorials 
to which senators have access at the time of the confirmation vote, so some analyses were 
conducted using these scores. To bridge Segal-Cover and Bailey scores, Segal-Cover nominee 
 Supreme Court nominations are often treated as a game with 
perfect information (Moraski and Shipan 1999: 1072; Johnson and Roberts 2005: 45; Rohde and 
Shepsle 2007: 668), and there is evidence that this particular perfect information assumption 
about nominee ideology is not heroic: “Presidents hoping to create lasting legacies in the form of 
Justices who share their ideologies can be reasonably certain that their appointees will behave in 
line with expectations – at least during the Justices’ first terms in office” (Epstein et al. 2007b: 
1486). 
                                                                                                                                                             
small portion of a year, so alternate scores were employed for these observations: the 1969 Goodell senator score 
was used for the 1968 Fortas chief justice cloture vote, the 1968 Dirksen senator score was used for the 1969 Burger 
confirmation vote, the 1986 Broyhill representative score was used for the 1986 Rehnquist and Scalia confirmation 
votes, the 1991 Akaka senator score was used for the 1990 Souter confirmation vote, and the 2005 Corzine senator 
score was used for the 2006 Alito confirmation vote. Senate median scores were drawn from a separate document of 
medians from Bailey and Maltzman (2009). 
18 Two nominees (Abe Fortas and William Rehnquist) were serving on the Court at the time of their nomination to 
the chief justiceship; Bailey estimated ideal points from the justice arrays described later were used for these 
nominees. Other nominees (Homer Thornberry, G. Harrold Carswell, Clement Haynsworth, Robert Bork, Douglas 
Ginsberg, and Harriet Miers) were not confirmed and therefore did not serve on the Court, which necessitated 
imputation of their Bailey estimated ideal point. Segal-Cover nominee perceived ideology scores and first year 
Bailey estimated ideal points for the 23 nominees between 1951 and 2006 who were not already serving on the 
Court (Earl Warren to Samuel Alito) were used to create a bridging equation to place these three rejected nominees 
on the Bailey metric. First-year justice Bailey estimated ideal points and Segal-Cover nominee perceived ideology 
scores correlated at -0.84 (p≤0.01). Segal-Cover nominee perceived ideology scores were drawn from “Perceived 
Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2005,” retrieved on September 8, 2008, from Jeffrey 
Segal’s website (http://www.sunysb.edu/polsci/jsegal/qualtable.pdf).  
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scores were regressed against first-year Bailey estimated ideal points for confirmed nominees to 
place the Segal-Cover values on the Bailey metric. Scores based on first-year Bailey estimated 
ideal point and on Segal-Cover bridges are presented in Table 3.1: 
 
Table 3.1. Nominee estimated ideal points 
Nominee Segal-Cover Ideal Point 
First-Year 
Bailey Estimated  
Ideal Point 
Bridged Segal-Cover 
Bailey Estimated  
Ideal Point 
Earl Warren 0.750 -1.00 -0.68 
John Harlan II 0.875 -0.19 -0.95 
William Brennan 1.000 -0.94 -1.21 
Charles Whittaker 0.500 0.28 -0.15 
Potter Stewart 0.750 0.17 -0.68 
Byron White 0.500 -0.42 -0.15 
Arthur Goldberg 0.750 -1.69 -0.68 
Abe Fortas (AJ) 1.000 -1.61 -1.21 
Thurgood Marshall 1.000 -1.43 -1.21 
Abe Fortas (CJ) 0.845 . -0.88 
Homer Thornberry 1.000 . -1.21 
Warren Burger 0.115 0.66 0.67 
Clement Haynsworth 0.160 . 0.58 
Harrold Carswell 0.040 . 0.83 
Harry Blackmun 0.115 0.58 0.67 
Lewis Powell 0.165 0.29 0.56 
William Rehnquist (AJ) 0.045 1.15 0.82 
John Paul Stevens 0.250 -0.38 0.38 
Sandra Day O'Connor 0.415 0.68 0.03 
William Rehnquist (CJ) 0.045 . 0.82 
Antonin Scalia 0.000 0.59 0.92 
Robert Bork 0.095 . 0.71 
Douglas Ginsberg 0.125 . 0.65 
Anthony Kennedy 0.365 0.40 0.14 
David Souter 0.325 -0.01 0.22 
Clarence Thomas 0.160 1.10 0.58 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 0.680 -0.57 -0.53 
Stephen Breyer 0.475 -0.48 -0.10 
John Roberts (AJ) 0.120 . 0.66 
John Roberts (CJ) 0.120 0.79 0.66 
Harriet Miers 0.270 . 0.34 
Samuel Alito 0.100 0.84 0.70 
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3.1 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL SENATOR OPPOSITION 
Data were drawn from the nineteen Supreme Court nominations for which the Senate advised 
and consented – or rejected – between 1968 (Abe Fortas) and 2006 (Samuel Alito). Ideological 
measures used in the analysis ranged from 1951 to 2008, but the initial observation was the 
failed cloture vote on Abe Fortas’ chief justice nomination, “the first sign that the constellation 
of political forces in the process of selecting and confirming Supreme Court [justices] was 
undergoing realignment” (Silverstein 1994: 163). Unlike the other analyses, restricting the 
analysis to the 1968-2006 time frame will not introduce problems associated with a small sample 
size. 
The 1968 Fortas vote appeared to mark a discontinuity in the level of senator opposition 
to Supreme Court nominations. The Warren Court had recently expanded the scope of judicial 
power (e.g., Baker v. Carr, 1962; Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966), 
and senators became less deferential in the advice and consent process: the Senate rejected only 
one of 45 Supreme Court nominations between 1895 and the Fortas chief justice nomination, 
with no filibuster attempts, a mean of 5 opposition votes, and 69 percent of nominations 
receiving a voice vote, including Fortas himself in 1965; however, after the failed cloture on the 
1968 Fortas nomination, three of the next nineteen nominations were rejected, with three 
filibuster attempts, a mean of 22 opposition votes, and no voice votes. 
The traditional measure of senator preferences regarding a nomination has been the 
recorded roll call vote (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990; Overby et al. 1992; Epstein et al 2006). 
However, inspection of the Congressional Record, Judiciary Committee hearings, and newspaper 
reports revealed the preferences of a substantial number of senators who did not cast a roll call 
vote. Senators Claiborne Pell and David Durenberger, for example, were not present at the 1994 
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Stephen Breyer confirmation vote, but each made statements in the Congressional Record 
supporting the nomination (pp. 18571-18572). Therefore, the dependent variable was coded 1 for 
senators who voted against a nomination at a roll call or whose opposition to a nomination could 
be culled from the aforementioned documents, and coded 0 for senators who voted for a 
nomination at a roll call or whose support for a nomination could be culled from the 
aforementioned documents.19
                                                 
19 See Appendix A for more details about the determination of senator preferences. 
 For the 1968 to 2006 period, the roll call measure contained 1,823 
observations over 320 senators, with 403 instances of senator opposition. The new measure 
produced 61 additional observations: 1,884 preferences over 323 senators, with 410 instances of 
senator opposition and one instance of a senator voting present (J. William Fulbright for the 1969 
Burger confirmation vote, coded as an absence). Figure 3.1 depicts the two measures of senator 
opposition. 
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Figure 3.1. Senator opposition to Supreme Court nominations 
 
Note: Figure displays the number of senators who opposed a nomination using the Congressional Record measure 
and the roll call vote measure. Differences between the measures reflect a situation in which a senator spoke out 
against a nomination that was confirmed by a voice vote, or a situation in which present senators indicated the 
preferences of one or more absent senators. 
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Models were estimated with probit due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable, with robust standard errors clustered by nomination, since multiple senator preferences 
regarding the same nomination are not independent (see Shipan 2008: 62-63). The substantive 
effect of the independent variables was calculated with predicted probabilities generated by 
Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). Each 
independent variable was coded with higher values predicted to correlate with senator 
opposition, and therefore all coefficients were expected to be positive. Tables in subsequent 
chapters provide indications of statistical significance at the 0.05 level for a one-tailed test, 
because hypotheses were directional. 
For each nomination, justices were arrayed by Bailey estimated ideal point scores for the 
year prior to the vacancy.20
 Seat Change = | Nominee – Senator | – | Departing Justice – Senator | 
 The score for the prior Court median was then identified. The score 
for the departing justice was then replaced with the score for the nominee, the justices were re-
ordered, and the score for the potential Court median was identified. Three ideological measures 
were calculated with the following equations, with each term expressed as a Bailey estimated 
ideal point: 
 Median Change = | Potential Median – Senator | – | Prior Median – Senator | 
 Ideological Distance = | Nominee – Senator | 
The 1968 Fortas and 1986 Rehnquist chief justice nominations were anomalies, in the 
sense that both involved associate justices nominated to replace a departing chief justice. 
Confirmation of each would have produced a temporary eight-member Court until a subsequent 
                                                 
20 For years with more than one nomination, the Bailey estimated ideal point of any confirmed nominee was placed 
into the justice array for subsequent nominations that year. Also, the first available score for Harry Blackmun was 
from 1971, so this score was used in the arrays for the Powell and Rehnquist associate justice nominations. 
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confirmation. Under one conception, the potential Court median would be the midpoint between 
the middle two justices on the interim court. However, both nominations were coupled with 
associate justice nominations (of Homer Thornberry and Antonin Scalia, respectively) with a 
clear ideological impact: senators perceived Thornberry as a liberal (Massaro 1990: 45), and 
Scalia received the most conservative Segal-Cover perceived nominee score possible. Therefore, 
senators had enough information to imagine a future nine-member Court.  
Consider the 1986 Rehnquist nomination: senators would likely not have thought that 
Rehnquist’s elevation to chief justice would have induced a median change, given that the 
nomination concerned Rehnquist’s promotion and not his addition to the Court, and given that 
Burger and Rehnquist were both conservatives and that a conservative was nominated to fill 
Rehnquist’s associate justice spot. Primary models presumed that senators did not perceive that 
the Fortas and Rehnquist attempted elevations to chief justice would have threatened a median 
change. Alternate models, though, were estimated under the eight-member interim Court 
assumption. 
The key theoretical variable is seat change, but controls for median change (Lemieux and 
Stewart 1991) and ideological distance (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990) were necessary to 
isolate the influence of senator considerations about the departing justice relative to the nominee. 
These three variables are conceptually related, but their inclusion in the models did not cause 
multicollinearity: pairwise correlations indicated that no couple exceeded the “potentially 
harmful” 0.80 level (Griffiths, Hill, and Judge 1993: 435), the largest variance inflation factor in 
any reported model was well below the value of 10 considered indicative of multicollinearity 
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(Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price 2000: 240; Hamilton 1992: 134), and the largest condition index was 
well below the value of 30 indicating strong collinearity (Kennedy 2003: 213).21
Models contained controls for factors the literature has identified as influencing senator 
voting on Supreme Court appointments: nominee qualifications (Epstein et al. 2006), presidential 
approval (Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992), and partisanship (Shipan 2008). Lack of nominee 
qualifications was operationalized as the additive inverse of nominee qualifications scores drawn 
from Segal and Cover (1989) as updated in Epstein and Segal (2005);
 
22 a lack of presidential 
approval was measured as the percentage of respondents disapproving of the president’s job 
performance, drawn from the Gallup poll conducted nearest and prior to the Senate confirmation 
or cloture vote on a nomination;23
3.1.1 Robustness check 1: Additional controls 
 and partisanship was coded 1 when the senator and president 
belonged to different political parties, and 0 otherwise.  
Several additional controls were included in alternate specifications to assess the robustness of 
findings and to adjust for more idiosyncratic elements of nominations. Chief justice nominations 
were coded 1 in a dichotomous control. A party polarization measure (McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal 2006) was coded as the absolute value of the distance between the Senate Democratic 
                                                 
21 The highest pairwise correlation was between seat change and median change (0.58), the largest VIF in any 
reported model was 2.8, and the largest condition index in any reported model was 12. 
22 Segal-Cover nominee perceived qualifications scores were drawn from “Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of 
Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2005,” retrieved on September 8, 2008, from Jeffrey Segal’s website  
(http://www.sunysb.edu/polsci/jsegal/qualtable.pdf). 
23 Gallup presidential disapproval data were collected from the Roper Center (http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/). 
Values were drawn from the poll conducted immediately prior to the Senate confirmation or cloture vote, unless the 
vote and the final date of the poll coincided; in that case, values were drawn from the poll that began before the date 
of the Senate vote and ended on the date of the Senate vote. 
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mean and Senate Republican mean for the Congress that voted on the nomination.24
The chief justice is the “first among equals” with greater authority than the other justices, 
like the power of opinion assignment when voting in the majority; therefore, inclusion of a chief 
justice control accounts for the possibility that senators are more likely to oppose a chief justice 
nomination, all else equal. Partisanship of a senator has been identified as an important influence 
on senator confirmation voting (Shipan 2008); the party polarization control accounts for the 
possibility that, all else equal, senator opposition to Supreme Court nominations increases in 
periods of increased polarization. The temporal control addresses the possibility that senators 
have become more likely to oppose a nomination over the years, all else equal.  
 And a 
temporal control was coded as the numbered Congress in which the confirmation or cloture roll 
call was conducted. 
Some studies have used interest group activity as an explanatory variable for senator 
confirmation voting (e.g., Caldeira and Wright 1998), but several factors caution against the 
inclusion of a pressure group measure. The most important consideration may be causal 
directionality, since interest group activity may be influenced by some independent variables in 
the model, like nominee qualifications and ideology, as much as it influences the senator 
opposition dependent variable. One possible workaround would be to estimate a stage model in 
which the already-discussed independent variables cause both interest group activity and senator 
opposition to a nomination; however, two further problems suggest that such a model may be 
difficult to properly estimate. The first problem is theoretical, regarding the proper conception of 
interest group activity, with possibilities that include interest group opposition, interest group 
support subtracted from interest group opposition, or total interest group activity. 
                                                 
24 Polarization data were retrieved May 21, 2009, from: http://polarizedamerica.com/.  
 50 
But once a decision about conceptualization is made, an additional problem is the 
construction of a measure with sufficient data. Information about the total funds interest groups 
have allocated to fight or support a given nomination would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine for any reasonable number of nominations. Caldeira and Wright (1998) considered 
lobbying done at the individual senator level, which required surveys of senators that reduced the 
number of observations to those associated with only three nominations.  
Epstein et al. (2007c) provided a listing of the number of interest groups testifying at 
Judiciary Committee hearings in favor of and in opposition to confirmation since the nomination 
of Earl Warren, but those numbers are imperfect proxies of interest group mobilization: first, the 
numbers conceal the variation in interest group strength of a small lobby and a large lobby, both 
of which are equally weighted in the measures; second, the numbers do not reflect interest 
groups that would have provided testimony but were not invited to appear before the committee; 
and third, the number of interest groups has exploded recently,25
                                                 
25 Testimony was provided by an average of four interest groups over the first fourteen dataset nominations with 
available data, four of which received no interest groups testimony. For the latter fourteen dataset nominations with 
available data, the average was 28 interest groups. 
 even though the increase in 
senator opposition has not been commensurate: the correlation was 0.43 between interest group 
activity against a nomination and senator opposition for the first fourteen dataset nominations 
with available interest group data, but, for the latter fourteen dataset nominations with available 
interest group data, the correlation was 0.27.  
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3.1.2 Robustness check 2: Roll call votes 
The dependent variables used in the baseline model reflect senator opposition as noted in the 
Congressional Record and other sources, so to determine any substantive difference between use 
of the new measure and use of the traditional roll call measure, a separate model was estimated 
with the roll call vote as the dependent variable. 
3.1.3 Robustness check 3: Alternate median specifications 
For the anomalous 1968 Fortas and 1986 Rehnquist chief justice nominations discussed earlier, 
that concerned only a promotion to chief justice and not an addition to the Court, the potential 
Court median was considered to be equivalent to the prior Court median. A robustness check was 
conducted with the potential median equal to the median of the eight-member interim Court. 
3.1.4 Robustness check 4: No cloture votes 
Cloture votes may reflect only opposition to a filibuster and not necessarily carry information 
about the senator’s preference over a nomination.26
                                                 
26 As an example, 72 senators voted to end debate on the Alito nomination, but only 58 senators voted to confirm. 
 Therefore, a model was estimated omitting 
the Fortas chief justice observation, the only dataset observation based on a cloture vote. 
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3.1.5 Robustness check 5: Alternate specification for median change 
A relatively small amount of median change accompanied potential Supreme Court replacements 
(see summary statistics in Appendix B), and the value of the variable was zero for the eight 
nominations for which there was no threat to change the median ideology of the Court. This may 
cause higher standard errors than necessary, which may influence inferences about statistical 
significance. The median change variable was recoded so that +1 indicated median movement 
away from the senator, -1 indicated potential median movement toward the senator, and 0 
indicated no potential median change. The resulting variable had a more even distribution: for 
senators whose preferences about a nomination were available, 572 observations were coded +1; 
519 observations were coded -1; and 792 observations were coded 0.  
3.1.6 Robustness check 6: Constituency concerns 
Constituency concerns provide a measurement problem, since state-level public opinion data is 
unavailable for most dataset nominations. Berry et al. (1998) developed state citizen ideology 
scores that date to 1960, but their measure is a poor proxy for constituency concerns because the 
measure is based on election returns, which reflect concerns like incumbency that cloud the 
measure. Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993, 2006) constructed measures from state-level public 
opinion data for particular issues and poll questions from 1976 to 2003, and Kastellec, Lax, and 
Phillips (2008) reported state-level public opinion data for nine nominees (O’Connor, Rehnquist, 
Bork, Thomas, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, and Alito).  
 Neither of these is a perfect proxy, but the Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips (2008) measure 
appears to be the best option because it directly measures support for nominees. Use of any other 
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measure, like one in which states were assigned a liberal-conservative score, poses problems for 
moderate nominees because – while it is a safe assumption that senators from conservative states 
would be pressured to oppose liberal nominees, and that senators from liberal states would be 
pressured to oppose conservative nominees – there was no clear assumption for how senators 
from any of these states would be expected to approach a moderate nominee like Lewis Powell. 
3.1.7 Robustness check 7: Clustering standard errors 
Statistical significance is determined by calculating the ratio of an estimated coefficient to its 
standard error. Standard error calculations presume that observations are independent. Including 
non-independent observations introduces error into the calculation, usually biasing estimates 
downward, because, among other things, the effective sample size is inflated. Clustering standard 
errors by non-independent observations is a method to address this problem. 
Observations of senator opposition to Supreme Court nominations are not independent on 
two dimensions: multiple senators consider the same nomination, and individual senators often 
consider multiple nominations. On the one hand, clustering standard errors by nomination can 
address the idiosyncrasies of a nomination not captured in the models, such as the personality of 
the nominee or a seemingly-unrelated national event. But clustering by senator also has an 
advantage, because it can help account for idiosyncrasies of the senator, like a relatively strong 
reluctance to oppose a nomination. 
Clustering standard errors by nomination provides a more conservative test of hypotheses 
because standard errors clustered by nomination should be more inflated than standard errors 
clustered by senator, given the relatively few nominations compared to the large number of 
senators who have had the opportunity to consider multiple nominations. Main models for 
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senator opposition therefore cluster standard errors by nomination, but a robustness check was 
conducted with standard errors clustered by senator. 
3.1.8 Robustness check 8: Alternate models of loss aversion 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 279) noted that “[a] salient characteristic of attitudes to changes 
in welfare is that losses loom larger than gains”.27
 
 Along these lines, the influence of seat change 
may be different for senators facing unfavorable seat changes compared to those facing favorable 
seat changes, as depicted in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. Linear loss aversion 
Note: Figure displays the probability of a senator vote at various levels of seat change. In this case, negative seat 
changes (i.e., those favorable to the senator) are not as influential as positive seat changes (i.e., those unfavorable to 
the senator). 
 
                                                 
27 A concept related to loss aversion is risk aversion, defined as a preference for x instead of a risk with an expected 
value of x (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 264). This does not have an exact analogue in confirmation voting, since 
senators are not given a choice, for example, between this nominee who is certain to be a moderate, and that 
nominee who has a fifty percent change of being a liberal and a fifty percent chance of being a conservative.  
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The methodological technique used to address this phenomenon was to construct a 
dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the nomination would move the seat away from the senator and 
0 if the nomination would move the seat toward the senator or if there were no potential seat 
change, and then to interact this variable with a measure of the absolute value of the ideological 
distance that the seat would change relative to the senator. 
3.1.9 Robustness check 9: Curvilinear models of loss aversion 
Senators’ preference functions for ideological distance may also be nonlinear, in terms of loss 
aversion. Senators may be more (Figure 3.3) or less (Figure 3.3) sensitive to extreme changes. 
To address these possibilities, ideological distance measures in the loss aversion model were 
replaced, first with squared measures and then with square-root measures. These measures were 
then interacted with the dichotomous median change variable. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Curvilinear loss aversion, type 1 
Note: Figure displays the probability of a senator vote at various levels of seat change. In this case, incremental seat 
changes further from the senator (in either a positive or negative direction) are more influential relative to equivalent 
incremental seat changes closer to the senator. 
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Figure 3.4. Curvilinear loss aversion, type 2 
 
Note: Figure displays the probability of a senator vote at various levels of seat change. In this case, incremental seat 
changes further from the senator (in either a positive or negative direction) are less influential relative to equivalent 
incremental seat changes closer to the senator. 
3.1.10 Robustness check 10: Nominee qualifications × seat change interaction 
The influence of seat changes may be conditioned on nominee qualifications, so an additional 
model was estimated with an interaction between the lack of nominee qualifications variable and 
the unfavorable seat change variable. 
3.1.11 Robustness check 11: Seat change directionality 
Senators may perceive a seat change differently based on nominee ideology, where, for instance, 
an unfavorable 0.5-unit seat change toward the prior Court median has a different influence than 
a 0.5-unit seat change away from the prior Court median. A dichotomous variable was coded 
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with 1 indicating a nomination in which the nominee fell closer to the prior Court median than 
the senator did, and 0 otherwise. 
3.1.12 Robustness check 12: Segal-Cover nominee ideology scores 
Although first-year justice scores for confirmed nominees are highly correlated with Segal-Cover 
scores, these first-year scores are not available to senators at the time of the confirmation vote. 
Segal-Cover perceived nominee ideology scores, though, are based on information for which 
senators have access at the time of the confirmation vote, so the analysis was conducted using 
these scores. Segal-Cover nominee scores were regressed against first-year Bailey estimated 
ideal points for confirmed nominees to place the Segal-Cover values on the Bailey metric. Then 
the Bailey arrays were recalculated, as were the three ideological variables, and the main model 
was re-estimated. 
3.1.13 Robustness check 13: Including pre-Fortas 1968 observations 
The increased emphasis on ideology makes nominations starting in the 1960s, especially with the 
failed chief justice nomination of Abe Fortas, an attractive starting point, given the increased 
emphasis placed on ideology in recent times (Silverstein 1994). But to test if senator opposition 
has increased in the Fortas era, a model was estimated for nomination between Earl Warren in 
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1954 and Abe Fortas in 1968, with a combined model estimated for all nominations between Earl 
Warren in 1954 and Samuel Alito in 2006.28
3.1.14 Robustness check 14: Grouped by partisanship 
 
Shipan (2008) estimated models disaggregated by partisanship. Results indicated that ideology 
was much more influential on opposite-party senators than senators who belonged to the same 
political party as the president. To check if a similar phenomenon occurs with considerations of 
the departing justice, the baseline model was estimated separately on same-party and different 
party senators. 
3.1.15 Robustness check 15: Multiple presidential nominations 
Senators may be more likely to oppose a president’s nomination after the president has received 
multiple opportunities to appoint justices to the Supreme Court. To test this claim, a model was 
estimated in which a sequence of dichotomous variables were included indicating the number of 
previous successful nominations the president has made.29
                                                 
28 Bailey estimated ideal points for Daniel (TX) in 1954, Griswold (NE) in 1954, Upton (NH) in 1954, Barkley (KY) 
in 1954, Blakley (TX) in 1957, and Buttum (SD) in 1962 were not available. These observations were deleted from 
the analysis. The 1963 senator score was used for Jordan (ID) in 1962. 
 
29 Coding for this variable was as follows. First nominations: Eisenhower (Earl Warren), Kennedy (Byron White), 
Johnson (Abe Fortas), Nixon (Warren Burger), Ford (John Paul Stevens), Reagan (Sandra Day O’Connor), HW 
Bush (David Souter), Clinton (Ruth Bader Ginsburg), and W Bush (John Roberts). Second nominations: Eisenhower 
(John Harlan II), Kennedy (Arthur Goldberg), Johnson (Thurgood Marshall), Nixon (Clement Haynsworth, Harrold 
Carswell, and Harry Blackmun), Reagan (CJ William Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia), HW Bush (Clarence Thomas), 
Clinton (Stephen Breyer), and W Bush (Samuel Alito). Third nomination: Eisenhower (William Brennan), Johnson 
(CJ Abe Fortas), Nixon (Lewis Powell), Reagan (Robert Bork and Anthony Kennedy). Fourth nomination: 
Eisenhower (Charles Whittaker) and Nixon (William Rehnquist). Fifth nomination: Eisenhower (Potter Stewart). 
Note that the 1986 nominations of Antonin Scalia and William Rehnquist were considered to be a single nomination 
for the purpose of constructing this variable because their confirmation vote occurred on the same day. The 1971 
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3.1.16 Robustness check 16: Alternate reference point 
The Court median may also be a salient feature of Supreme Court nominations that senators may 
compare to the nominee. Therefore, a model was estimated in which the median justice of the 
previous nine-member Court was considered the reference point for senators in relation to the 
nominee. 
3.2 CONFIRMATION DELAY 
The confirmation delay hypotheses were tested on the 28 nominations from 1953 to 2006, 
excluding those not reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Homer Thornberry in 1968, 
and Harriet Miers in 2005) and nominations not officially submitted to the Senate (Douglas 
Ginsberg in 1987, and the associate justice nomination of John Roberts in 2005), but including 
the failed 1968 cloture vote on the elevation of associate justice Abe Fortas to chief justice. The 
failed cloture vote on the Fortas chief justice nomination was considered the final Senate action. 
Even though failed cloture is not the same end event as the other nominations (i.e., a final roll 
call vote), it is plausible to assume that a roll call vote on the Fortas nomination would have 
occurred on or near the date of the failed cloture, given that the three other Supreme Court 
nomination cloture votes were followed by a roll call vote on the same day. Moreover, the 
decision to code the Fortas cloture vote as the end event is also methodologically justified, since 
                                                                                                                                                             
nominations of Rehnquist and Lewis Powell were announced on the same day, but the confirmation vote for 
Rehnquist occurred four days after the vote for Powell, and so was considered to be a subsequent nomination. 
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there was presumably no risk of a roll call confirmation vote on the Fortas nomination after the 
failed cloture. 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
The two dependent variables for confirmation delay were measured as follows: Judiciary 
Committee extended from Senate receipt of a nomination30
                                                 
30 Dates for confirmation benchmarks were drawn from Rutkus and Bearden (2006). An alternate approach of 
starting the analysis with the presidential announcement of the nomination (with dates drawn from Garrett and 
Rutkus 2005) was less justified because the Senate cannot be considered to delay a nomination before it has been 
officially received. Moreover, there was a relatively high variation in the time between a presidential announcement 
of a nomination and its receipt in the Senate; half of nominations in the dataset were received on the same day as the 
announcement, but eight took a week or longer, including the nominations of Anthony Kennedy (19 days) and 
Sandra Day O’Connor (43 days). John Harlan II and John Roberts were both nominated twice. Harlan’s original 
nomination was received with less than a month remaining in the 83d Congress, which did not hold hearings on the 
nomination; Harlan was then re-nominated at the start of the 84th Congress. Roberts’ nomination was withdrawn 
after the death of Rehnquist, and Roberts was re-nominated to the chief justiceship on the same date. The earlier date 
for the Harlan and Roberts nominations was used, since the Senate had the interim time available to gather 
information about the nominees.  
 to the committee’s reporting of the 
nomination to the Senate, and Roll Call extended from the final committee report to the final 
Senate action on a nomination, whether a vote to confirm, a vote to reject, or a failed cloture. 
Figure 3.5 depicts the length of each of these phases, across nominations. 
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Figure 3.5. Duration of confirmation phases 
Note: Figure displays the number of days between Senate receipt of a US Supreme Court nomination and the 
Judiciary Committee report (phase 1), and the number of days between the Judiciary Committee report and the final 
roll call vote on the nomination. Days that the Senate was in recess were not excluded. 
3.2.2 Estimation technique 
The Cox proportional hazards model was employed to estimate durations, which is preferable to 
alternate parametric models because the Cox model does not require an assumption about the 
distribution of the baseline hazard (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). All models included 
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robust standard errors. Hypotheses were directional, so statistical significance tests were 
performed at the 0.05 level with a one-tailed test. 
The Cox proportional hazards model assumes that the effect of any variable on the risk of 
failure is constant over time. Schoenfeld residuals were analyzed to test if the assumption of 
proportionality holds for model variables, and a simple correction for any violation included an 
interaction with time for each offending covariate (Blossfeld, Golsch, and Rohwer 2007: 237).  
If the start and end dates of a particular phase for a particular nominee occurred on the 
same date, the end date was increased by one day to ensure that the nomination was not dropped 
from the analysis (following Binder and Maltzman 2002 and Shipan and Shannon 2003); this 
occurred for the 1962 White and 1962 Goldberg nominations, both of which had a Judiciary 
Committee report and Senate roll call vote on the same date. 
3.2.3 Recess days 
Previous research (e.g., McCarty and Razaghian 1999; Bell 2002; Shipan and Shannon 2003) has 
not removed dates in which the Senate was in recess from the count of days, which may 
introduce error into the modeling. The nomination of John Harlan, for example, was received in 
the Senate less than a month before the end of the 83d Congress, and languished for more than a 
month during a Thanksgiving recess and the interregnum between the 83d and 84th Congress. 
The 1987 Kennedy nomination sat during the period between the first and second session of the 
100th Congress, and the Scalia and Rehnquist nominations were stalled while the Senate 
recessed from mid-August to early September 1986. Table 3.2 lists the nominations that sat 
during Senate recesses and the number of days that the nominations were delayed in this fashion.  
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Table 3.2. Days the nomination sat while the Senate was in recess 
 
Judiciary  
Committee  
Phase 
Roll Call  
Phase 
John Harlan II 45 -- 
Potter Stewart 13 -- 
Thurgood Marshall 12 -- 
Abe Fortas (CJ) 47 -- 
Harrold Carswell 7 6 
Lewis Powell 5 6 
William Rehnquist 5 6 
Sandra Day O'Connor 22 -- 
William Rehnquist (CJ) 12 25 
Antonin Scalia 12 25 
Robert Bork 35 -- 
Anthony Kennedy 35 -- 
David Souter 38 -- 
Clarence Thomas 41 -- 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 13 -- 
Stephen Breyer 44 -- 
 
The advantage of including recess days is that those days represent genuine delay by the 
Senate in processing a nomination, and this delay may be a factor that influences senator action 
on a nomination. Senators and Senate staffers, for example, may use recess days to prepare for 
hearings or to meet with the president to discuss their confirmation vote. Senators may also use 
recess days to strategically delay the confirmation process. For these reasons, recess days should 
be included in the model. 
But inclusion of recess days has a major disadvantage: there is no risk of Senate action on 
a recess day. The Judiciary Committee could be ready to start hearings, or the Senate Majority 
Leader could be prepared to schedule a roll call vote, but a Senate recess would preclude these 
actions. Inclusion of recess days would therefore artificially inflate the number of days that the 
Senate needed to act. 
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The chosen methodology was to subtract recess days from the time periods to remove any 
time that Senate action was suspended and for which there is no risk of action. Days in which the 
Senate was in recess were removed from the baseline analysis, but were included in an alternate 
specification.31
3.2.4 Independent variables 
 
Bailey estimated ideal points were used to proxy ideology. Seat change and median change 
measures for the key senators (i.e., the Judiciary Committee chair and the Majority Leader)32
 Seat Change = | Key Senator – Nominee | – | Key Senator – Departing Justice | 
 
were calculated with the following formulas, with higher values coded as more unfavorable 
changes: 
 Median Change = | Key Senator – Potential Court median | – | Key Senator – Former 
Court median | 
Absolute ideological measures were calculated, for the absolute value of the difference 
between the key senator and the nominee and also for the absolute value of the difference 
between nominee and prior Court median ideology. Diagnostic tests were conducted to check for 
multicollinearity between the ideological variables. 
  
                                                 
31 Methodologically, the number of dates the Senate was in recess during the hearings phase was added to date the 
Senate received the nomination, and the number of dates the Senate was in recess during the roll call phase was 
subtracted from the date the Senate voted on the nomination. Recess dates were drawn from the US Senate website 
document, “Dates of Sessions of the Congress, present-1789,” retrieved June 26, 2009, from:  
http://senate.gov/reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm.  
32 The identity of the Judiciary Committee chair for each nomination was drawn from Nelson and Bensen (1993) 
and Canon, Nelson, and Stewart (2002). The identity of the Senate Majority Leader for each nomination was drawn 
from the Senate webpage, “Majority and Minority Leaders and Party Whips,” retrieved October 22, 2008, at:  
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Majority_Minority_Leaders.htm.  
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Other model variables included a lack of nominee qualifications, presidential disapproval, 
the presence of divided government, and the Congress in which the confirmation or cloture roll 
call was conducted. In addition, the length of the first phase was included as a control in the 
second phase, to control for any dependency between phase lengths. 
Models did not include several controls that often appear in analyses of confirmation 
delay. Critical nominations (Ruckman 1993) were omitted, since this measure was indirectly 
incorporated in the ideological variables. Also, the main models did not include a count of days 
remaining in a session or a dichotomous variable indicating a nomination submitted late in a 
session, since the Senate should not be expected to expedite the confirmation process to 
shoehorn in a nomination given the importance of the Supreme Court. End of session dates are 
determined by the Congress itself and can easily be extended, but, more importantly, the Senate 
can carry over a nomination to the next session by unanimous consent, which happened recently 
for the Anthony Kennedy nomination in November 1987 and the Samuel Alito nomination in 
November 2005. The end of a Congress may be a more justified expediting factor,33 but the sole 
nomination made with fewer than 30 days remaining in a Congress (that of John Harlan II in 
November 1954) lapsed without even a hearing, and the president resubmitted the nomination at 
the beginning of the next Congress.34
Also excluded was a control for nominations made by presidents in the final year of their 
term or for nominations made by lame duck presidents. Theoretically, the Senate may speed up a 
 
                                                 
33 The end of Congress date may influence the speed at which the Senate considers a nomination, but that influence 
may be quite complicated. Presumably, the influence is a non-linear function that has a negligible value until late in 
a Congress (perhaps around 60 days remaining) at which point a nomination would be slightly expedited so that it 
can be voted on before adjournment; however, at some point (perhaps around 25 days remaining), senators would be 
pessimistic about finishing the nomination before the end of Congress and therefore not proceed on it at all (so that 
the closeness of a nomination to the end of a Congress would actually elongate the process). 
34 The recess appointments of William Brennan and Potter Stewart were additional anomalies, with the recess 
appointment made in the Congress before the nomination was officially submitted to the Senate. 
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process to ensure that a nomination receives a roll call vote before the president leaves office and 
the nomination lapses, or, conversely, an oppositional Senate might use delay to derail a lame 
duck or last-year-of-term nomination; however, the only dataset observation that falls into either 
of these categories is Lyndon Johnson’s nomination of Abe Fortas in June 1968, which occurred 
so early in the final year of a presidency that any attempt to postpone a roll call vote on the 
nomination would have shattered all-time records for Supreme Court confirmation delay. 
3.2.5 Robustness check 1: Weibull specification 
A Weibull model was estimated as a robustness check, since the Cox model may suffer from bias 
if more than five percent of observations have the same duration, and parameter estimates can be 
less precise with small sample sizes (Yamaguchi 1991).  
3.2.6 Robustness check 2: Additional controls 
Some additional controls were included in alternate model specifications to assess the robustness 
of findings and to adjust for more idiosyncratic elements of nominations: the quarter of the 
presidential term in which the nomination was announced (coded as y modulo 4, where y is the 
year that the Senate received the nomination),35
                                                 
35 The modulo function returns the remainder from a division operation, so, for example, 2009 modulo 4 would 
return a value of 1, indicating the first year of a presidential term, in this case, the inaugural year of the Obama 
administration.  
 recess appointments (a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 for a nominee currently serving on the Supreme Court under a recess appointment), and 
nominations made during the period of the Court’s summer recess, which typically extends from 
early June to the first Monday in October (coded 1 for a nomination in June, July, August, or 
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September). The recess and summer variables accounted for the possibility that the urgency of 
completing the confirmation process is lessened when justices are already serving on the Court 
or while the Court is out of session. 
3.2.7 Robustness check 3: Overlapping nominations 
An alternate specification controlled for overlapping nominations, with a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 for both nominations if the Senate received a nomination while it was still considering 
another nomination. The alternate model also included robust standard errors clustered by 
overlapping nomination to avoid the assumption that simultaneous nominations were 
independent observations. 
3.2.8 Robustness check 4: Recess days 
A robustness check was conducted with recess days included in the total count for the dependent 
variables. 
3.3 PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION OF A NOMINEE 
The six models of presidential constraint predict various locations for the ideal point of a 
Supreme Court nominee. Determination of these predicted ideal points required the use of ideal 
point estimates for presidents, senators, justices, and nominees. Estimated ideological ideal 
points for presidents, senators, and justices were drawn from Bailey and Maltzman (2009). 
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Bailey estimated ideal points were available for presidents from 1950 to 2008, for 
senators from 1951 to 2008, and for justices from 1950 to 2008.36
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
 The dataset therefore included 
all Supreme Court appointments from Earl Warren in 1953 to Samuel Alito in 2006, including 
nominations announced by the president but not officially submitted to the Senate (Douglas 
Ginsberg in 1987, the associate justice nomination of John Roberts in 2005, and Harriet Miers in 
2005) and those received in the Senate but not reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
(Homer Thornberry in 1968). 
Models predict the dependent variable of nominee ideology. Bailey estimated ideal points were 
not available for Supreme Court nominees, so nominee ideology was proxied as the first 
available Bailey estimated ideal point for a justice, which required only the assumption that 
senators have information about the potential voting behavior of a nominee in the justice’s first 
year on the Court.37
  
 Table 3.3 lists presidential and nominee ideal points. 
                                                 
36 Bailey estimated ideal points were retrieved from personal correspondence with Michael Bailey (September 28, 
2009). President and Senate median scores were drawn from the year in which the confirmation or cloture vote 
occurred, and justice arrays were constructed based on ideal points drawn from the year prior to the appointment, 
except for Anthony Kennedy, nominated at the end of November, and for Samuel Alito, nominated in November. 
37 Two nominees (Abe Fortas and William Rehnquist) were serving on the Court at the time of their nomination to 
the chief justiceship; Bailey estimated ideal points from the justice arrays described later were used for these 
nominees. Other nominees (Homer Thornberry, G. Harrold Carswell, Clement Haynsworth, Robert Bork, Douglas 
Ginsberg, and Harriet Miers) were not confirmed and therefore did not serve on the Court, which necessitated 
imputation of their Bailey score. Segal-Cover nominee perceived ideology scores and first year Bailey estimated 
ideal points for the 23 nominees between 1951 and 2006 who were not already serving on the Court (Earl Warren to 
Samuel Alito) were used to create a bridging equation to place these three rejected nominees on the Bailey metric. 
First year justice Bailey estimated ideal points and Segal-Cover nominee perceived ideology scores correlated at -
0.84 (p≤0.01). Segal-Cover nominee perceived ideology scores were drawn from “Perceived Qualifications and 
Ideology of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2005,” retrieved on September 8, 2008, from Jeffrey Segal’s website  
(http://www.sunysb.edu/polsci/jsegal/qualtable.pdf), with scores for Homer Thornberry and Douglas Ginsberg 
drawn from Cameron and Park (2009). 
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Table 3.3. President and nominee ideal points 
Nominee P N  Nominee P N 
Warren (CJ) -0.05 -1.00 Rehnquist (AJ) 0.83 1.15 
Harlan II -0.05 -0.19 Stevens 0.78 -0.38 
Brennan -0.05 -0.94 O’Connor 1.15 0.68 
Whittaker -0.05 0.28 Rehnquist (CJ) 1.15 1.21 
Stewart -0.05 0.17 Scalia 1.15 0.59 
White -1.37 -0.42 Bork 1.15 0.71 
Goldberg -1.37 -1.69 Ginsberg 1.15 0.65 
Fortas (AJ) -1.05 -1.61 Kennedy 1.15 0.40 
Marshall -1.05 -1.43 Souter 1.11 -0.01 
Fortas (CJ) -1.05 -1.61 Thomas 1.11 1.10 
Thornberry -1.05 -1.21 Ginsburg -0.88 -0.57 
Burger (CJ) 0.83 0.66 Breyer -0.88 -0.48 
Haynsworth 0.83 0.58 Roberts (AJ) 1.11 0.79 
Carswell 0.83 0.83 Roberts (CJ) 1.11 0.79 
Blackmun 0.83 0.58 Miers 1.11 0.34 
Powell 0.83 0.29 Alito 1.11 0.84 
 
3.3.2 Pivotal senator 
Modeling political phenomena often requires simplifying assumptions to reduce processes to 
their core elements. Presidents issue a great deal of nominations to federal offices; most are 
confirmed without controversy, but those that fail are usually derailed before the final roll call 
vote (Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998). Supreme Court nominations are of such high stakes, 
though, that presidents can be confident that, in all but the most extraordinary circumstances, 
their nominations will not fail before a floor vote (see Moraski and Shipan 1999: 1092-3 for a 
discussion of the Judiciary Committee not serving as a gatekeeper that may derail a 
nomination).38
                                                 
38 No modern Supreme Court nomination has been defeated in the Judiciary Committee.  
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 A nomination can also be defeated through a filibuster, but only one Supreme Court 
nomination has ever been withdrawn after a failed cloture vote (the 1968 chief justice 
nomination of associate justice Abe Fortas), and in only three other cases have cloture votes been 
attempted to close debate on a nomination. The distribution of roll call votes in these three cases 
indicated that some senators who opposed the nomination were unwilling to support a filibuster 
to defeat the nomination: in 1986, the Senate voted 68 to 31 to end debate on the Rehnquist chief 
justice nomination, and that same day confirmed the nomination, 65 to 33; in 2006, 72 senators 
voted to end debate on the Alito nomination, but only 58 senators voted to confirm; and in 1971, 
the Senate confirmed the Rehnquist associate justice nomination 68 to 26 even though earlier 
that day cloture failed 54 to 42.  
Models presented below therefore presume that the only method of Senate rejection is 
through a roll call vote by the full Senate, so the median senator was considered the pivotal 
member of the Senate. 
3.3.3 Departing justice constraint 
To determine the predicted nominee ideal point of presidents operating under the departing 
justice constraint, departing justice winsets were calculated as follows, where values are 
expressed as Bailey estimated ideal points: 
 Departing justice winset = {median senator – | median senator – departing justice |, 
median senator + | median senator – departing justice |} 
The next step was to determine if the location of the nominee fell on or within the median 
senator’s departing justice winset. If so, then the president was predicted to nominate at the 
presidential ideal point; but if the nominee fell outside the median senator’s departing justice 
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winset, then the president was predicted to nominate at the edge of the departing justice winset 
closest to the presidential ideal point. 
Table 3.4 presents ideal points and edges of the departing justice winset. Gray rows 
indicate presidents operating under the departing justice constraint, and clear rows indicate 
unconstrained presidents. Horizontal lines divide nominations by appointing president. P, S, and 
D respectively refer to ideal points of the president, Senate median, and the departing justice. 
Predicted N refers to the predicted nominee ideal point. 
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Table 3.4. Predicted N: Departing justice consideration 
Nominee Departing Justice P S D 
Dep. Just. 
Winset 
Predicted  
N 
Warren (CJ) Vinson -0.05 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.73 0.65 
Harlan II Jackson -0.05 0.66 0.29 0.29 1.03 0.29 
Brennan Minton -0.05 0.46 0.74 0.18 0.74 0.18 
Whittaker Reed -0.05 0.38 0.80 -0.04 0.8 -0.04 
Stewart Burton -0.05 0.32 0.52 0.12 0.52 0.12 
White Whittaker -1.37 -0.01 0.28 -0.30 0.28 -0.30 
Goldberg Frankfurter -1.37 -0.01 0.49 -0.51 0.49 -0.51 
Fortas (AJ) Goldberg -1.05 -0.33 -1.69 -1.69 1.03 -1.05 
Marshall Clark -1.05 -0.35 0.06 -0.76 0.06 -0.76 
Fortas (CJ) Warren -1.05 -0.38 -1.35 -1.35 0.59 -1.05 
Thornberry Fortas -1.05 -0.38 -1.61 -1.61 0.85 -1.05 
Burger (CJ) Warren 0.83 -0.47 -1.37 -1.37 0.43 0.43 
Haynsworth Fortas 0.83 -0.47 -1.61 -1.61 0.67 0.67 
Carswell Fortas 0.83 -0.55 -1.61 -1.61 0.51 0.51 
Blackmun Fortas 0.83 -0.55 -1.61 -1.61 0.51 0.51 
Powell Black 0.83 -0.57 -0.26 -0.88 -0.26 -0.26 
Rehnquist (AJ) Harlan 0.83 -0.57 0.00 -1.14 0.00 0.00 
Stevens Douglas 0.78 -0.53 -1.88 -1.88 0.82 0.78 
O’Connor Stewart 1.15 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.13 
Rehnquist (CJ) Burger 1.15 -0.10 0.76 -0.96 0.76 0.76 
Scalia Rehnquist 1.15 -0.10 1.21 -1.41 1.21 1.15 
Bork Powell 1.15 -0.21 0.32 -0.74 0.32 0.32 
Ginsberg Powell 1.15 -0.21 0.32 -0.74 0.32 0.32 
Kennedy Powell 1.15 -0.21 0.32 -0.74 0.32 0.32 
Souter Brennan 1.11 -0.27 -1.75 -1.75 1.21 1.11 
Thomas Marshall 1.11 -0.41 -2.01 -2.01 1.19 1.11 
Ginsburg White -0.88 -0.44 0.51 -1.39 0.51 -0.88 
Breyer Blackmun -0.88 -0.44 -1.21 -1.21 0.33 -0.88 
Roberts (AJ) O’Connor 1.11 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.43 0.43 
Roberts (CJ) Rehnquist 1.11 0.32 0.96 -0.32 0.96 0.96 
Miers O’Connor 1.11 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.43 0.43 
Alito O’Connor 1.11 0.32 0.18 0.18 0.46 0.46 
 
For example, values indicate that President Dwight Eisenhower was constrained by 
departing justice considerations for his first nomination, which became that of Earl Warren. The 
Senate median fell relatively close to the departing justice (0.04 units), so the departing justice 
winset was small, ranging from 0.65 to 0.73. If Eisenhower nominated someone at his ideal point 
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of -0.05, the nominee would fall much further than the departing justice from the Senate median, 
and the median senator would be expected to oppose the nomination. Eisenhower was therefore 
predicted to nominate someone with an ideal point of 0.65, the edge of the departing justice 
winset closest to his ideal point. 
 Presidents were constrained from nominating at their ideal point due to the departing 
justice winset for 23 of the 32 dataset appointments (72 percent), including three of the four 
nominations that the Senate rejected (Carswell, Haynsworth, and Bork, but not Fortas). 
Constraint closely tracked presidential administration: presidents were always or never 
constrained along the departing justice dimension for each of their Supreme Court appointments, 
except for Lyndon Johnson’s replacement of Tom Clark and Ronald Reagan’s replacement of 
William Rehnquist as associate justice. 
3.3.4 Court mean constraint 
The Court mean constraint was calculated as follows. First, the distance between the ideal point 
of the median senator and each member of the prior nine-member Court was calculated and 
averaged. Then the distance between the ideal point of the median senator and each member of 
the prior nine-member Court – but with the departing justice replaced with the president – was 
calculated and averaged. If the average distance was smaller with the president as a member of 
the Court than with the departing justice as a member of the Court, then the president was 
considered to be unconstrained and was predicted to nominate at the presidential ideal point. If 
the average distance was larger with the president as a member of the Court than with the 
departing justice as a member of the Court, then the president was predicted to nominate 
someone with an ideal point that was as close to the presidential ideal point as possible without 
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moving the mean Court ideology from the median senator. Table 3.5 lists the values of predicted 
nominee ideal points under this constraint. Note that the predictions in each case, although not 
necessary, nonetheless fall at the same location as the predicted ideal points in the departing 
justice constraint. 
 
Table 3.5. Predicted N: Court mean consideration 
Nominee Departing Justice P D 
Prior 
Mean Dist 
Unconstrained 
Mean Dist 
Predicted  
N 
Warren (CJ) Vinson -0.05 0.65 0.800 0.878 0.65 
Harlan II Jackson -0.05 0.29 0.966 1.003 0.29 
Brennan Minton -0.05 0.74 0.884 0.910 0.18 
Whittaker Reed -0.05 0.80 0.982 0.983 -0.04 
Stewart Burton -0.05 0.52 0.883 1.049 0.12 
White Whittaker -1.37 0.28 0.877 0.996 -0.30 
Goldberg Frankfurter -1.37 0.49 0.890 0.950 -0.51 
Fortas (AJ) Goldberg -1.05 -1.69 0.859 0.788 -1.05 
Marshall Clark -1.05 0.06 0.791 0.823 -0.76 
Fortas (CJ) Warren -1.05 -1.35 0.757 0.629 -1.05 
Thornberry Fortas -1.05 -1.61 0.757 0.694 -1.05 
Burger (CJ) Warren 0.83 -1.37 0.780 0.824 0.43 
Haynsworth Fortas 0.83 -1.61 0.806 0.823 0.67 
Carswell Fortas 0.83 -1.61 0.787 0.822 0.51 
Blackmun Fortas 0.83 -1.61 0.787 0.822 0.51 
Powell Black 0.83 -0.26 0.808 0.929 -0.26 
Rehnquist (AJ) Harlan 0.83 0.00 0.869 0.961 0.00 
Stevens Douglas 0.78 -1.88 0.987 0.982 0.78 
O’Connor Stewart 1.15 0.13 0.686 0.799 0.13 
Rehnquist (CJ) Burger 1.15 0.76 0.853 0.762 0.76 
Scalia Rehnquist 1.15 1.21 0.769 0.762 1.15 
Bork Powell 1.15 0.32 0.884 0.977 0.32 
Ginsberg Powell 1.15 0.32 0.884 0.967 0.32 
Kennedy Powell 1.15 0.32 0.892 0.984 0.32 
Souter Brennan 1.11 -1.75 0.978 0.967 1.11 
Thomas Marshall 1.11 -2.01 1.034 1.026 1.11 
Ginsburg White -0.88 0.51 0.962 0.906 -0.88 
Breyer Blackmun -0.88 -1.21 0.969 0.932 -0.88 
Roberts (AJ) O’Connor 1.11 0.21 0.803 0.879 0.43 
Roberts (CJ) Rehnquist 1.11 0.96 0.803 0.820 0.96 
Miers O’Connor 1.11 0.21 0.784 0.860 0.43 
Alito O’Connor 1.11 0.18 0.786 0.858 0.46 
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3.3.5 Court median constraint 
To determine if presidents constrain their nominations because of Court median considerations, 
the distance between the ideal points of the Senate median and the median justice of the prior 
nine-member Court was calculated. Then the distance between the ideal points of the Senate 
median and the median justice of the new nine-member Court – presuming that the president 
nominated as the presidential ideal point – was calculated. If this second distance was less than 
the first distance, then the president was predicted to nominate at the presidential ideal point. If 
not, then the president was predicted to nominate at the location closest to the presidential ideal 
point as possible without increasing the Senate-median-to-Court-median distance. Table 3.6 lists 
the predicted nominee ideal points based on the Court median constraint. 
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Table 3.6. Predicted N: Court median consideration 
Nominee Departing Justice P Predicted N 
Warren (CJ) Vinson -0.05 0.39 
Harlan II Jackson -0.05 0.29 
Brennan Minton -0.05 -0.01 
Whittaker Reed -0.05 -0.05 
Stewart Burton -0.05 0.04 
White Whittaker -1.37 -0.05 
Goldberg Frankfurter -1.37 -0.42 
Fortas (AJ) Goldberg -1.05 -1.05 
Marshall Clark -1.05 -0.97 
Fortas (CJ) Warren -1.05 -1.05 
Thornberry Fortas -1.05 -1.05 
Burger (CJ) Warren 0.83 0.83 
Haynsworth Fortas 0.83 -0.30 
Carswell Fortas 0.83 -0.46 
Blackmun Fortas 0.83 -0.46 
Powell Black 0.83 -0.26 
Rehnquist (AJ) Harlan 0.83 0.83 
Stevens Douglas 0.78 0.03 
O’Connor Stewart 1.15 0.13 
Rehnquist (CJ) Burger 1.15 1.15 
Scalia Rehnquist 1.15 1.15 
Bork Powell 1.15 0.32 
Ginsberg Powell 1.15 0.32 
Kennedy Powell 1.15 0.32 
Souter Brennan 1.11 0.41 
Thomas Marshall 1.11 0.40 
Ginsburg White -0.88 -0.88 
Breyer Blackmun -0.88 -0.88 
Roberts (AJ) O’Connor 1.11 1.11 
Roberts (CJ) Rehnquist 1.11 1.11 
Miers O’Connor 1.11 1.11 
Alito O’Connor 1.11 1.11 
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3.3.6 No constraint 
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 on the previous pages contain presidential ideal points, which were used as 
predictions of nominee ideology for the scenario in which the president does not constrain 
nominations because of ideological considerations. 
3.3.7 Conditional deference: partisanship 
The first step in calculating predicted nominee ideal points for models in which presidents offer 
conditional deference based on partisanship was to determine if the nomination was announced 
when the Senate was controlled by an opposition party. If the nomination was announced when 
the president’s party controlled the Senate, then the predicted nominee ideal point was at the 
presidential ideal point; but if the nomination was announced when an opposition party 
controlled the Senate, then the predicted nominee ideal points were the predicted nominee ideal 
points based on Court median considerations and Court mean considerations. Table 3.7 presents 
these predicted nominee ideal points. 
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Table 3.7. Predicted N: Partisanship constraints 
Nominee Departing Justice 
Divided 
Government 
Predicted N 
Partisanship 
& 
Court Mean 
Partisanship 
& 
Court Median 
Warren (CJ) Vinson 1 0.65 0.39 
Harlan II Jackson 0 -0.05 -0.05 
Brennan Minton 1 0.18 -0.01 
Whittaker Reed 1 -0.04 -0.05 
Stewart Burton 1 0.12 0.04 
White Whittaker 0 -1.37 -1.37 
Goldberg Frankfurter 0 -1.37 -1.37 
Fortas (AJ) Goldberg 0 -1.05 -1.05 
Marshall Clark 0 -1.05 -1.05 
Fortas (CJ) Warren 0 -1.05 -1.05 
Thornberry Fortas 0 -1.05 -1.05 
Burger (CJ) Warren 1 0.43 0.83 
Haynsworth Fortas 1 0.67 -0.30 
Carswell Fortas 1 0.51 -0.46 
Blackmun Fortas 1 0.51 -0.46 
Powell Black 1 -0.26 -0.26 
Rehnquist (AJ) Harlan 1 0.00 0.83 
Stevens Douglas 1 0.78 0.03 
O’Connor Stewart 0 1.15 1.15 
Rehnquist (CJ) Burger 0 1.15 1.15 
Scalia Rehnquist 0 1.15 1.15 
Bork Powell 1 0.32 0.32 
Ginsberg Powell 1 0.32 0.32 
Kennedy Powell 1 0.32 0.32 
Souter Brennan 1 1.11 0.41 
Thomas Marshall 1 1.11 0.40 
Ginsburg White 0 -0.88 -0.88 
Breyer Blackmun 0 -0.88 -0.88 
Roberts (AJ) O’Connor 0 1.11 1.11 
Roberts (CJ) Rehnquist 0 1.11 1.11 
Miers O’Connor 0 1.11 1.11 
Alito O’Connor 0 1.11 1.11 
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3.3.8 Conditional deference: partisanship and nominee extremism 
Table 3.8 presents values used to determine predicted nominee ideal points for the partisanship 
and nominee extremism model, listing the mean and standard deviation (std) of the estimated 
ideal points of the prior nine-member Court, the leftmost and rightmost edge of the extreme 
ranges (defined as one standard deviation from the mean), the presence of divided government, 
and the predicted nominee ideal point, which was restricted to fall on or within one standard 
deviation of the Court’s mean ideology.39
 
 
  
                                                 
39 If the nominee extremism range was defined as two standard deviations from the mean, the only constrained 
observation would be the Nixon nomination to replace Earl Warren. 
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Table 3.8. Predicted N: Nominee extremism 
Nominee Departing Justice Mean Std Left Right P 
Divided 
Gov’t. 
Predicted 
N 
Warren (CJ) Vinson -0.07 0.99 -1.07 0.92 -0.05 1 -0.05 
Harlan II Jackson -0.26 1.02 -1.28 0.76 -0.05 0 -0.05 
Brennan Minton -0.28 1.05 -1.33 0.77 -0.05 1 -0.05 
Whittaker Reed -0.46 1.00 -1.46 0.53 -0.05 1 -0.05 
Stewart Burton -0.49 1.00 -1.49 0.52 -0.05 1 -0.05 
White Whittaker -0.50 1.04 -1.54 0.54 -1.37 0 -1.37 
Goldberg Frankfurter -0.58 1.00 -1.58 0.42 -1.37 0 -1.37 
Fortas (AJ) Goldberg -0.84 0.94 -1.78 0.10 -1.05 0 -1.05 
Marshall Clark -0.83 0.88 -1.72 0.05 -1.05 0 -1.05 
Fortas (CJ) Warren -0.84 0.86 -1.69 0.02 -1.05 0 -1.05 
Thornberry Fortas -0.84 0.86 -1.69 0.02 -1.05 0 -1.05 
Burger (CJ) Warren -0.98 0.81 -1.79 -0.17 0.83 1 -0.17 
Haynsworth Fortas -0.76 0.96 -1.71 0.20 0.83 1 0.20 
Carswell Fortas -0.75 0.94 -1.69 0.20 0.83 1 0.20 
Blackmun Fortas -0.75 0.94 -1.69 0.20 0.83 1 0.20 
Powell Black -0.49 0.96 -1.45 0.47 0.83 1 0.47 
Rehnquist (AJ) Harlan -0.43 0.99 -1.42 0.57 0.83 1 0.57 
Stevens Douglas -0.25 1.09 -1.34 0.84 0.78 1 0.78 
O’Connor Stewart -0.09 0.95 -1.03 0.86 1.15 0 1.15 
Rehnquist (CJ) Burger -0.14 1.02 -1.17 0.88 1.15 0 1.15 
Scalia Rehnquist -0.26 1.03 -1.29 0.78 1.15 0 1.15 
Bork Powell -0.17 1.04 -1.21 0.87 1.15 1 0.87 
Ginsberg Powell -0.17 1.04 -1.21 0.87 1.15 1 0.87 
Kennedy Powell -0.22 1.04 -1.26 0.82 1.15 1 0.82 
Souter Brennan -0.26 1.12 -1.38 0.86 1.11 1 0.86 
Thomas Marshall -0.28 1.16 -1.44 0.88 1.11 1 0.88 
Ginsburg White 0.23 0.84 -0.61 1.07 -0.88 0 -0.88 
Breyer Blackmun 0.21 0.88 -0.67 1.08 -0.88 0 -0.88 
Roberts (AJ) O’Connor 0.02 0.93 -0.91 0.94 1.11 0 1.11 
Roberts (CJ) Rehnquist 0.02 0.93 -0.91 0.94 1.11 0 1.11 
Miers O’Connor 0.00 0.91 -0.91 0.90 1.11 0 1.11 
Alito O’Connor -0.01 0.90 -0.91 0.89 1.11 0 1.11 
 
3.3.9 Estimation technique 
The dependent variable of nominee ideal point was estimated with ordinary least squares 
regression. Presidents often issued multiple appointments, so observations were clustered by 
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president. The six non-nested models were compared with each other in terms of Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC), following Primo, Binder, and Maltzman (2008). 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Previous chapters outlined the theory of reference dependence and applied the theory to Supreme 
Court nominations, deriving testable hypotheses in three areas: senator confirmation voting, 
Senate confirmation delay in processing a nomination, and presidential selection of a nominee. 
This chapter described the research design for testing these hypotheses, including several 
robustness checks. The next three chapters present the results from the analysis. 
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4.0  EMPIRICAL RESULTS, SENATOR OPPOSITION 
The theory of the departing justice indicates that the justice who has left the Court provides a 
reference point for persons judging a nomination. Applying this theory to confirmation voting 
results in the hypothesis that senators are more likely to oppose a nomination the greater the 
potential the nomination has to move the ideology of the vacant seat away from their ideal point. 
This hypothesis was tested on the nineteen Supreme Court nominations for which the Senate 
advised and consented – or rejected – between 1968 (Abe Fortas) and 2006 (Samuel Alito). 
Results from the analysis are presented in this chapter. 
4.1 RESULTS 
Inspection of the raw data provided some preliminary support for the seat change hypothesis. 
The mean value of the seat change variable for senators opposing a nomination was 0.69, 
indicating a move away from the senator, while the mean value of seat change for senators 
supporting a nomination was -0.32, indicating a move toward the senator. To give some 
perspective on the Bailey metric, the minimum observed dataset value was -2.16 (Michigan 
senator Philip Hart), and the maximum observed value was 2.44 (Alabama senator Joseph Lister 
Hill). The mean senator Bailey estimated ideal point for the 1,900 observations of senators 
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serving at the time of a confirmation or cloture roll call was -0.15, with a standard deviation of 
1.10. 
Figure 4.1 presents correlational data in support of the seat change hypothesis, depicting 
the number of senators opposing a nomination for two levels of seat change: gray dots denote 
senators closer to the nominee than to the departing justice (indicating a favorable seat change), 
and black dots denote senators closer to the departing justice than to the nominee (indicating an 
unfavorable seat change). Senators facing unfavorable seat changes accounted for 86 percent of 
instances of senator opposition (352 of 410). 
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Figure 4.1. Seat changes and senator opposition 
Note: Figure displays the number of senators opposing a nomination. Gray dots indicate senators closer to the 
nominee than to the departing justice, and black dots indicate senators closer to the departing justice than to the 
nominee. Numbers in square brackets denote the total number of senators opposing the nomination. CJ = chief 
justice nomination. 
  
Additional evidence in favor of the seat change hypothesis is provided by regressions 
controlling for other factors. Table 4.1 presents coefficients and standard errors from a probit 
regression predicting senator opposition to Supreme Court nominations.  
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Table 4.1. Senator opposition to US Supreme Court nominations (1968-2006) 
 
Baseline 
Model 4.0 
All Nominations 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
Increased ideological distance 0.97 (0.22) 
Lack of nominee qualifications 3.69 (0.57) 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
Number of observations 1883 
Number of clusters 19 
Pseudo R2 0.54 
Percent correctly predicted 0.89 
Percent modal category 0.78 
Percent reduction of error 0.52 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a Supreme Court nomination over the seventeen Supreme Court 
nominations between the 1968 Fortas chief justice nomination and the 2006 Alito associate justice nomination. 
Models were estimated with probit, with robust standard errors clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 
(one-tailed test). Percent reduction of error statistics were derived from the precalc utility designed by Frederick J. 
Boehmke (http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html). 
 
  
 Results replicated previous findings, with increased ideological distance, a lack of 
nominee qualifications, a lack of presidential approval, and partisan differences associating with 
an increased probability of senator opposition (see, for example, Segal, Cameron, and Cover 
1992; Epstein et al. 2006; Shipan 2008). The model also provides evidence that senator 
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preferences are influenced by the contrast between the nominee and the departing justice, such 
that potential movement of the seat away from a senator correlates with an increased likelihood 
of opposition to a nomination. 
More specifically, the predicted probability of senator opposition to a nomination was 6 
percent, with all model variables set to their mean.40
Figure 4.2 presents the substantive effect of seat changes on senator preferences. For 
senators of the same party as the president, the point estimate for the predicted probability of 
senator opposition rose from 0 percent when seat change was set to a value one standard 
deviation below its observed mean for same party senators to 4 percent when seat change was set 
to a value one standard deviation above its observed mean for same party senators. For senators 
of a different party than the president, the corresponding predicted probabilities were 8 percent 
and 37 percent, indicating that seat changes can be substantial influences on senator preferences 
regarding a Supreme Court nomination. 
 For a one standard deviation increase in 
ideological distance, the predicted probability fell to 1.5 percent, and for a one standard deviation 
decrease in ideological distance, predicted probability rose to 21 percent. Standard deviation 
changes for the lack of nominee qualifications variable ranged from 1 percent to 28 percent, 3 
percent to 13 percent for presidential disapproval variable, and 2 percent to 16 percent for the 
partisanship variable. 
                                                 
40 Unless otherwise indicated, predicted probabilities in this chapter were calculated with all variables at their mean. 
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Figure 4.2. The influence of seat change, by partisanship 
Note: Figure depicts the predicted probability that a senator opposes a nomination at various levels of observed seat 
change, with all other model variables at their mean. Dots denote point estimates, and vertical bars indicate 95 
percent confidence intervals. Black dots indicate senators of a different party than the president, and white dots 
indicate senators of the same party as the president. The means and standard deviations of the seat change variable 
were 0.17 and 1.08 for different party senators, and -0.37 and 1.04 for same party senators. Predicted probabilities 
were generated with Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). 
 
 
The influence of seat changes rivaled that of ideological distance and nominee 
qualifications. The respective predicted probabilities for ideological distance were 0 percent to 4 
percent (same party senators, with ideological distance set one standard deviation below and 
above its observed mean for same party senators) and 9 percent to 49 percent (different party 
senators, with ideological distance set one standard deviation below and above its observed mean 
for different party senators). For a lack of nominee qualifications, the corresponding predicted 
probabilities were 0 percent to 12 percent (same party senators) and 3 percent to 50 percent 
(different party senators).  
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Several robustness checks for Model 1 were conducted and reported in Table 4.2. Model 
4.1 included a temporal control for the Congress in which the confirmation or cloture roll call 
occurred, a control for chief justice nominations, and a control for party polarization, but when 
added separately to the main model, the chief justice, party polarization, and Congress variables 
failed to reach statistical significant (p=0.90, 0.22, and 0.30, respectively).  
Model 4.2 predicted the recorded roll call vote, coded 1 for a vote against cloture or 
confirmation, and 0 for a vote in favor of cloture or confirmation. Results were essentially the 
same as those from the baseline model in terms of statistical and substantive significance. 
For Model 4.3, potential median change values for the Fortas and Rehnquist chief justice 
nominations were based on the interim eight-member Court, and, for Model 4.4, the Fortas 
cloture vote was excluded because a vote to end debate may reflect only opposition to the use of 
a filibuster to block the appointment and not necessarily carry any information regarding 
preferences about the nomination itself. Again, no inferences drawn from these models were 
different than inferences drawn from the baseline model.   
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Table 4.2. Robustness checks 1 to 4 for senator opposition 
 Baseline Check 1 Check 2 Check 3 Check 4 
 
Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 Model 4.4 
Senator 
Opposition 
Additional 
Controls Roll Calls 
Alternate 
Median 
No Cloture 
Votes 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
0.54 
(0.13) 
0.47 
(0.15) 
0.47 
(0.15) 
0.50 
(0.16) 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
-0.69 
(0.48) 
-0.31 
(0.45) 
-0.19 
(0.51) 
-0.34 
(0.40) 
Increased  
ideological distance 
0.97 
(0.22) 
0.97 
(0.19) 
1.00 
(0.25) 
0.95 
(0.23) 
0.90 
(0.27) 
Lack of nominee  
qualifications 
3.69 
(0.57) 
3.63 
(0.53) 
3.64 
(0.57) 
3.66 
(0.58) 
3.62 
(0.58) 
Presidential  
disapproval 
3.70 
(1.67) 
2.47 
(2.27) 
3.53 
(1.68) 
3.70 
(1.69) 
3.49 
(1.96) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
1.11 
(0.14) 
1.13 
(0.16) 
1.14 
(0.16) 
1.18 
(0.17) 
Chief justice --- -0.20 (0.34) --- --- --- 
Party polarization --- 5.70 (9.56) --- --- --- 
Congress --- -0.07 (0.16) --- --- --- 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
2.43 
(10.73) 
-1.78 
(0.86) 
-1.77 
(0.86) 
-1.69 
(0.88) 
Number of observations 1883 1883 1883 1883 1787 
Number of clusters 19 19 19 19 18 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.53 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable for Model 4.2 is the recorded roll call vote. For all other models, the dependent variable is 
senator opposition to a nomination. Models were estimated with probit, and robust standard errors were clustered by 
nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). Model 4.1 included a control for the Congress in which the 
roll call occurred. Model 4.3 used eight-member interim Court values to calculate the potential median change for 
the Fortas and Rehnquist chief justice nominations. Model 4.4 excluded the Fortas cloture vote. Eleven failures and 
0 successes were completely determined in Model 4.1. 
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Model 4.5, presented in Table 4.3, was estimated with the alternate median change 
control, with median change coded +1, 0, or -1, but results were essentially as in the baseline 
model for the other variables, although the unfavorable median change variable, while not 
significant, was signed as expected. 
Table 4.3 contains another robustness check, Model 4.6a, with a model that includes a 
control for state level public opinion about a nomination. State-level public opinion was 
statistically significant and in the expected direction, consistent with results from Kastellec, Lax, 
and Phillips (2008) and with the implications of Overby et al. (1992).  
One methodological problem, though, was that the limited number of observations for 
which public opinion data was available reduced the number of observations by more than half. 
The coefficient for seat change in this model was not statistically significant, but that may only 
indicate that seat change serves as an indirect influence through state level public opinion; note 
also that a lack of nominee qualifications loses statistical significance in the presence of the state 
public opinion control.  
Model 4.6b was therefore estimated on the observations restricted to those for which state 
public opinion data was available, suggesting that the loss of statistical significance for the seat 
change variable was due to the elimination of more than half of the observations and not 
necessarily the presence of state level public opinion as a control. 
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Table 4.3. Robustness checks 5 and 6 for senator opposition 
 Baseline Check 5 Check 6 
 
Model 4.0 Model 4.5 Model 4.6a 
Model 
4.6b 
Senator 
Opposition 
Alternate 
Median Constituency Concerns 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
0.36 
(0.16) 
-0.09 
(0.28) 
0.37 
(0.30) 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
0.21 
(0.30) 
6.68 
(3.42) 
1.64 
(4.08) 
Increased ideological distance 0.97 (0.22) 
0.96 
(0.22) 
1.21 
(0.25) 
1.02 
(0.35) 
Lack of nominee qualifications 3.69 (0.57) 
3.70 
(0.56) 
1.28 
(0.96) 
2.35 
(1.26) 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
3.61 
(1.67) 
0.68 
(1.77) 
2.83 
(2.68) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
1.07 
(0.16) 
2.28 
(0.20) 
1.34 
(0.19) 
State public opinion against a nomination --- --- 0.10 (0.01) --- 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
-1.74 
(0.85) 
3.10 
(1.31) 
-2.55 
(0.75) 
Number of observations 1883 1883 900 900 
Number of clusters 19 19 9 9 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.55 0.69 0.52 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable for all models is senator opposition to a nomination. Models were estimated with probit, 
and robust standard errors were clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). Model 4.5 
used a trichotomous median change variable (-1 for potential median movement toward the senator, +1 for 
movement away, and 0 for no change). Model 4.6a contained a control for state-level public opinion on a 
nomination; in Model 4.6a, 47 failures and zero successes were completely determined. Model 4.6b re-estimates 
Model 4.6a on the observations restricted to those for which state public opinion data is available. 
 
Table 4.4 contains two more robustness checks, the first (Model 4.7) with standard errors 
clustered by senator instead of by nomination, since multiple votes by the same senator are not 
independent events. Standard errors tended to be smaller when clustering nominations by 
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senator, likely because there were more senator clusters and so the number of effective 
observations was higher than when clustering by nomination. No inferences changes for any of 
the variables, though. 
Table 4.4. Robustness checks 7 and 8 for senator opposition 
 Baseline Check 7 Check 8 
 
Model 4.0 Model 4.7 Model 4.8 
Senator 
Opposition 
Cluster by 
Senator 
Loss 
Aversion 1 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Seat change dummy --- --- 0.05 (0.49) 
Seat change distance --- --- -0.85 (0.21) 
Seat change distance x Seat change dummy --- --- 0.95 (0.41) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
0.49 
(0.07) --- 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
-0.40 
(0.44) 
-0.41 
(0.55) 
Increased ideological distance 0.97 (0.22) 
0.97 
(0.08) 
1.00 
(0.20) 
Lack of nominee qualifications 3.69 (0.57) 
3.69 
(0.22) 
3.75 
(0.57) 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
3.70 
(0.48) 
2.97 
(1.77) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
1.14 
(0.13) 
1.19 
(0.18) 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
-1.77 
(0.23) 
-1.30 
(0.99) 
Number of observations 1883 1883 1883 
Number of clusters 19 320 19 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.55 0.55 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a nomination. Model 4.7 was estimated with robust standard 
errors clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). For Model 4.8, seat change distance is 
the absolute value of the potential seat change, and the seat change dummy is coded 1 if the seat change is 
unfavorable and 0 if favorable or there is no seat change. 
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Model 4.8 of Table 4.4 investigates if potential seat change losses are as influential as 
potential seat change gains. The first three variables involve an interaction term, so the 
interpretation is not straightforward. The seat change distance is a component of the interaction 
term, so it must be interpreted in light of the other component of seat change dummy. The non-
statistically significant coefficient on the seat change dummy indicates that there is no evidence 
that the probability of senator opposition is different when there is a potential positive seat 
change compared to when there is a potential negative seat change. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on seat change distance indicates that greater seat change distance 
correlates with a decrease in senator opposition when the value of the seat change dummy is zero 
(i.e., when the potential seat change is favorable or zero). The interaction term is statistically 
significant, which indicates that the slope of seat change distance is statistically different for 
favorable and unfavorable seat changes; a lincom for seat change distance plus the interaction 
terms returns a coefficient of 0.10 that is not statistically significant (p=0.77), which suggests 
that the influence of seat change distance when there is an unfavorable seat change is not 
statistically different than zero. 
Table 4.5 contains two additional robustness checks, including a squared seat distance 
term (Model 4.9a) and a square root seat distance term (Model 4.9b). The seat change dummy in 
both models is not statistically significant, providing no evidence that a difference in favorable 
vs. unfavorable seat changes influences senator opposition when seat change distance is zero. 
Squared and the square root of seat change distance coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant in both models, indicating that senator opposition is less likely when the value of the 
variables increase when the seat change dummy is zero (i.e., when seat change is favorable); the 
positive and statistically significant coefficients on interaction terms indicates a difference in the 
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slope of the seat change distance variable between favorable and unfavorable seat changes. A 
series of lincom calculations indicates that the slope of the seat change distance variable is not 
statistically significant in either model (p=0.82 for Model 4.9a; p=0.66 for Model 4.9b) for 
unfavorable seat changes. 
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Table 4.5. Robustness check 9 for senator opposition 
 Baseline Check 9 
 
Model 4.0 Model 4.9a 
Model 
4.9b 
Senator 
Opposition Loss Aversion 2 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Seat change dummy --- 0.40 (0.42) 
-0.73 
(0.68) 
Seat change distance2 --- -0.30 (0.09) --- 
Seat change distance2 x Seat change dummy --- 0.33 (0.17) --- 
Square root of seat change distance --- --- -1.66 (0.41) 
Square root of seat change distance x  
Seat change dummy --- --- 
1.93 
(0.73) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) --- --- 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
-0.31 
(0.51) 
-0.44 
(0.55) 
Increased ideological distance 0.97 (0.22) 
1.02 
(0.21) 
0.98 
(0.20) 
Lack of nominee qualifications 3.69 (0.57) 
3.68 
(0.57) 
3.79 
(0.56) 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
2.98 
(1.77) 
3.04 
(1.75) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
1.18 
(0.17) 
1.20 
(0.19) 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
-1.68 
(0.99) 
-0.64 
(1.03) 
Number of observations 1883 1883 1883 
Number of clusters 19 19 19 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.55 0.55 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a nomination. The model was estimated with probit, and robust 
standard errors were clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). Seat change dummy is 
coded 1 if the seat change is unfavorable, and 0 if favorable or there is no seat change. 
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Table 4.6 contains three additional robustness checks Model 4.10 contains an interaction 
between lack of nominee qualifications and unfavorable seat change. Unfavorable seat change is 
statistically significant and positive, which means that senators are more likely to oppose a 
nomination the more unfavorable a seat change when the nominee has no lack of qualifications. 
Lack of nominee qualifications is also statistically significant and positive, which means that that 
senators are more likely to oppose a nomination the more the nominee lacks qualifications, when 
the value of seat change is zero. And the interaction term is statistically significant and positive, 
indicating that unfavorable seat changes are more influential the more a nominee lacks 
qualifications. 
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Table 4.6. Robustness checks 10 to 12 for senator opposition  
 Baseline Check 10 Check 11 Check 12 
 
Model 4.0 Model 4.10 Model 4.11 Model 4.12 
All  
Nominations Interaction Directionality 
Segal-Cover 
Nominee 
Scores 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
0.90 
(0.21) 
0.53 
(0.18) 
0.27 
(0.17) 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
-0.57 
(0.56) 
-0.59 
(0.48) 
0.04 
(0.65) 
Increased ideological distance 0.97 (0.22) 
0.96 
(0.21) 
0.98 
(0.21) 
1.04 
(0.22) 
Lack of nominee qualifications 3.69 (0.57) 
3.57 
(0.56) 
3.77 
(0.66) 
3.87 
(0.71) 
Lack of nominee qualifications 
× Unfavorable seat change --- 
0.69 
(0.26) --- --- 
Moderating nominations --- --- -0.58 (0.42) --- 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
3.40 
(1.66) 
4.68 
(1.78) 
4.17 
(1.71) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
1.20 
(0.17) 
1.19 
(0.18) 
1.20 
(0.19) 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
-1.69 
(0.86) 
-1.90 
(0.88) 
-1.80 
(0.76) 
Number of observations 1883 1883 1883 1883 
Number of clusters 19 19 19 19 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.50 
Percent correctly predicted 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.89 
Percent modal category 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
Percent reduction of error 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.48 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a Supreme Court nomination over the seventeen Supreme Court 
nominations between the 1968 Fortas chief justice nomination and the 2006 Alito associate justice nomination. 
Ideological variables for Model 4.12 were based on bridged Segal-Cover nominee qualification scores. Models were 
estimated with probit, with robust standard errors clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 ( one-tailed 
test). Percent reduction of error statistics were derived from the precalc utility designed by Frederick J. Boehmke 
(http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html). 
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Figure 4.3 displays the interaction of nominee qualifications and seat change, illustrating 
that seat change matters little when the nominee is highly qualified (with predicted probabilities 
of senator opposition ranging from 0.6 percent to 6 percent), but is a substantial influence when 
the nominee is only moderately qualified (with predicted probabilities ranging from 2 percent to 
84 percent). This result suggests that presidents can shield their nominations from opposition due 
to unfavorable seat changes by selecting a highly qualified nominee. 
 
Figure 4.3. The influence of seat change, interacted with qualifications 
Note: Figure depicts the predicted probability that a senator opposes a nomination at various levels of observed seat 
change, with all other model variables at their mean, for two levels of nominee qualifications: impeccable 
qualifications (Segal-Cover perceived qualifications score of 1.00), and moderate qualifications (Segal-Cover 
perceived qualifications score of 0.500). Predicted probabilities were generated with Clarify (King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). 
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Model 4.11 of Table 4.6 contains a dichotomous “moderating” control, coded 1 for those 
nominations in which the nominee fell closer to the prior Court median than the senator did, and 
0 otherwise. The moderating variable did not reach statistical significance (p=0.172), providing 
no evidence that senator opposition is influenced by whether or not the nomination has the 
potential to make the mean ideology of the Court more moderate. And when an interaction 
between the moderating variable and seat change was included, neither variable reached 
statistical significance, although the seat change main effect retained its statistical significance 
(p=0.04). 
Model 4.12 employed bridged Segal-Cover perceived nominee ideology scores instead of 
first-year Bailey estimated ideal points as proxies for nominee ideology. The only changes with 
regard to model variable values were to the ideology of the nominee in each case, and to the 
ideology of the potential Court median in three cases (Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy). The 
ideological variables highly correlated across the Segal-Cover and first-year Bailey measures: 
0.95 (seat change), 0.89 (median change), and 0.90 (ideological distance).  
The seat change variable Model 4.12 lost its statistical significance, with a t-value of 1.57 
(p=0.12), although the other model variables that reached statistical significance in the main 
model retained their statistical significance and the same sign of directionality. This indicates 
that the seat change variable is not robust to every model specification in terms of statistical 
significance. But even with a lack of statistical significance at the 0.05 level with a one-tailed 
test, the seat change variable did have some influence. The predicted probability of senator 
opposition with all variables set at their mean was 7 percent. This value rose to 12 percent and 
fell to 4 percent with a one-standard deviation change in the seat change variable, and rose to 24 
 100 
percent and fell to 2 percent when the seat change variable was set at its lowest and highest 
value. 
Table 4.7 contains four additional models with two concerns. The first, Model 4.13a and 
Model 4.13b, were estimated on Supreme Court nominations from different time periods. Model 
4.13a was estimated on pre-Fortas nominations between 1954 and 1967. Results indicate that 
seat change was not a statistically significant influence on those observations; lack of nominee 
qualifications did not reach statistical significance, either, which may warrant further analysis. 
Model 4.13b was estimated on all Supreme Court nominations between 1954 and 2006. Seat 
change was statistically and substantively significant, with an increase in the seat change variable 
from its highest to lowest value corresponding to an increase in the predicted probability of 
senator opposition from 0 percent to 30 percent. 
Model 4.14a was estimated on different party senators, and Model 4.14b was estimated 
on senators with the same political party as the president. A one-standard deviation change for 
seat change in the different party senator model corresponded to a change in predicted 
probability of senator opposition from 7 percent to 45 percent; a one-standard deviation change 
in ideological distance for different party senators corresponded to a 7 percent to 40 percent 
change. But the corresponding changes for same party senators were not equivalent. A one-
standard deviation change for seat change in the same party senator model corresponded to a 
change in predicted probability of senator opposition from 1 percent to 3 percent; a one-standard 
deviation change in ideological distance for same party senators corresponded to a 0 percent to 
14 percent change. Results were roughly consistent with those from Shipan (2008), with 
ideological distance having a stronger influence on different party senators than same party 
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senators; results for seat change were analogous, as well, with seat changes having more of an 
influence on different party senators than same party senators.41
 
 
Table 4.7. Robustness checks 13 and 14 for senator opposition 
  Check 13 Check 14 
 
Model 4.0 Model 4.13a 
Model 
4.13b 
Model 
4.14a 
Model 
4.14b 
Senator 
Opposition Pre-1968 1954-2006 
Different 
Party 
Senators 
Same 
Party 
Senators 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
-0.35 
(0.32) 
0.43 
(0.15) 
0.66 
(0.23) 
0.23 
(0.14) 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
-0.13 
(0.99) 
-1.21 
(0.65) 
-0.18 
(0.61) 
-0.78 
(0.51) 
Increased ideological 
distance 
0.97 
(0.22) 
0.85 
(0.25) 
0.85 
(0.17) 
0.93 
(0.30) 
1.07 
(0.15) 
Lack of nominee 
qualifications 
3.69 
(0.57) 
1.28 
(1.61) 
3.52 
(0.55) 
4.34 
(0.68) 
2.75 
(0.52) 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
4.08 
(0.99) 
4.18 
(1.17) 
4.98 
(1.56) 
1.33 
(2.16) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
0.71 
(0.48) 
1.10 
(0.16) --- --- 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
-3.32 
(1.58) 
-1.85 
(0.72) 
-0.65 
(0.75) 
-1.52 
(1.00) 
Number of observations 1883 864 2747 960 923 
Number of clusters 19 9 28 19 19 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.32 0.51 0.48 0.52 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a nomination. The model was estimated with probit, and robust 
standard errors were clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). Model 4.13a is restricted 
to pre-Fortas nominations, and Model 4.13b includes all nominations between 1954 and 2006. Model 4.14a is the 
baseline model restricted to different party senators, and Model 4.14b is the baseline model restricted to same party 
senators. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Note that values for seat change were one standard deviation changes measured on all observations, not on same-
party or different-party senators. 
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 Model 4.15a of Table 4.8 presents estimation results for a model that includes dummy 
variables for the number of previous successful nominations the president has made. The model 
included all observations from 1954 to 2008, so the left-hand column of Table 4.8 presents 
results for the baseline of that estimation. The first nomination made by a president is the omitted 
category. Results indicate that the seat change variable retains its statistical significance, but only 
one of the nomination-number variables is statistically different than the omitted category: the 
fifth nomination by a president. But that variable only represents one nomination, that of Potter 
Stewart by Dwight Eisenhower, so that finding may be infected with the idiosyncrasies of that 
nomination.42
 
 The general lack of statistical significance suggests that senators may not be more 
likely to oppose subsequent nominations made by a president simply because the president has 
already issued previous nominations. 
  
                                                 
42 An unreported model omitted the second category of the second nomination made by a president, but only the 
fifth nomination variable was statistically different than zero. 
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Table 4.8. Robustness check 15 for senator opposition 
 
Model 4.13b 
Check 15 
Model 4.15 
Senator 
Opposition 
Presidential 
Nominations 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.43 (0.15) 
0.46 
(0.18) 
Unfavorable median change -1.21 (0.65) 
-0.83 
(0.65) 
Increased ideological distance 0.85 (0.17) 
0.88 
(0.18) 
Lack of nominee qualifications 3.52 (0.55) 
4.35 
(0.67) 
Presidential disapproval 4.18 (1.17) 
4.55 
(1.36) 
Different party 1.10 (0.16) 
1.14 
(0.19) 
Second nomination by a president --- -0.09 (0.46) 
Third nomination by a president --- 0.58 (0.57) 
Fourth nomination by a president --- 0.48 (0.33) 
Fifth nomination by a president --- 1.87 (0.31) 
Constant -1.85 (0.72) 
-1.70 
(0.89) 
Number of observations 2747 2747 
Number of clusters 28 28 
Pseudo R2 0.51 0.54 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a nomination. The model was estimated with probit, and robust 
standard errors were clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). Model 4.15 contains 
dummy variables for the number of previous successful nominations made by the president, with the first 
nomination of the president serving as the omitted category. 
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Model 4.16 of Table 4.9 contains results from the baseline model re-estimated with a 
control for an alternate reference point: the median justice of the prior nine-member Court. The 
variable did not reach statistical significance, indicating that the ideological relationship between 
the senator, nominee, and prior Court median has not generally been an influence on senator 
opposition to a nomination.43
 
 
  
                                                 
43 The Prior Court median reference point variable is not statistically significant even if the seat change variable is 
omitted from the model (p=0.207). 
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Table 4.9. Robustness check 16 for senator opposition 
 
Baseline Check 16 
Model 4.0 Model 4.16 
Senator 
Opposition 
Alternate 
Reference 
Point 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
0.46 
(0.14) 
Prior Court median as 
reference point --- 
0.14 
(0.18) 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) 
-0.62 
(0.55) 
Increased ideological 
distance 
0.97 
(0.22) 
0.92 
(0.24) 
Lack of nominee 
qualifications 
3.69 
(0.57) 
3.64 
(0.56) 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
3.68 
(1.67) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
1.13 
(0.17) 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
-1.77 
(0.85) 
Number of observations 1883 1883 
Number of clusters 19 19 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.55 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a nomination. The model was estimated with probit, and robust 
standard errors were clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). Model 4.16 included a 
control for an alternate reference point, the median justice on the prior nine-member Court. 
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One anomaly in the findings for senator opposition to Supreme Court nominations is the 
relatively consistent negative sign on the median change variable. The coefficient for median 
change rarely reached statistical significance, but it did in Model 4.13b, when the model was 
estimated on all Supreme Court nominations from 1954 to 2006. The negative sign indicates that 
an increase in the unfavorableness of a nomination (in terms of distance between the senator and 
nominee relative to the distance between the senator and departing justice) corresponds to a 
decrease in senator opposition. For Model 4.13b, this decrease was not unsubstantial: a one-
standard deviation increase and decrease in the median change variable corresponded to 
predicted probabilities of 2 percent and 7 percent, and a change from highest and lowest values 
corresponded to predicted probabilities of 0 percent and 23 percent. This finding warrants further 
investigation. But see Model 4.M3 of Table 4.8 for a possible explanation. 
4.2 THE MODERATING INFLUENCE OF MEDIAN CONCERNS 
One objection to the theory of the departing justice may be that the focus of an appointment 
should be – and is – on the potential impact to the Court median. The question then becomes 
whether the nominee-for-departing-justice switch is more or less salient than the potential-Court-
median-for-prior-Court-median switch. Several things suggest that the former change may be 
more salient. Seat changes are typically much larger than median changes, and the identity of the 
departing justice and nominee are clear, while there may be some disagreement over the exact 
location of the Court median, which may depend on the issue area of the legal question that the 
Court considers (Rohde and Spaeth 1976, but see Martin and Quinn 2002b:12 ff). Moreover, 
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headlines focus on the replacement (“O’Connor, Alito Differ in Style, Views,” Holland 2006), 
and senators explicitly contrast the nominee with the departing justice: 
I look at the seat Judge Alito has been nominated to replace. It is a 
seat of moderation. Justice O’Connor represented mainstream 
America. She understood as a Justice for the highest court in the 
land, her decisions impacted real people and their lives. Her 
decisions were not made in the abstract. Judge Alito has stated he 
looks at the facts of each case, yet time and time again his 
decisions show support for big business, for the executive branch, 
but not so much for everyday Americans (Senator Barbara 
Mikulski, 2006). 
 Seat changes and median changes both reflect senator perceptions about the potential of a 
nomination to alter the Court relative to the previous nine-member array of justices, and these 
influences may moderate one another. This moderation may be a function of relative size and 
impact of the two considerations. 
 For example, seat changes may be less influential for nominations with the potential to 
alter the median justice; this may have occurred with Alito’s replacement of O’Connor, if 
senators’ focus fell on the movement of the Court median rightward to Anthony Kennedy, whose 
record on campaign finance, affirmative action, and abortion restrictions were markedly more 
conservative than those of O’Connor (Cohen 2006). However, a seat change may also dilute an 
emphasis on median change, which would have been the case if, for instance, the most salient 
feature of the Thomas nomination had been the nominee’s distance from departing justice 
Thurgood Marshall (a Bailey estimated ideal point difference of 3.11), rather than the potential 
movement of the median from O’Connor to Kennedy (a Bailey estimated ideal point difference 
of 0.04). 
Table 4.10 presents results from a probit regression on nominations lacking a potential 
median change (Model 4.M1) and a probit regression on nominations with the potential to alter 
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the Court median (Model 4.M2).44 Comparison of Model 4.M1 to Model 4.M2 suggests that seat 
changes are more influential when coupled with potential median changes: predicted 
probabilities for opposition from an opposite party senator ranged from 5 percent to 26 percent in 
Model 4.M1 (one standard deviation below and above the mean seat change for opposite party 
senators), but ranged from 6 percent to 60 percent in Model 4.M2 under the same conditions.45
 
  
  
                                                 
44 Correlation between median change and seat change is 0.62 (p<0.01, n=2776) for all observations, and 0.58 for 
observations including and after the Fortas chief justice nomination (p<0.01, n=1900). 
45 Note, though, that potential seat changes are typically smaller for nominations that pose no threat to change the 
median, since the departing justice and nominee necessarily lay on the same side of the Court median. Therefore, to 
provide a more even comparison, the mean and standard deviation of the seat change variable for opposite party 
senators were based on all observations. 
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Table 4.10. Median changes and senator opposition 
 
Model 4.0 Model 4.M1 Model 4.M2 Model 4.M3 
All  
Nominations 
No Potential 
 Median  
Change 
Potential 
Median  
Change 
All  
Nominations 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 0.49 (0.14) 
0.49 
(0.21) 
0.89 
(0.24) --- 
Unfavorable median change -0.40 (0.43) --- 
-0.66 
(0.95) 
1.24 
(0.50) 
Increased ideological 
distance 
0.97 
(0.22) 
1.42 
(0.23) 
0.33 
(0.27) 
1.14 
(0.20) 
Lack of nominee 
qualifications 
3.69 
(0.57) 
2.48 
(0.71) 
4.85 
(1.05) 
3.25 
(0.61) 
Presidential disapproval 3.70 (1.67) 
3.71 
(2.08) 
5.55 
(2.27) 
3.30 
(1.72) 
Different party 1.14 (0.16) 
1.42 
(0.24) 
1.14 
(0.21) 
1.01 
(0.17) 
Constant -1.77 (0.85) 
-3.83 
(0.93) 
-0.66 
(1.15) 
-2.03 
(0.74) 
Number of observations 1883 792 1091 1883 
Number of clusters 19 8 11 19 
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.52 
Percent correctly predicted 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.89 
Percent modal category 0.78 0.81 0.76 0.78 
Percent reduction of error 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.52 
 
Note: Dependent variable is senator opposition to a Supreme Court nomination over the seventeen Supreme Court 
nominations between the 1968 Fortas chief justice nomination and the 2006 Alito associate justice nomination. 
Models were estimated with probit, with robust standard errors clustered by nomination. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 
(one-tailed test). Percent reduction of error statistics were derived from the precalc utility designed by Frederick J. 
Boehmke (http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html). 
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Figure 4.4 depicts the moderating effect of median change on seat change, illustrating the 
increased influence of seat change considerations for nominations that threaten to alter the Court 
median. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Seat change moderated by potential median change 
Note: Figure depicts the predicted probability that a senator opposes a nomination at various levels of observed seat 
change, with all model variables at their mean. Dots denote point estimates, and vertical bars indicate 95 percent 
confidence intervals. Black dots indicate nominations with a potential median change, and white dots indicate 
nominations with no potential median change. The means and standard deviations of the seat change variable were -
0.08 and 1.26 for nominations with the potential for median change, and -0.12 and 0.82 for nominations lacking the 
potential for median change. Predicted probabilities were generated with Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; 
Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). 
  
 
Model 4.M3 of Table 4.10 tested for median effects in an estimation removing the seat 
change variable. Results indicated that unfavorable median changes associated with an increased 
likelihood of senator opposition: the predicted probability of opposition from an opposite party 
senator increased from 13 percent with median change set one deviation below its mean for an 
opposite party senator to 25 percent with median change set one deviation above its mean for an 
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opposite party senator. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on median change 
when seat change considerations are omitted from the model suggests that the negative sign on 
median change in most models may be a statistical artifact of some kind, since unfavorable 
median changes associate in the expected direction when seat change is absent from the model. 
Compare Model 4.M3 to Model 4.0. Note that, when the baseline model contained a seat 
change measure, median change had almost no effect: respective predicted probabilities for 
opposition from an opposite party senator decreased marginally from 18 percent to 14 percent. 
The larger effect of median change when seat change is omitted therefore suggests that seat 
change considerations may supersede median change considerations. 
This presumed priority of seat changes may be a function of relative size if seat changes 
are more salient because they are larger; in terms of Bailey estimated ideal points, the mean 
difference between nominee and departing justice ideology was ten times greater than the mean 
difference between potential and prior median justices (1.15 compared to 0.11). Figure 4.5 
displays the relative sizes of seat and median changes; seat changes were measured as the 
absolute value of the distance between the Bailey estimated ideal point for the nominee and the 
departing justice, and median changes were measured as the absolute value of the distance 
between the Bailey estimated ideal point for the prior median justice and the potential median 
justice. 
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Figure 4.5. Values for the seat change and median change measures 
Note: Figure relative sizes of seat and median changes; seat changes were measured as the absolute value of the 
distance between the Bailey estimated ideal point for the nominee and the departing justice, and median changes 
were measured as the absolute value of the distance between the Bailey estimated ideal point for the prior median 
justice and the potential median justice. 
 
Seat changes may also figure more prominently if senators accept a median change as a 
given. When liberal justice Thurgood Marshall retired under a Republican administration, liberal 
senators may have resigned themselves to the expectation that George H.W. Bush would 
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nominate someone to the right of the Court median, and therefore concentrated on the fact that 
Thomas was perceived to be such a conservative pick. Presumably some senators who objected 
to Thomas would have supported a more moderate nominee to the conservative side of the Court 
median. 
And seat changes may be more influential because of cognitive accessibility. In other 
words, the departing justice who anchors the seat change consideration is someone who has 
likely been receiving praise and/or criticism in the press as they plan to retire, which would make 
the departing justice – and the consequent seat change – a much more salient consideration than 
the potential median change. This is also true considering the other half of the comparison: the 
nominee in the seat change consideration is by far the most visible actor in the appointment, 
especially compared to the potential Court median. 
4.3 THE THOMAS NOMINATION REVISITED 
The logic of the seat change phenomenon suggests that Clarence Thomas benefitted from the fact 
that he was chosen to replace an extreme ideologue, because – as conservative as Thomas was – 
he still fell slightly closer to the median senator than did the justice he was replacing and, 
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therefore, for most senators,46 Thomas presented a closer approximation of their ideology than 
the justice who had just retired.47
A counterfactual analysis was used to test this assertion. First, predicted probabilities 
were estimated for each senator serving at the time of the Thomas nomination, based on Model 1 
values that were constant for the nomination (lack of qualifications and presidential disapproval) 
and that varied by senator (seat change, median change, ideological distance, and different 
party). Senators were counted as opposing the nomination if the point estimate for their predicted 
probability of senator opposition fell above fifty percent. Opposition was predicted from 49 
senators, a figure close to the observed tally of 48 senators who voted against the Thomas 
nomination.  
  
Next, a counterfactual was estimated, replacing the ideology of retiring justice Thurgood 
Marshall (Bailey estimated ideal point of -2.01) with the ideology of prior median justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor (score of 0.40). Ideological distance, median change, and all other model 
variables remained the same as in the estimation using observed values from the Thomas 
nomination, and the only consequence of the manipulation was to make Thomas appear less 
ideologically attractive than the retiring justice to the majority of senators, with an unfavorable 
seat change for 68 senators, compared to 49 in the observed nomination. The mean value of 
unfavorable seat change rose from -0.37 in the observed confirmation to 0.37 in the 
counterfactual confirmation, and estimations with this moderate 0.40 departing justice 
                                                 
46 Johnson and Roberts (2005: 32) observed that the filibuster pivot – and not the median senator – should serve as 
the constraint on presidential selection of a nominee. The median was referenced in this section since all but one 
dataset observation concerned a confirmation vote (requiring a majority) and not a cloture vote (requiring a 
supermajority). 
47 Marshall’s 1991 Bailey estimated ideal point was -2.01, Thomas’ first year score (from 1992) was 1.10, and the 
median senator score in 1991 was -0.41. Therefore, Thomas fell 1.51 units from the median senator, while Marshall 
fell 1.60 units from the median senator. 
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ideological score predicted opposition from 57 senators, representing a change in vote for eight 
senators, and – more importantly – a change in outcome from confirmation to rejection. 
Figure 4.6 depicts the point estimate and 95 percent confidence interval for the predicted 
probability that each senator serving at the time of the 1991 Thomas confirmation vote would 
oppose the nomination. The left graph is based on Model 4.0 variables set to observed values for 
the Thomas nomination, and the right graph is based on Model 4.0 variables with the more 
moderate departing justice. For the observed Thomas nomination, senators closer to Marshall’s 
liberal ideology had a large perceived loss (a conservative replacing a fellow liberal), and 
senators closer to Thomas’ conservative ideology had a large perceived gain (a fellow 
conservative replacing a liberal). Preferences for many senators would therefore be relatively 
easy to predict, and for the observed Thomas nomination, 32 senators had a predicted probability 
of opposition less than one percent. But for the counterfactual depicted in the right graph, with a 
moderate retiring justice, no senator had a predicted probability of opposition less than one 
percent because conservatives – who had a low probability of voting against Thomas when he 
was nominated to replace Marshall – now had a higher probability of opposition because their 
perceived gain (a conservative in place of a moderate) was smaller; similarly, liberals in the 
counterfactual were less likely to oppose Thomas compared to the observed nomination because 
their perceived loss was lessened. 
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Figure 4.6. 1991 Clarence Thomas nomination counterfactual 
Note: Dots denote point estimates and horizontal bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals for the predicted 
probability that each senator serving at the time of the 1991 Thomas confirmation vote would oppose the 
nomination. The left graph is based on Model 4.0 variables set to observed values for the Thomas nomination. The 
right graph is based on Model 4.0 variables with a more moderate departing justice than Thurgood Marshall (Bailey 
estimated ideal point of 0.40, compared to -2.01 for Marshall). Senators were ordered by left graph point estimates. 
Senators were ordered by left graph point estimates. Vertical numbers from 0 to 100 reference individual senators. 
Predicted probabilities were generated with Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and 
King 2001). 
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This counterfactual analysis suggests what may be a counterintuitive recommendation, 
namely that – all else equal – nominations of extreme conservatives will be better received when 
the departing justice is an extreme liberal than when the departing justice is a moderate liberal. 
The conventional wisdom for presidents may be to lessen the distance between nominee and 
departing justice and thus to delay appointing an ideologue until a moderate retires. But this logic 
neglects that fact that such a replacement would be perceived as a loss by most senators, relative 
to the scenario in which a conservative ideologue is tapped to replace a liberal ideologue, about 
which the median senator would be more ambivalent.48
According to this line of thought, the nomination of conservative Robert Bork may have 
been successful if Bork (bridged Bailey estimated ideal point of 0.71) had been nominated to 
replace a liberal like Thurgood Marshall (1986 Bailey estimated ideal point of -1.73) instead of 
moderate Lewis Powell (1986 Bailey estimated ideal point of 0.32) because the ideology of the 
vacant seat would have moved closer to the median senator (Bailey estimated ideal point of -
0.20) in the Bork-for-Marshall exchange instead of away from the median senator, as occurred in 
the observed Bork-for-Powell swap. Predicted probabilities based on Model 4.0 values for the 
Bork nomination estimated that 55 senators would oppose the nomination, close to the observed 
tally of 58 senators, but in a counterfactual replacing the ideology of departing justice Powell 
with the ideology of Marshall, only 42 senators were predicted to oppose the nomination. 
  
                                                 
48 The recommendation, of course, is also applicable to presidents intending to nominate an extreme liberal. 
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4.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Evidence presented in this chapter reveals that senator opposition to Supreme Court nominees is 
influenced by the ideology of the departing justice. Senators over the past few decades have, in 
general, been more likely to oppose nominations that would reflect a loss for them in terms of the 
ideology of the vacant seat, independent of considerations of potential median changes, 
ideological distance, partisanship, and nominee qualifications. 
Predicted probability calculations suggested that these seat change considerations can be 
quite substantial concerns for senators that may result in a change from a yea to a nay vote, or 
vice versa, simply on the basis of the ideology of the departing justice. The analysis also 
provided evidence that the influence of seat changes is substantial, suggesting that nominations 
receiving a close roll call vote, like that of Clarence Thomas, may have had a different outcome 
if senators were faced with different seat change considerations. 
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5.0  EMPIRICAL RESULTS, CONFIRMATION DELAY 
The theory of the departing justice indicates that the justice who has left the Court provides a 
reference point for persons judging a nomination. Applying this theory to confirmation delay 
results in the hypothesis that senators are more likely to oppose a nomination the greater the 
potential the nomination has to move the ideology of the vacant seat away from their ideal point; 
in particular, confirmation delay should be related to the interests of the key senators in the 
confirmation process: the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee for delay in scheduling and 
completion of hearings on a nomination, and the Senate Majority Leader for delay in the 
scheduling and holding of a floor roll call vote on a nomination.  
 These hypotheses were tested on the 28 nominations from 1953 to 2006, excluding those 
not reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Homer Thornberry in 1968, and Harriet Miers 
in 2005) and nominations not officially submitted to the Senate (Douglas Ginsberg in 1987, and 
the associate justice nomination of John Roberts, 2005), but including the failed 1968 cloture 
vote on the elevation of associate justice Abe Fortas to chief justice.  
5.1 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DELAY RESULTS 
Table 5.1 presents results from the baseline model of delay for the Judiciary Committee phase. 
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Table 5.1. Judiciary Committee delay for US Supreme Court nominations (1950-2008) 
 Baseline 
 Model 5.0 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 
-1.15 
(0.31) 0.32 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 
2.07 
(1.33) 7.9 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Judiciary Committee Chair 
0.46 
(0.19) 1.6 
Ideological extremism of the nominee 0.20 (0.65) 1.2 
Lack of nominee qualifications -1.44 (0.74) 0.24 
Presidential disapproval -6.35 (2.02) 0.0017 
Divided government -0.91 (0.43) 0.40 
Congress number 0.06 (0.03) 1.06 
Number of observations 28 
Log pseudolikelihood -60.2 
 
Note: Dependent variable is length of time between Senate receipt of a nomination and the final report by the 
Judiciary Committee, with Senate recess days not counted. The model was estimated with a Cox proportional 
hazards model, with robust standard errors. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). 
 
 In interpreting Cox model coefficients, a negative sign on a statistically significant 
coefficient indicates that an increase in the value of the variable correlates with a decreased risk 
of the event, in this case, a decreased risk that the Judiciary Committee will report the 
nomination to the full Senate. Therefore, as expected, an unfavorable potential seat change for 
the Judiciary Committee Chair associated with a decreased risk of reporting the nomination, i.e., 
an increased length of the time between Senate receipt of the nomination and the Judiciary 
Committee’s report. The -1.15 coefficient corresponds to a hazard ratio of 0.32 (i.e., -1.15 
exponentiated), so the hazard rate of a final report by the Judiciary Committee decreases by 68 
percent for a one-unit increase in the size of an unfavorable seat change.  
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 Increased Judiciary Committee delay also correlated with a lack of nominee 
qualifications, presidential disapproval, and divided government, while an increased risk 
associated with an increased ideological distance of the nominee from the Judiciary Committee 
Chair and with the Congress number.49
 A test of the proportional hazards assumption based on Schoenfeld residuals revealed that 
the proportional hazards assumption may have been violated by three variables: unfavorable seat 
change for the Judiciary Committee Chair, unfavorable median change for the Judiciary 
Committee Chair, and ideological extremism of the nominee. Results are reported in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Test of the proportional hazards assumption 
 Rho Chi2 Prob < Chi2 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 0.30 3.66 0.06 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair -0.26 3.96 0.05 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Judiciary Committee Chair 0.06 0.07 0.79 
Ideological extremism of the nominee 0.32 7.01 0.01 
Lack of nominee qualifications 0.23 1.22 0.27 
Presidential disapproval 0.03 0.02 0.88 
Divided government -0.23 1.97 0.16 
Congress number 0.16 0.60 0.44 
 
Global Test 8.63 0.37 
 
 The Cox model was re-estimated to account for the possibility that those three covariates 
had time-dependent coefficients, by interacting the three covariates with time.50
                                                 
49 Median change did not reach statistical significance in the baseline model, but did when observations were 
clustered by the five Judiciary Committee Chairs. Only ideological extremism failed to reach statistical significance 
when the baseline model observations were clustered by Judiciary Committee Chair. 
 Results 
presented in Model 5.0a of Table 5.3 do not indicate that the effect of the seat change variable 
50 Time-varying covariates are variables whose values may change over time, such as presidential disapproval 
ratings. Time-dependent coefficients, on the other hand, are associated with variables whose values do not change 
over time, but whose influence may wax or wane on an observation during the time from entry to exit (Golub 2008: 
532). 
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was a function of time, because the interaction of seat change and time is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 5.3. Judiciary Committee delay with time-dependent coefficients 
 Model 5.0 Model 5.0a 
Baseline Time-Dependent Coefficients 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 
-1.15 
(0.31) 
-1.70 
(1.07) 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 
2.07 
(1.33) 
3.05 
(5.35) 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Judiciary Committee Chair 
0.46 
(0.19) 
0.52 
(0.25) 
Ideological extremism of the nominee 0.20 (0.65) 
-2.70 
(2.88) 
Lack of nominee qualifications -1.44 (0.74) 
-1.59 
(1.11) 
Presidential disapproval -6.35 (2.02) 
-6.95 
(2.40) 
Divided government -0.91 (0.43) 
-0.81 
(0.43) 
Congress number 0.06 (0.03) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
Time × Unfavorable seat change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair --- 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Time × Unfavorable median change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair --- 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
Time × Ideological extremism of the nominee --- 0.11 (0.06) 
Number of observations 28 28 
Log pseudolikelihood -60.2 -56.8 
 
Note: Dependent variable is length of time between Senate receipt of a nomination and the final report by the 
Judiciary Committee, with Senate recess days not counted. The model was estimated with a Cox proportional 
hazards model, with robust standard errors. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). 
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Table 5.4 contains further robustness checks: Model 5.1 was estimated with a Weibull 
model, and Model 5.2 included additional control for presidential quarter, summer nomination, 
and recess nomination. Estimates were relatively similar between the main proportional hazards 
model and the Weibull specification, but several differences between the main model and the 
model with additional controls manifested: median change reached statistical significance, and 
coefficients nearly doubled for nominee qualifications, presidential disapproval, divided 
government, and Congress number. Estimates in Model 5.2, though, should be interpreted with 
caution, since eleven independent variables were used to explain variation in 28 observations. 
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Table 5.4. Robustness checks 1 and 2 for Judiciary Committee delay 
 Baseline Check 1 Check 2 
 Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 
Baseline Weibull Additional Controls 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 
-1.15 
(0.31) 
-1.21 
(0.37) 
-1.43 
(0.43) 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 
2.07 
(1.33) 
2.17 
(1.63) 
2.76 
(1.51) 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Judiciary Committee Chair 
0.46 
(0.19) 
0.47 
(0.27) 
0.64 
(0.33) 
Ideological extremism of the nominee 0.20 (0.65) 
0.15 
(0.61) 
-0.18 
(0.67) 
Lack of nominee qualifications -1.44 (0.74) 
-1.78 
(0.97) 
-2.95 
(1.04) 
Presidential disapproval -6.35 (2.02) 
-7.19 
(2.98) 
-12.93 
(3.92) 
Divided government -0.91 (0.43) 
-0.91 
(0.60) 
-1.60 
(0.82) 
Congress number 0.06 (0.03) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.06) 
Presidential quarter --- --- -0.72 (0.40) 
Summer nomination --- --- -1.49 (0.77) 
Recess nomination --- --- -3.23 (1.18) 
Constant --- -12.29 (4.65) --- 
Number of observations 28 28 28 
Log pseudolikelihood -60.2 -18.8 -53.6 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is length of time between Senate receipt of a nomination and the final report by the 
Judiciary Committee, with Senate recess days not counted. Models 5.0 and 5.2 were estimated with a Cox 
proportional hazards model, with robust standard errors, and Model 5.1 was estimated with a Weibull model, with 
robust standard errors. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test).  
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Table 5.5 contains additional robustness checks. Model 5.3 was estimated with a control 
for overlapping nominations and with standard errors clustered by overlapping nominations, and 
Model 5.4 was estimated without removal of recess days. Overlapping nominations had a 
negligible effect on estimates of coefficient values and levels of statistical significance, but the 
elimination of recess days produced several major differences with the baseline model: the 
coefficient for seat change increased from -1.15 to -2.08 (with a corresponding change in hazard 
rate of 32 percent to 12 percent), median change and ideological extremism became statistically 
significant, and coefficient estimates for nominee qualifications and presidential disapproval 
nearly doubled.  
These results suggest that the decision to include or ignore recess days can have a 
substantial effect on estimates, but the results themselves provide no guidance for the decision 
about whether to include recess days in a model. In any specification, though, seat change 
remains a statistically significant and substantial influence on the length of time that the 
Judiciary Committee handles a nomination, with increased unfavorable seat change associating 
with an extended length for the Judiciary Committee phase of the confirmation process. 
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Table 5.5. Robustness checks 3 and 4 for Judiciary Committee delay 
 Baseline Check 3 Check 4 
 Model 5.0 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 
Baseline Overlapping Nominations 
No Recess  
Days 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 
-1.15 
(0.31) 
-1.17 
(0.31) 
-2.08 
(0.51) 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Judiciary Committee Chair 
2.07 
(1.33) 
2.06 
(1.31) 
5.31 
(1.76) 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Judiciary Committee Chair 
0.46 
(0.19) 
0.49 
(0.22) 
0.63 
(0.31) 
Ideological extremism of the nominee 0.20 (0.65) 
0.21 
(0.67) 
1.20 
(0.67) 
Lack of nominee qualifications -1.44 (0.74) 
-1.43 
(0.74) 
-3.98 
(1.17) 
Presidential disapproval -6.35 (2.02) 
-6.18 
(2.12) 
-11.08 
(3.28) 
Divided government -0.91 (0.43) 
-0.90 
(0.44) 
-1.27 
(0.62) 
Congress number 0.06 (0.03) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
Overlapping nominations --- 0.15 (0.40) 
--- 
Number of observations 28 28 28 
Log pseudolikelihood -60.2 -60.2 -50.9 
 
Note: Dependent variable is length of time between Senate receipt of a nomination and the final report by the 
Judiciary Committee, with Senate recess days not counted (Models 5 and 5.3) and with Senate recess days counted 
(Model 5.4). Models were estimated with a Cox proportional hazards model, with robust standard errors. Bold type 
indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). 
5.2 ROLL CALL DELAY RESULTS 
This section tests for the influence of seat change on the second phase of the confirmation 
process that is overseen by the Senate Majority Leader. Table 5.6 contains results from Model 
5.5, which provided no evidence that unfavorable seat change associates with the length of the 
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second phase. In fact, the only model variables that correlated with the length of the second 
phase were lack of nominee qualifications and the length of the first phase, both of which 
predicted increased delay. No variable reached statistical significance when the length of the first 
phase was removed from the model, so the lack of statistical significance was not because of the 
inclusion of that variable (pairwise correlation between the two lengths is only 0.30, n=29, 
p=0.06). Exponentiation of the seat change coefficient indicates that the hazard ratio for that 
variable is 0.76, which means that the likelihood of a floor vote decreases by 76 percent for each 
one-unit increase in unfavorable seat change. 
Table 5.6. Roll call delay for US Supreme Court nominations (1954-2008) 
 Baseline 
Model 5.5 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Senate Majority Leader 
-0.28 
(0.43) 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Senate Majority Leader 
0.51 
(1.18) 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Senate Majority Leader 
0.12 
(0.54) 
Ideological extremism of the nominee 0.07 (0.60) 
Lack of nominee qualifications -3.20 (1.16) 
Presidential disapproval -3.24 (2.46) 
Divided government -0.25 (0.42) 
Congress number 0.04 (0.04) 
Length of Judiciary Committee phase -0.02 (0.01) 
Number of observations 28 
Log pseudolikelihood -62.1 
 
Note: Dependent variable is length of time between the final report by the Judiciary Committee and the Senate roll 
call confirmation vote (or cloture vote for Abe Fortas’ 1968 nomination), with Senate recess days not counted. 
Models were estimated with a Cox proportional hazards model, with robust standard errors. Bold type indicates 
p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). 
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 A test of the proportional hazards assumption based on Schoenfeld residuals provided no 
evidence that the proportional hazards assumption was violated by any variables. Results are 
reported in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7. Test of the proportional hazards assumption 
 Rho Chi2 Prob < Chi2 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Senate Majority Leader 0.01 0.01 0.94 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Senate Majority Leader -0.19 1.81 0.18 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Senate Majority Leader 0.11 0.46 0.50 
Ideological extremism of the nominee -0.05 0.11 0.74 
Lack of nominee qualifications -0.20 1.91 0.17 
Presidential disapproval 0.17 0.69 0.41 
Divided government 0.06 0.07 0.79 
Congress number 0.09 0.26 0.61 
Length of Judiciary Committee phase 0.05 0.10 0.75 
 
Global test 5.11 0.83 
 
These results suggest that the length of the second phase of the confirmation process that 
is largely under the direction of the Senate Majority Leader is mostly immune from strategic 
delay. This lack of statistical significance may have been caused by the relatively small range of 
observations for the second phase of the confirmation process (median and range of six days and 
45 days, respectively, compared to a median and range of 28 days and 120 days for the first 
phase); the relatively truncated length of the second phase would increase standard errors for the 
estimates and decrease the chance that coefficient estimates were statistically significant.  
However, the lack of statistical significance may also have resulted because the second 
phase of the confirmation process is less susceptible to strategic influences, for several reasons. 
Delay may be more justifiable in the first phase when investigators are working behind the 
scenes to comb through and summarize the body of work attributed to the nominee, compared to 
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the second phase, when little or no investigation is necessary. Moreover, once the Judiciary 
Committee reports a nomination, it is no longer the prerogative of a committee but is the concern 
of the entire Senate, so the Senate Majority Leader may be less able to influence the length of the 
process than the Judiciary Committee Chair, who must deal with only a few committee members. 
Or it may be the case that, at least for the observed nominations, the Senate Majority Leader had 
less desire to delay a nomination based on most of the considerations reflected in the model.51
Robustness checks in Table 5.8 (Models 5.6 and 5.7) and in Table 5.9 (Models 5.8 and 
5.9) do not provide any evidence that unfavorable seat change associates with the length of the 
second phase, although there is evidence that the length of the second phase associates with 
presidential quarter and with overlapping nominations. The 0.87 coefficient for presidential 
quarter corresponds to an exponentiated hazard ratio of 2.38, indicating that a one-unit increase 
in presidential quarter corresponds to a more than doubled hazard, such that nominations are 
processed quicker the later in a presidential term that they occur. The coefficient for overlapping 
nominations, however, is negative (-0.57), indicating that overlapping nominations take longer to 
process than stand-alone nominations. 
 
  
                                                 
51 No variable that did not reach statistical significance in the baseline model reached statistical significance when 
observations were clustered by the eight Senate Majority Leaders. 
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Table 5.8. Robustness checks 1 and 2 for roll call delay 
 Baseline Check 1 Check 2 
 Model 5.5 Model 5.6 Model 5.7 
Baseline Weibull Additional Controls 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Senate Majority Leader 
-0.28 
(0.43) 
-0.16 
(0.51) 
0.25 
(0.54) 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Senate Majority Leader 
0.51 
(1.18) 
0.71 
(2.07) 
1.11 
(1.60) 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Senate Majority Leader 
0.12 
(0.54) 
0.03 
(0.77) 
0.61 
(0.70) 
Ideological extremism of the nominee 0.07 (0.60) 
-0.04 
(1.09) 
-0.81 
(0.62) 
Lack of nominee qualifications -3.20 (1.16) 
-3.61 
(1.21) 
-4.86 
(2.18) 
Presidential disapproval -3.24 (2.46) 
-4.05 
(3.24) 
-2.93 
(3.73) 
Divided government -0.25 (0.42) 
-0.15 
(0.54) 
-0.64 
(0.70) 
Congress number 0.04 (0.04) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Length of Judiciary Committee phase -0.02 (0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Presidential quarter -- -- 0.87 (0.51) 
Summer nomination -- -- -1.14 (0.82) 
Recess nomination -- -- -0.95 (0.89) 
Constant -- -6.47 (6.69) -- 
Number of observations 28 28 28 
Log pseudolikelihood -62.1 -29.7 -58.9 
 
Note: Dependent variable is length of time between the final report by the Judiciary Committee and the Senate roll 
call confirmation vote (or cloture vote for Abe Fortas’ 1968 nomination), with Senate recess days not counted. 
Models 5.5 and 5.7 were estimated with a Cox proportional hazards model, with robust standard errors, and Model 
5.6 was estimated with a Weibull model, with robust standard errors. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). 
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Table 5.9. Robustness checks 3 and 4 for roll call delay 
 Baseline Check 3 Check 4 
 Model 5.5 Model 5.8 Model 5.9 
Baseline Overlapping Nominations 
No Recess  
Days 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Unfavorable seat change 
for the Senate Majority Leader 
-0.28 
(0.43) 
-0.24 
(0.50) 
-0.14 
(0.43) 
Unfavorable median change 
for the Senate Majority Leader 
0.51 
(1.18) 
0.88 
(0.96) 
0.10 
(1.26) 
Increased ideological distance 
from the Senate Majority Leader 
0.12 
(0.54) 
0.07 
(0.64) 
0.39 
(0.50) 
Ideological extremism of the nominee 0.07 (0.60) 
0.15 
(0.57) 
-0.08 
(0.67) 
Lack of nominee qualifications -3.20 (1.16) 
-3.70 
(1.30) 
-2.58 
(1.02) 
Presidential disapproval -3.24 (2.46) 
-4.25 
(2.34) 
-0.43 
(2.66) 
Divided government -0.25 (0.42) 
-0.20 
(0.40) 
-0.21 
(0.38) 
Congress number 0.04 (0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Length of Judiciary Committee phase -0.02 (0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Overlapping nomination --- -0.57 (0.33) --- 
Number of observations 28 28 28 
Log pseudolikelihood -62.1 -61.6 -64.2 
 
Note: Dependent variable is length of time between the final report by the Judiciary Committee and the Senate roll 
call confirmation vote (or cloture vote for Abe Fortas’ 1968 nomination), with Senate recess days not counted 
(Models 5.5 and 5.8) and with Senate recess days counted (Model 5.9). Models were estimated with a Cox 
proportional hazards model, with robust standard errors. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed test). 
5.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Results presented in this chapter did not provide evidence that unfavorable seat changes 
influenced the time that the Senate Majority Leader took to process the nomination between the 
Judiciary Committee report of the nomination and the final roll call vote. One possible 
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explanation for this latter finding is that the Senate Majority Leader has less discretion in 
delaying a nomination once it has been reported by the Senate. 
 However, results indicated that an unfavorable seat change for the Judiciary Committee 
Chair correlates with an increased delay by the committee in processing the nomination, 
providing additional evidence that models of Supreme Court nominations may benefit from 
inclusion of the departing justice. In the baseline model, the hazard of a final report by the 
Judiciary Committee decreased by 32 percent for a one-unit increase in the size of an 
unfavorable seat change, indicating that the Judiciary Committee chair may be delaying the 
confirmation process when the nomination is unfavorable in terms of seat change. 
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6.0  EMPIRICAL RESULTS, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT 
Results so far have indicated that the departing justice serves as an important consideration for 
senators considering a Supreme Court nomination. Senators were much more likely to oppose a 
nomination the more unfavorable a seat change was, and – in particular – the Judiciary 
Committee chair has been much more likely to delay the processing of a nomination because of 
unfavorable seat changes. Given the influence of the departing justice on senator considerations 
of a nomination – and given that the Senate has veto power over nominations – presidents may 
constrain their selection of a nominee because of considerations of senator preferences. To test if 
this was the case, Supreme Court appointments from Earl Warren in 1953 to Samuel Alito in 
2006 were analyzed, including nominations announced by the president but not officially 
submitted to the Senate (Douglas Ginsberg in 1987, the associate justice nomination of John 
Roberts in 2005, and Harriet Miers in 2005) and those received in the Senate but not reported by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee (Homer Thornberry in 1968). 
6.1 RESULTS 
Table 6.1 presents several estimates of model fit between nominee ideal point and predicted 
nominee ideal point derived from models described in the previous section. Models are ordered 
by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) scores presented in the final column. The BIC 
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compares the fit of nonnested models, with lower BIC scores indicating preferred models and a 
BIC difference greater than 10 providing strong evidence in favor of one model over another 
(Freese and Long 2006: 110-112).52
According to this criterion, there is strong evidence that none of the constraint models 
outperforms the no constraint model in terms of fit. In fact, arraying models by BIC score 
appears to suggest that fit decreases as more restrictive constraints are assumed for the president: 
for example, the three models that eliminate Senate constraint under unified government 
outperform those in which the president was assumed to consider the Senate median regardless 
of partisanship. Other information presented in Table 6.1 corroborates BIC scores, with the BIC 
ordering of model fit consistent with ordering by Akaike information criterion (AIC) scores and 
by pairwise correlation. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
52 Note that the departing justice constrain returned the same predicted nominee locations as the Court mean 
constraint, so only one of those models is presented. 
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Table 6.1. Comparison of models predicting nominee ideal points 
Model 
Number of 
Constrained 
Appointments 
Pairwise 
Correlation 
with 
Nominee 
Ideal Point 
OLS Results 
AIC 
score 
BIC 
score 
Constant 
(Std. 
Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. 
Error) 
No constraint 0 0.87 -0.23 (0.10) 
0.83 
(0.11) 41.5 44.4 
Partisanship &  
Nominee extremism 11 0.81 
-0.11 
(0.15) 
0.84 
(0.12) 51.6 54.5 
Partisanship &  
Court mean 13 0.75 
-0.11 
(0.17) 
0.78 
(0.14) 59.0 61.9 
Partisanship &  
Court median 14 0.75 
-0.00 
(0.18) 
0.80 
(0.16) 59.5 62.4 
Court median 18 0.71 -0.05 (0.21) 
0.87 
(0.21) 63.8 66.8 
Court mean 23 0.70 -0.11 (0.18) 
0.93 
(0.21) 64.4 67.3 
 
Note: Number of observations for each model is 32. Bold font indicates values statistically significant at the 0.05 
level (one-tailed test). 
 
This result is somewhat inconsistent with previous research that has found that the 
president is, to some degree, ideologically constrained when making Supreme Court nominations 
(Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005). But the tests of the models of constraint 
from those publications may be imperfect. Tests of the Moraski and Shipan model presumed 
equivalence between ADA scores for presidents and senators, Segal-Cover nominee scores for 
nominees, and percent liberal voting scores on civil liberties cases for sitting justices; Bailey and 
Chang (2001) demonstrated this assumption was problematic when the model was re-estimated 
with ideal points derived from bridging observations such as presidential statements on Supreme 
Court decisions. Johnson and Roberts (2005) employed DW-Nominate scores and Segal-Cover 
scores and assumed equivalence, as well, which was problematic for a similar reason. 
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The lack of strong evidence that the president has not systematically constrained his 
nominations to the Supreme Court along an ideological dimension may be due to several factors. 
One is that the results reflect the true state of the world in which presidents do not systematically 
defer to the interests of pivotal senators, same party or otherwise. Another reason may be that the 
models tested overlook another, more accurate model of presidential constraint, or that the 
estimated ideal points and their underlying assumptions are incorrect. Or it may be that the 
model includes too many nominations, especially older ones made by presidents such as 
Eisenhower in times like the 1950s when “not very much was happening politically” (Nie and 
Anderson 1974: 579). 
 Figure 6.1 depicts values from two models (no constraint and Court mean constraint) 
against nominee ideal points. Early dataset nominations appear to be less constrained than later 
nominations. Nominations made by Eisenhower (Warren to Stewart) and John Kennedy (White 
and Goldberg) are somewhat haphazard, sometimes to the left and sometimes to the right, and 
Lyndon Johnson’s nominations (Fortas to Thornberry) are consistently to the liberal side. But 
nearly all Supreme Court nominees after the Fortas / Thornberry couple have been more 
moderate than their appointing president, suggesting that modern presidents may have felt more 
constrained by ideological considerations. 
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Figure 6.1 Bailey estimated ideal points, three constraints 
Note: Figure depicts ideal point for nominees, presidents, and predicted nominee location based on Senate median 
Court mean considerations. For instances in which no white circle is visible, the white and gray circles coincide. For 
instances in which no white or gray circles appear, all three circles coincide. 
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6.1.1 Re-analysis with more modern nominations 
To test if presidents have been more constrained in more recent nominations, models were re-
estimated omitting the eleven dataset nominations issued before the election of Richard Nixon, 
with results presented in Table 6.2. The no constraint model still has the lowest BIC score, but 
the difference between the lowest and highest BIC score is within 10 units. The BIC evidence in 
favor of the no constraint model over the partisanship and Court median model is merely positive 
(BIC difference in the 2 to 6 range), although the evidence in favor of no constraint over the 
Court mean model is still strong (BIC difference in the 6 to 10 range). 
 
Table 6.2. Comparison of models predicting nominee ideal points, post-LBJ nominations 
Model 
Pairwise 
Correlation 
with 
Nominee 
Ideal Point 
AIC 
score 
BIC 
score 
No constraint 0.70 19.1 21.1 
Partisanship & Court median 0.61 24.0 26.1 
Court median 0.60 24.3 26.4 
Partisanship & nominee extremism 0.57 25.2 27.3 
Partisanship & Court mean 0.55 26.2 28.3 
Court mean 0.49 27.9 30.0 
 
Note: Number of observations for each model is 21. Bold font indicates values statistically significant at the 0.05 
level (one-tailed test). 
 
 
 Results from the more recent nominations, when compared to results from the model 
containing all nominations between 1953 and 2006, suggests that recent presidents may have 
been constraining their nominations in ideological terms more than before. But the no constraint 
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model still performs the best in terms of model fit, indicating that presidential constraint in this 
area has not been a systematic feature of Supreme Court nominations. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Few regularly-occurring events in American politics are as momentous as a Supreme Court 
appointment. The president is invested with the right to propose nominees to the Court, but – 
save for recess appointments – the nomination must be processed and approved by a majority of 
senators. Analysis of 32 presidential nominations to the Court between 1953 and 2006 failed to 
produce evidence, though, that the president systematically defers to the Senate in terms of 
nominee ideology.  
This finding is consistent with the idea that presidential nominations are issued with the 
presumption of success (Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998: 871) and with the observation that 
“[s]ince the administration of William McKinley, the Senate has tended to defer to the 
President’s choices, serving in most cases as a political rubber stamp for his nominations” (Tullis 
1996-1997: 1331). Model constraints presumed that senators vote purely on ideological or 
partisan grounds, but senators consider other factors like nominee qualifications (Epstein et al. 
2006) and presidential approval (Johnson and Roberts 2004). Presidents can also force a 
nomination onto a multidimensional playing field by nominating a woman or a minority, which 
may reduce or eliminate ideological constraint (Overby et al. 1992; Johnson and Roberts 2005). 
And even if the appointments game were played strictly according to ideology, presidents may 
be reluctant to accommodate senators given ambiguity about exact ideal points of the nominee 
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(Szmer and Songer 2005), the justices, and the pivotal senator, not to mention uncertainty about 
the identity of the pivotal senator. 
One implication of these results is that Supreme Court justices like-minded with the 
president should not heavily weigh their decision to retire on the relative location of the Senate 
median or the departing justice, since presidents may select a nominee at the presidential ideal 
point without offering much, if any, in terms of ideological concessions to the Senate. But the 
evidence for a lack of constraint on the president should make non-like-minded justices 
apprehensive about departing the Court when the president is ideologically distant, no matter the 
ideological composition of the Senate. 
A major caveat to these results is that things may be changing. Recent Supreme Court 
nominations battles have become more intense and nominees have been receiving more 
opposition votes from senators. Evidence suggested that presidential appointments have become 
more restrained – if not constrained – since the nomination of Abe Fortas (cf. Silverstein 1991). 
Presidents may therefore have begun to be more concerned with the relative ideological position 
of justices and senators, and – if the Senate begins to exert additional opposition – may begin to 
consider other veto points like the filibuster pivot and members of the Judiciary Committee.  
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7.0  CODA: POLITICAL RETIREMENT 
Previous chapters presented theory and evidence that the memory of the departing justice affects 
the confirmation dynamics of the subsequent nomination. The political science literature, though, 
has focused on the departing justice’s intentional attempt to influence the ideology of his or her 
successor through a political retirement, with mixed results: Peretti and Rozzi (2009: 28) cited 
eleven studies of this alleged phenomenon, five of which found evidence of political retirement, 
and six that did not. Such disagreement in the literature invites further investigation, and this 
chapter provides another exploration into the possibility that US Supreme Court justices 
voluntarily leave the bench for political reasons. 
7.1 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN LEAVING THE BENCH 
Empirical studies have indicated that Supreme Court justices’ votes in cases are motivated by 
political considerations (Segal and Spaeth 1996, 2002). The theory of political retirement 
suggests that justices’ concern for policy also influences their decision to leave Court, such that 
justices delay retirement when their expected replacement is ideologically distant, and hasten 
retirement when their expected replacement is ideologically congruent. Justices have displayed 
an ability to behave strategically (Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999; Katz 2006), and political 
retirement would be another manifestation of this aptitude. If justices strategically retire, then 
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justices should be more likely to retire during politically opportune times than to retire during 
politically inopportune times. 
7.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The abundance of studies about political retirement and its relatively straightforward research 
question make theory construction less important for new investigations than research design, in 
particular, the fundamental concern of operationalizing politically opportune conditions for a 
political retirement.  
7.2.1 Identifying a political retirement 
Some studies have employed a dichotomous partisanship variable, considering a politically 
opportune time to be when the political party of the justice controls the presidency (Squire 1988) 
or the presidency and/or the Senate (Zorn and Van Winkle 2000). But partisanship, especially in 
recent decades, has been an unreliable proxy for Supreme Court ideology, with Republicans Earl 
Warren, Harry Blackmun, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens developing liberal voting records 
and Democrat Byron White becoming more conservative; a partisanship variable, for example, 
indicates that Blackmun’s departure during a Democratic administration was inconsistent with 
political motivations, even though President Bill Clinton’s dedication to abortion rights made 
Blackmun comfortable leaving the bench (Yarbrough 2008: 318) and even though Blackmun had 
performed a “near complete flip, from one of the Court’s most conservative members to among 
its most consistent civil libertarians” (Epstein et al. 2007b: 1494). 
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Other research has proxied political considerations with continuous ideological variables 
for the distance between the ideal points of a justice and the president (Beckstrom 2004; Nelson 
and Ringsmuth 2009), the distance between the ideal points of a justice and the Senate median 
(Nelson and Ringsmuth 2009), or the distance between the ideal points of a justice and the 
expected location of a successor based on the Moraski and Shipan (1999) model of the 
appointments game (Perry and Zorn 2008). But these measures may also be imperfect because 
they omit an ideological reference point. 
Consider Figure 7.1, with president P and a five-member Court comprised of justices J1 
to J5. The Beckstrom (2004) and Nelson and Ringsmuth (2009) measure of the ideological 
relationship between a justice and the president would indicate that J1 and J4 are equally likely to 
retire for political reasons under P, since the ideal points of J1 and J4 are equidistant from the 
ideal point of P. But political retirement considerations should also account for the ideology of 
the presumed challenger in the next presidential election, or, if considerations are retrospective, 
the ideology of the losing candidate in the previous presidential election. The ideal point of J1 is 
much closer to the ideal point of P than to the ideal point of presumed challenger C, so J1’s 
retirement under the current administration would be consistent with political considerations; on 
the other hand, the ideal point of J4 is closer to the ideal point of C than to the ideal point of P, so 
J4’s retirement under the current administration would not be consistent with political 
considerations. 
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Figure 7.1. Political retirement array 
 
 
An opportunity for political retirement was therefore operationalized with a dichotomous 
variable coded 1 if the ideal point of the justice fell closer to the ideal point of the current 
president than to the ideal point of the presumed challenger in the next presidential election, 
coded 1 if the ideal point of the justice fell equidistant between the ideal points of the current 
president and the presumed challenger, and coded 0 if the ideal point of the justice fell closer to 
the ideal point of the presumed challenger than to the ideal point of the current president.53
Political ideology was proxied with Bailey estimated ideal point estimates, with values 
for justices and presidents available from 1950 to 2008 (Bailey and Maltzman 2009).
 
54
                                                 
53 This measure presumes that justices expect a president to select a nominee at the presidential ideal point. Some 
evidence suggests that presidential nominations are sometimes restricted based on the composition of the Senate and 
the Court (Moraski and Shipan, 1999), but other research indicates that presidents often have the ability to overcome 
such institutional constraints to ensure the confirmation of their preferred nominee (Johnson and Roberts, 2005). 
Certain presidents in certain circumstances may temper their choice of nominee ideology due to institutional 
constraints, but it may nonetheless be reasonable to expect justices to base their retirement decision on the relative 
ideal points of the president and presumed challenger, and not on a complex calculation that incorporates the 
ideological arrangement of actors across three branches of government. 
 
Estimating ideal points for presumed challengers presented a more difficult operationalization 
because justices are typically not aware of the identity of the challenger until the year of the 
presidential election. However, justices’ expectations may be retrospective if they anticipate the 
54 Bailey estimates were not available for some justice-year observations: Harold Burton in 1958 (1957 score used); 
Fred Vinson in 1953 (1952 score used); Sherman Minton in 1956 (1955 score used); Byron White in 1962 (1963 
score used); and Abe Fortas in 1969 (1968 score used). Observed Bailey estimated ideal point estimates ranged from 
-2.27 (William Douglas in 1967 and 1968) to 1.28 (Clarence Thomas in 2008). 
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challenger in the next election to be ideologically comparable to the previous challenger, similar 
to the way that some voters appear to base their electoral choice on retrospective evaluations of 
the economy (Lanoue 1994); therefore, estimates for the ideal point of the presumed challenger 
in the next presidential election were proxied as the ideal point of the losing candidate in the 
previous election. 
Bailey estimates for several losing presidential candidates were available from their 
tenures as a representative, senator, or president,55 but three losing candidates – governors 
Thomas Dewey, Adlai Stevenson, and Michael Dukakis – did not serve in the federal 
government, and therefore estimates were not available. Ideal points for these three candidates 
were proxied by the median Bailey estimate of same-party representatives serving in their 
respective states (New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts) during the year of their electoral loss 
(1952 for Stevenson, and 1988 for Dukakis; 1951 for Dewey, since no representative estimates 
were available before that year).56 These makeshift estimates possessed some face validity, with 
liberal estimates for Democrats Stevenson and Dukakis, and a moderate conservative estimate 
for liberal Republican Dewey.57
Table 7.1 lists the presidents who served a majority of each year from 1950 to 2008 and 
their challenger in the immediately previous election, with Bailey estimated ideal point estimates 
for each. 
 
                                                 
55 Presidential ideal point estimates were used for Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H.W. Bush. George 
McGovern and John Kerry served as senators during and after their presidential run, so the estimate for each was the 
senator estimate for the year prior to their presidential nomination. Richard Nixon’s last available senator estimate, 
from 1952, was used for 1961 to 1964; Barry Goldwater’s last available senator estimate before his presidential 
nomination, from 1964, was used for 1965 to 1968; Hubert Humphrey’s last available senator estimate before his 
presidential nomination, from 1964, was used for 1969 to 1972; Walter Mondale’s last available senator estimate, 
from 1976, was used for 1985 to 1988; Bob Dole’s last available senator estimate, from 1996, was used for 1997 to 
2000; and Al Gore’s last available senator estimate, from 1992, was used for 2001 to 2004. 
56 The Bailey estimate for New York Republican Representative Robert Tripp Ross was from the 1952 term. 
57 Ideal point estimates for Stevenson and Dukakis were -1.37 and -0.76, respectively, and the estimate for Dewey 
was 0.43. As a reference, Bailey estimates were -1.05 for Lyndon Johnson and 1.15 for Ronald Reagan. 
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Table 7.1. Presidents and challenger estimated ideal points 
 
Year President Bailey Score Challenger 
Bailey 
Score Year President 
Bailey 
Score Challenger 
Bailey 
Score 
1950 Truman -1.68 Dewey 0.46 1981 Reagan 1.15 Carter -0.97 
1951 Truman -1.68 Dewey 0.46 1982 Reagan 1.15 Carter -0.97 
1952 Truman -1.68 Dewey 0.46 1983 Reagan 1.15 Carter -0.97 
1953 Eisenhower -0.05 Stevenson -1.37 1984 Reagan 1.15 Carter -0.97 
1954 Eisenhower -0.05 Stevenson -1.37 1985 Reagan 1.15 Mondale -1.83 
1955 Eisenhower -0.05 Stevenson -1.37 1986 Reagan 1.15 Mondale -1.83 
1956 Eisenhower -0.05 Stevenson -1.37 1987 Reagan 1.15 Mondale -1.83 
1957 Eisenhower -0.05 Stevenson -1.37 1988 Reagan 1.15 Mondale -1.83 
1958 Eisenhower -0.05 Stevenson -1.37 1989 HW Bush 1.11 Dukakis -0.76 
1959 Eisenhower -0.05 Stevenson -1.37 1990 HW Bush 1.11 Dukakis -0.76 
1960 Eisenhower -0.05 Stevenson -1.37 1991 HW Bush 1.11 Dukakis -0.76 
1961 Kennedy -1.37 Nixon 0.95 1992 HW Bush 1.11 Dukakis -0.76 
1962 Kennedy -1.37 Nixon 0.95 1993 Clinton -0.88 HW Bush 1.11 
1963 Kennedy -1.37 Nixon 0.95 1994 Clinton -0.88 HW Bush 1.11 
1964 Johnson -1.05 Nixon 0.95 1995 Clinton -0.88 HW Bush 1.11 
1965 Johnson -1.05 Goldwater 1.14 1996 Clinton -0.88 HW Bush 1.11 
1966 Johnson -1.05 Goldwater 1.14 1997 Clinton -0.88 Dole 1.24 
1967 Johnson -1.05 Goldwater 1.14 1998 Clinton -0.88 Dole 1.24 
1968 Johnson -1.05 Goldwater 1.14 1999 Clinton -0.88 Dole 1.24 
1969 Nixon 0.83 Humphrey -1.58 2000 Clinton -0.88 Dole 1.24 
1970 Nixon 0.83 Humphrey -1.58 2001 W Bush 1.11 Gore -1.17 
1971 Nixon 0.83 Humphrey -1.58 2002 W Bush 1.11 Gore -1.17 
1972 Nixon 0.83 Humphrey -1.58 2003 W Bush 1.11 Gore -1.17 
1973 Nixon 0.83 McGovern -1.33 2004 W Bush 1.11 Gore -1.17 
1974 Nixon 0.83 McGovern -1.33 2005 W Bush 1.11 Kerry -1.44 
1975 Ford 0.78 McGovern -1.33 2006 W Bush 1.11 Kerry -1.44 
1976 Ford 0.78 McGovern -1.33 2007 W Bush 1.11 Kerry -1.44 
1977 Carter -0.97 Ford 0.78 2008 W Bush 1.11 Kerry -1.44 
1978 Carter -0.97 Ford 0.78      
1979 Carter -0.97 Ford 0.78      
1980 Carter -0.97 Ford 0.78      
 
 
7.2.2 Statistical approach 
A Cox proportional hazards model was estimated to determine the relative weight, if any, that an 
opportunity for political retirement had on the decision to leave the Court, controlling for other 
relevant factors. Cox models permit observations to be clustered by justice and are preferable to 
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parametric event history models because they do not require an assumption about the distribution 
of the baseline hazard (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997: 1432).  
The unit of observation was a justice-year, and the dichotomous dependent variable was 
coded 1 for retirement from the Court and 0 for a death or continuation in office. A justice’s first 
opportunity to retire was considered to occur during the summer recess after their tenure on the 
Court began. The data contain nine left-censored observations (the justices serving at the 1950 
start point), and 12 right-censored observations (the nine justices serving at the 2008 end point, 
and the three justices who died while members of the Court).  
Control variables included age, pension eligibility, job satisfaction, and presidential term. 
Age was a continuous variable coded as the square of the justice’s age because the risk of 
retirement due to a one-unit increase in age should be higher as a justice grows older. Pension 
eligibility was a dichotomous variable coded 1 for justices who qualified for a federal pension 
based on the provisions of US Code 28.I.17.§371,58 and the measure of job satisfaction was 
coded as the percent of formally-decided cases in which the justice voted in the minority.59
Presidential term was a series of dichotomous variables for the first, second, and fourth 
years of a presidential term, with the third year serving as the omitted class; retirements were 
expected to occur less frequently in the fourth year of a term when the president is either a lame 
duck or running for re-election, and to occur more frequently during the first year of a term, 
 The 
age and dissent rate variables were normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
                                                 
58 Starting March 1, 1937, justices could retire in senior status instead of resigning if they had at least seventy years 
of age and ten years of federal judicial service. This provision was expanded on February 10, 1954, to include 
justices with 65 years of age and fifteen years of federal judicial service, and the Rule of Eighty was implemented on 
July 10, 1984, in which justices could receive their salary for life if they had attained 65 years of age and any 
combination of 80 years of age or federal service. 
59 Data were drawn from The Supreme Court database (http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php), 2009 Release 2, Cases 
Organized by Supreme Court Citation (analu of zero), retrieved October 1, 2009. Observations for minority voting 
rates begin in 1953. 
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when a president traditionally experiences a honeymoon period and is more likely to have a like-
minded nominee confirmed by the Senate; the first year of a term should also coincide with the 
retirement of those justices who tarried until a change of administration.60
7.3 RESULTS 
 
Table 7.2 lists justices and the years in which retirement would and would not have been 
consistent with political considerations. Many observations reflected partisanship considerations, 
for example, with Republicans Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia having 
an opportunity to politically retire under Republican presidents but not during Democratic 
administrations. The measure also appeared to identify observations for which partisanship is 
deceptive, like liberal Republicans John Paul Stevens and David Souter, who had an opportunity 
to politically retire under Democratic presidents but not during Republican administrations. 
Cases of ideological drift were also captured, with Harry Blackmun having an opportunity to 
politically retire during Republican administrations early in his career (1971-1976) but not later 
in his tenure (1980-1992).An opportunity for political retirement was present in 56 percent of 
justice-year observations (295 of 531), compared to the 65 percent of observed retirements (13 of 
20) that occurred during those opportunities. Observed retirements were therefore slightly more 
likely to have been consistent with political considerations than would have been expected in a 
                                                 
60 No pairwise correlation between any independent variables exceeded the “potentially harmful” 0.80 level 
(Griffiths, Hill, and Judge, 1993:435), and values for variance inflation factors and condition indexes did not exceed 
levels respectively recommended in Hamilton (1992:134) and Kennedy (2003:213), indicating that multicollinearity 
did not pose a problem. 
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random draw, although a t-test indicated that the 4.4 percent risk of a political retirement was not 
statistically different (t=0.88) than the 3.0 percent risk of a non-political retirement. 
Table 7.2. Political retirement from the US Supreme Court (1950-2008) 
Departing 
Justice 
Opportunity for a 
Political Retirement 
No Opportunity for a 
Political Retirement 
Vinson 1953 (d) 1950-1952 
Jackson 1953-1954 (d) 1950-1952 
Minton 1953-1956* 1950-1952 
Reed 1953-1957* 1950-1952 
Burton 1953-1958* 1950-1952 
Whittaker 1957-1960 1961-1962* 
Frankfurter 1950-1960 1961-1962* 
Goldberg 1963-1965*  
Clark 1953-1960, 1967* 1950-1952, 1961-1966 
Warren 1961-1968* 1954-1960 
Fortas 1966-1968 1969* 
Black 1950-1952, 1961-1968, 1970-1971* 1953-1960, 1969 
Harlan II 1955-1960, 1969-1971* 1961-1968 
Douglas 1950-1952, 1961-1968 1953-1960, 1969-1975* 
Stewart 1959-1960, 1964-1976, 1981* 1961-1963, 1977-1980 
Burger 1970-1976, 1981-1986* 1977-1980 
Rehnquist 1972-1976, 1981-1992, 2001-2005 (d) 1977-1980, 1993-2000 
Powell 1972-1976, 1981-1987* 1977-1980 
Brennan 1961-1968, 1977-1980 1957-1960, 1969-1976, 1981-1990* 
Marshall 1968, 1977-1980 1969-1976, 1981-1991* 
White 1962-1976, 1981-1992 1977-1980, 1993* 
Blackmun 1971-1976, 1993-1994* 1977-1992 
O’Connor 1982-1992, 2001-2005* 1993-2000 
Stevens 1977-1980, 1993-2000 1976, 1981-1992, 2001-2008 
Scalia 1987-1992, 2001-2008 1993-2000 
Kennedy 1988-1992, 2001-2008 1993-2000 
Souter 1993-2000 1991-1992, 2001-2008 
Thomas 1992, 2001-2008 1993-2000 
Ginsburg 1994-2000 2001-2008 
Breyer 1995-2000 2001-2008 
Roberts 2006-2008  
Alito 2006-2008  
 
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates the year that the justice announced retirement, and a (d) indicates the year that the 
justice died as a member of the Court. 
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Table 7.3 presents results from the Cox model predicting retirement from the Court.61
The negative coefficient for dissent rate indicates that the risk of retirement decreases for 
justices who issue more dissenting votes (cf. Squire 1988; Nelson and Ringsmuth 2009),
 
Cox model coefficients greater than zero reflect a variable for which an increase in the value of 
the covariate correlates with an increase in the hazard, and coefficients less than zero reflect a 
variable for which an increase in the value of the covariate correlates with a decrease in the 
hazard. Therefore, the positive coefficient for the age variable indicates that the risk of retirement 
increases as a justice grows older which is consistent with previous research (Nelson and 
Ringsmuth 2009; but see Squire 1988), and the positive coefficient for the pension eligibility 
variable indicates that the risk of retirement increases as a justice grows older, which is also 
consistent with previous research (Squire 1998; but see Nelson and Ringsmuth 2009). 
62 and 
the positive coefficient for the first year of a presidential term indicates that the risk of retirement 
is higher during the first year of a term relative to the third year. Variables for political 
opportunity and for the second and third years of a term did not reach statistical significance, so 
the data do not provide evidence that these factors influence the risk of retirement from the 
Court.63
  
 
                                                 
61 A diagnostic test based on Schoenfeld residuals indicated that the proportional hazards assumption was not 
violated by any covariate or by the model as a whole. Plots of martingale residuals against omitted covariates 
produced close-to-linear scatterplots, suggesting that independent variable transformations were not necessary; this 
was corroborated by a multivariable fractional polynomial model that only linearly transformed the continuous age-
squared and minority voting rate variables, which produced no change in estimates of model coefficients or levels of 
statistical significance. 
62 Dissent rate highly correlated with ideological extremism, measured as the distance between the ideal point of the 
justice and the Court median (0.71, p<0.01). The statistical significance of each variable remained the same when 
dissent rate was replaced with ideological extremism. 
63 A continuous variable representing the opportunity for political retirement – coded as the distance that the ideal 
point of the justice fell closer to the ideal point of the current president than to the ideal point of the presumed 
challenger – also failed to reach statistical significance when replacing the dichotomous opportunity variable 
(coefficient of -0.10, p-value of 0.34). 
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Table 7.3. Cox model of political retirement from the US Supreme Court (1953-2008) 
 
 
Coefficient 
(Std. Err.) 
Hazard  
Ratio 
Opportunity for political retirement 0.13 (0.42) 1.14 
Age2 3.55 (1.30) 34.97 
Pension eligibility 1.94 (0.88) 6.93 
Job satisfaction (Dissent rate) -1.87 (0.98) 0.15 
Presidential term, first year 1.88 (0.68) 6.52 
Presidential term, second year 0.03 (0.47) 1.03 
Presidential term, fourth year -0.21 (0.57) 0.81 
Number of observations 495 
Number of clusters 31 
Number of retirements 20 
Pseudo R2 0.37 
 
Note: Dependent variable is retirement from the US Supreme Court, and the estimation technique was a Cox 
proportional hazards model, with robust standard errors clustered by justice. Bold type indicates p≤0.05 (one-tailed 
test). Continuous variables for age and dissent rate were normalized so that observed values range from 0 to 1. 
Dissent rates were not available for years before 1953, so the number of observations has been reduced from 531. 
 
 Hazard ratios in the second numeric column of Table 7.3 provide a measure of the 
increase in the risk of retirement at higher levels of a covariate. All other model variables held 
constant, the risk of retirement for a justice who has reached pension eligibility is nearly seven 
times the risk for a justice who has not reached pension eligibility, and the risk of retirement 
during the first year of a presidential term is approximately 6.5 times the risk of retirement in the 
third year of a term. Hazard ratios for normalized continuous variables for age-squared and 
dissent rate indicate the risk of retirement for justices scoring 1 on the variable relative to the risk 
for justices scoring 0 on the variable; therefore, the risk of retirement for the oldest observed 
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justice is estimated to be 35 times the risk for the youngest observed justice, and the risk of 
retirement for the justice with the highest observed dissent rate is predicted to be 0.15 times the 
risk for the justice with the lowest observed dissent rate. 
 A test of the proportional hazards assumption based on Schoenfeld residuals provided no 
evidence that the proportional hazards assumption was violated by any variable. Results are 
reported in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.4. Test of the proportional hazards assumption 
 Rho Chi2 Prob < Chi2 
Opportunity for political retirement 0.00 0.00 0.99 
Age2 0.27 1.04 0.31 
Pension eligibility -0.04 0.06 0.81 
Job satisfaction (Dissent rate) 0.12 0.15 0.70 
Presidential term, first year -0.06 0.01 0.93 
Presidential term, second year -0.11 0.00 0.95 
Presidential term, fourth year -0.13 0.01 0.91 
 
Global Test 1.58 0.98 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
Anecdotal evidence may be marshaled to support the claim that some justices strategically retire 
during politically opportune times, but empirical results presented in this article failed to 
demonstrate that political retirement is a tactic systematically employed by Supreme Court 
justices. However, only a handful of retirements fell into the time frame of the analysis, which 
increased the influence of idiosyncratic observations. 
For example, two non-political retirements, those of liberals William Brennan (1990) and 
Thurgood Marshall (1991), respectively occurred in the tenth and eleventh year of an unbroken 
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string of Republican administrations at a time when the sitting president held relatively high 
approval ratings, making the prospect of a Democratic presidential victory in the next election 
somewhat remote. The retirement of these two justices, while not consistent with political 
considerations, may therefore be explained by a relative lack of opportunity, since these justices 
had not been given an occasion to retire under a like-minded president for more than a decade 
and were facing the prospect of at least another five years of Republican administrations. 
The non-finding of political retirement provides support for the assumption that models 
of presidential appointments may presume that vacancies are exogenous events. But, even 
though this analysis produced no systematic evidence of political retirement, future models of 
presidential appointments may gain theoretical or empirical leverage by incorporating a 
retirement as an endogenous part of the appointment process. 
A lack of political retirements may be expected if justices value their role on the Court 
more than they value granting the president the opportunity to replace them with an 
ideologically-proximate successor, especially given the possibility that they can achieve the latter 
goal without artificially shortening their tenure (Brenner 1999: 438). After all, even a like-
minded successor cannot perfectly represent a justice, so in a sense every retirement is a loss for 
the justice, not only in policy but in power; therefore, justices who continue on the Court may 
have made a strategic calculation that is more personal than political. 
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8.0  CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reviews results from the empirical analyses and discusses several implications of 
the findings, and then concludes with unanswered questions and suggestions for future research. 
8.1 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation provided evidence that US Supreme Court justices do not behave in line with 
expectations derived from the political retirement hypothesis. The retirement decision for some 
justices, like Harry Blackmun and David Souter, suggests a delay during periods when the 
president is ideologically dissimilar and a retirement once a like-minded president assumes 
office. However, systematic evidence for such behavior was absent from the analysis presented 
in this dissertation, indicating that the justices, by and large, do not purposefully act to influence 
the ideological composition of the Court that they leave behind. 
 However, the dissertation provided evidence that justices may nonetheless indirectly and 
perhaps unintentionally impact the next natural Court. The major contribution of this dissertation 
was the development and test of the hypothesis that senators considering US Supreme Court 
nominations are influenced by the contrast between the nominee and the departing justice. The 
theory of reference dependence found in the marketing and psychological literature was applied 
to senators considering Supreme Court nominations, with the consequent hypothesis that 
 155 
senators would be more likely to oppose nominations with the potential to move the ideology of 
the vacant seat from their ideal point. The expectation was that senators ideologically closer to 
the departing justice than to the nominee would perceive the nomination as a potential loss, while 
senators closer to the nominee than to the departing justice would consider the nomination a 
gain. Empirical results provided at best marginal evidence that key senators in the confirmation 
process delay a nomination that would move the vacant seat away from their ideal point, but very 
strong and robust evidence was provided that that senators are indeed more likely to oppose a 
nomination – in terms of roll call confirmation voting and stated preferences – the greater the 
threatened loss in terms of seat change. This research has several implications for politicians and 
for the political science literature. 
 First, Supreme Court vacancies are not interchangeable. Formal models of appointments 
often describe an eight-member interim Court (e.g., Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and 
Roberts 2005), indicating that consideration of the departing justice is orthogonal to presidential 
selection of a nominee. However, evidence that senator confirmation voting is influenced by the 
ideological relationship of the nominee to the departing justice suggests that presidents may – or 
at least, should – incorporate the departing justice into their decision calculus.  
 Observers expected Barack Obama to have the opportunity to fill at least one seat vacated 
by a liberal justice, with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens cited as the 
most likely to leave (Greenburg 2008; Johnson 2009). Sonia Sotomayor’s appointment to replace 
any of these three would not have affected the median justice, but may have altered the roll call 
tally and the risk of a filibuster attempt, depending on which justice left the Court. Presuming 
that Ginsburg is more liberal than Souter and Sotomayor, Sotomayor may have received more 
support if she were nominated to replace Ginsburg than for her nomination to replace Souter: 
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liberal senators may have been relatively less supportive of a Ginsburg-Sotomayor swap, since 
the seat would have moved away from their ideal point, but their probability of opposing 
Sotomayor would have been negligible given other factors predicting support, like partisanship 
and ideological proximity to the nominee; on the other hand, conservatives would have been 
slightly more pleased with a Ginsburg-Sotomayor exchange that would move the seat toward 
their ideal point, and their opposition may have been diluted by this consideration and may have 
resulted in an approval vote from one or more of the more moderate Republicans who opposed 
Sotomayor’s confirmation.  
A second implication is for confirmation studies. Many other judiciaries and independent 
regulatory agencies are multi-member institutions that produce policy through a deliberative 
process with a membership determined by an executive appointment and a legislative advice and 
consent. Evaluations of nominations to collegial bodies like these may also be influenced by 
departing members, with the impact presumably a function of the organization’s membership 
size, jurisdiction, and decision-making process. 
A third implication is for the appointments literature. Research has employed the eight-
member interim Court as a status quo in models of how senators (Lemieux and Stewart 1991) 
and the Senate (Lemieux and Stewart 1990) consider Supreme Court nominations. Moraski and 
Shipan (1999) provided evidence that presidential choices of nominee are influenced by the 
eight-member interim Court, finding that the ideology of a nominee was related to the median of 
the eight member Court when the president and the Senate median fell on opposite sides of the 
Court median. 
But while the eight-member interim Court is traditionally considered the status quo in the 
literature on Supreme Court appointments (see also Johnson and Roberts 2005 and Rohde and 
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Shepsle 2007), this conceptualization leads to non-intuitive results. Consider the nine-member 
Court in Figure 8.1, where the shaded circle with an M denotes the location of the Court median: 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Court median before departure of J9 
 
Suppose that the most conservative justice J9 departs from the Court; under the eight-
member interim Court conceptualization, the Court median would shift leftward, to the midpoint 
of the J4 to J5 range, as shown in Figure 8.2: 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Court median after departure of J9 
 
Now suppose that conservative justice J9 is replaced by moderate Jnew. Figure 8.3 displays 
the consequent rightward movement of the median: 
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Figure 8.3. Court median after confirmation of Jnew 
 
Note the logic inherent in the eight-member interim Court conceptualization when 
applied to the confirmation process as a whole: the Court median shifted twice, even though the 
ideology and identity of the median justice did not change. Moreover, the addition of moderate 
Jnew generated a conservative shift in the Court median, even though the Court as a whole is more 
liberal than it was before the vacancy. Contrast this with the nine-member conceptualization that 
retains the departing justice: replacement of conservative J9 with moderate Jnew would result in a 
leftward shift of the seat and would result in no change to either the identity or ideology of the 
median justice. 
The nine-member operationalization is more plausible both conceptually and 
operationally. Actual eight-member Courts have been relatively rare in recent decades, since 
nearly all postwar vacancies have been retirements or resignations (William Rehnquist was the 
only sitting justice to die between 1955 and 2007) and have tended to occur during the Court’s 
summer recess: ten of the twelve confirmation votes since Potter Stewart’s 1981 retirement have 
occurred in July, August, September, or October, resulting in little or no disruption to the Court’s 
business, which begins the first Monday of October and ends in late June or early July. The last 
extended eight-member Court occurred as President Ronald Reagan attempted to replace Lewis 
Powell in the 1987 term, after the rejection of Robert Bork, the withdrawal of Douglas Ginsburg, 
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and eventual confirmation of Anthony Kennedy. Moreover, some justices have retired pending 
the confirmation of their successor, as O’Connor did in her July 1 letter to President George W. 
Bush, noting that her resignation was “effective upon the nomination and confirmation of my 
successor” (O’Connor 2005). But, even in an extended period of an interim Court, it is unclear 
how much influence an intangible midpoint between two center justices would have, relative to a 
flesh-and-blood justice who had, in most cases, served on the Court for decades.64
A final implication is for political science research. The fields of political psychology and 
political institutions have traditionally been separated in the political science discipline, with 
psychological theories being tested primarily on members of the mass public. However, the 
research presented above provided evidence of the value of incorporating psychological theories 
into investigations of the behavior of institutional actors, suggesting that similar psychological 
forces govern the behavior and preferences of the public and of political elites. 
 
But, while the analysis presented in this dissertation continued the research agenda of 
explaining the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation processes, it, of course, does not 
represent the final word. Several unanswered questions remain for future research to address. 
8.2 UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
Incorporating constituency concerns is an important task for studies of confirmation voting, but 
faces several hurdles. The first is obtaining quality measures of state-level public opinion about 
                                                 
64 Cognitive accessibility would make the prior nine-member Court a more likely reference point, because 
envisioning the prior nine-member Court and the real prior median justice is much easier for senators –not to 
mention the mass public that tries to influence senators – than envisioning an eight-member Court and an abstract 
median located between two real justices. 
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Supreme Court nominations. Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips (2008) provided such data for nine 
recent nominations, seven of which overlap with the 1968 to 2006 time period of the above 
analysis. However, restriction to nine nominations presents the problem of small sample size, 
with data for only five nominations (O’Connor, Bork, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito) that had the 
potential for a median change. The second hurdle is isolating the influence of constituency 
concerns. Public opinion about a nomination is presumably governed by the same factors that 
influence senatorial preferences in the absence of constituency concerns, like partisanship, 
nominee qualifications, and ideological considerations; therefore, insertion of state-level public 
opinion into a model would not be able to determine the indirect influence of model variables 
through constituency concerns. Isolating the direct influence of model variables from their 
indirect influence through state-level public opinion is a problem that unfortunately lies beyond 
the scope of this present analysis, but presents a challenge for future research on senator 
opposition to Supreme Court nominations. One avenue for future research is to incorporate state-
level public opinion in such a manner that it is possible to isolate the influence of constituency 
concerns from key variables like nominee qualifications and ideology.  
8.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Another line of research is to revisit the reference dependence theory replacing ideology 
with other nominee characteristics, like gender or race (cf. Ruckman 1993), once more women 
and minorities have been nominated to the Court and statistical analysis becomes feasible. 
Research could address whether a man-for-man swap is considered as attractive as a man-for-
woman exchange or a woman-for-man replacement, in particular, testing whether some of the 
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opposition to the nomination of Samuel Alito compared to that of John Roberts was fed by the 
fact that Alito’s confirmation halved female representation on the Court.  
The passage of time should also provide an opportunity to revisit political retirement. The 
first five retirements in the 1950-to-2008 time period of analysis were inconsistent with political 
retirement, but 10 of the 14 subsequent retirements were consistent, as were 11 of 15 if the 2009 
retirement of David Souter is considered. Future research could test if political retirement has 
become more common after the Court began a more ambitious agenda in the 1960s.  
Accumulation of additional observations could also help resolve the question of whether 
the influence of considerations of the ideology departing justice is consistent with rational choice 
theory. Extant empirical and theoretical research views Supreme Court appointments through the 
prism of rational choice, with decisions fully determined by a utility function derived from 
preferences over viable options. Rational actors rank the choices available to them, and select the 
alternative that provides the most benefit for the least cost. 
Senators, for example, prefer justices who share their ideology, so confirmation votes are 
influenced by the ideological distance between the senator and a nominee (Epstein et al. 2006) 
and by the potential impact a nomination would have on the ideology of the Court median 
(Lemieux and Stewart 1990). Legislators prefer a skilled judiciary, so unqualified nominees have 
a more difficult time receiving confirmation (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990). Senators prefer 
to strengthen their political party, and are faced with an electoral disincentive for voting against 
nominations made by popular presidents, so legislators are more likely to vote to confirm an 
appointment made by a president of the same party (Shipan 2008) or by a president with high 
approval ratings (Johnson and Roberts 2004). Senators also possess an “electoral connection” to 
their constituents (Mayhew 1974), so confirmation voting has been found to be influenced by 
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interest group lobbying (Caldeira and Wright 1998), reelection concerns (Overby et al. 1992), 
and public opinion (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2008). 
However, the influence of the seat change variable in explaining senator confirmation 
voting can be interpreted in at least two ways. From one perspective, senators voting against a 
nomination that would move the ideology of the vacated seat further from their ideal point is 
rational behavior if the senator perceives that the departing justice will remain on the Court until 
a successor is confirmed. But senators considering the departing justice would be behaving 
irrationally if they do not perceive that the departing justice will remain on the Court until a 
successor is confirmed. For many dataset observations, it was at least plausible for senators to 
think that a departing justice may tarry on the Court for a while longer, but for others – like the 
death of William Rehnquist – it was not. Future research therefore could compare the influence 
of the departing justice when there is no or little possibility of continuation on the Court with 
situations in which a justice retires conditional on the confirmation of a successor. 
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APPENDIX A 
This Appendix contains the list of sources used for construction of the senator opposition 
dependent variable that was used in the individual-level and aggregate-level analysis. 
 
The Congressional Record indicated that the nomination was approved by voice vote (p. 2381).  
Earl Warren (3/1/1954, Chief Justice) 
 In the Record, Knowland (p. 2047, 2380) and Kuchel (p. 2380) spoke in favor of the 
nomination. Long stated that he expected to vote for the nomination (p. 2046). Johnson of 
Colorado stated that he was a supporter of the Chief Justice (p. 2046). Welker (apparently 
referring to himself as “the Senator from Idaho”) stated that he enjoys a “warm and close 
friendship with the nominee” (p. 2046). Morse spoke in favor (p. 2046). Hendrickson 
called the nominee “distinguished” (p. 2046). 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed four Judiciary Committee 
hearing documents. The first document (HRG-1954-SJS-0094, Feb. 2, 1954, 76 pp.) 
contained letters from the chair to the committee members regarding the Warren 
nomination indicating that a non-response would be interpreted as no objection. 
Documents were included from Knowland (p. 67) and Kuchel (p. 68), both of whom 
approved. In the second document (HRG-1954-SJS-0092, Feb. 19, 1954, 40 pp.), 
Knowland provided testimony in support (p. 67), Smithey read a letter from Hendrickson 
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in favor (p. 68-71), Welker thanked Hendrickson for the letter (p. 72), and Smithey read a 
letter from O’Conor in favor (p. 72-73). The third document (HRG-1954-SJS-0091, Feb. 
20, 1954, 28 pp.) contained no testimony from any senators. The fourth document (HRG-
1954-SJS-0089, Feb. 24, 1954, 132 pp.) contained a roll call to report the nomination 
favorably (p. 143-154): Butler, Dirksen, Hendrickson (twice), Kefauver, McCarran, 
McClellan, Watkins, Welker, Wiley voted in favor. Eastland and Johnston voted in 
opposition. Langer voted in favor but “with a lot of reservations”, which Kilgore 
concurred with, but then Kilgore changed his vote to opposition. Kilgore noted that his 
opposition was based on the “press pressure methods of trying to get a decision out of 
this committee” (p. 147) and that he “still think[s] Earl Warren is an excellent Chief 
Justice” (p. 147) and that he would vote in favor of the confirmation of Earl Warren if 
that were the only issue (p. 153). The document noted that Jenner favored the nomination 
but did not speak (he may be the second Hendrickson listed). The official Judiciary 
Committee report was favorable, 12-3. 
 The idiosyncratic nature of opposition to the Warren nomination in the Judiciary 
Committee vote cautioned against imputing preferences to senators. 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 71 in favor and 11 opposed (82 total, 14 missing).  
John Harlan II (3/16/1955) 
 The Congressional Record or the roll call (p. 3011, 3036) indicated that Scott withheld 
his opposition vote in a pair with Morse (OR), who would have voted in favor. The 
Record also indicated that Kennedy (MA), McNamara (MI), Saltonstall (MA), Smith 
(NJ), and Symington (MO) would have voted in favor.  The Record indicated only that 
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Bridges (NH), Carlson (KS), George (GA), Murray (MT), Schoeppel (KS), Sparkman 
(AL), and Young (ND) were absent. 
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks in the Senate on the nomination 
revealed no preferences of uncoded senators (p. 2829ff, 3012ff, 3022ff, 3034ff). 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed four Judiciary Committee 
hearing documents. The first document (HRG-1954-SJS-0182, Feb. 4, 1954, 4 pp.) 
indicated only that blue slip senators Lehman and Irving had no objection. The second 
document (HRG-1954-SJS-0140, Nov. 19, 1954, 55 pp.) contained no information about 
uncoded senator preferences. The third document returned was a copy of the second 
document. The fourth document (HRG-1955-SJS-0001, Feb. 24, 25, 1955, 232 pp.) and 
fifth document (HRG-1955-SJS-0127, Feb. 23, 1955, 9 pp.) contained no information 
about uncoded senator preferences. None of the uncoded senators were on the Judiciary 
Committee.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 77 in favor and 12 opposed, with 7 
uncoded (Bridges, Carlson, George, Murray, Schoeppel, Sparkman, and Young). 
 
The Congressional Record indicated that the nomination was approved by voice vote (p. 3946).  
William Brennan (3/19/1957) 
 In the Record, Smith (NJ) and Case (NJ) spoke in favor (p. 3936). McCarthy spoke 
against the nomination (p. 3937). Dirksen spoke in defense of Brennan (p. 3945-3946). 
Morse noted that every senator on his side of the aisle was prepared to vote for Brennan’s 
nomination (p. 3946). Knowland spoke in favor (p. 3633). 
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 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed only a Judiciary Committee 
hearing (HRG-1957-SJS-0039, Feb. 26, 27, 1957, 44 pp.). Smith (NJ) and Case (NJ) 
spoke in favor, and Joseph McCarthy (WI) spoke against. The nomination was reported 
favorably from committee without an indication of a vote tally (Rutkus and Bearden 
2006). 
 
The Congressional Record indicated that the nomination was approved by voice vote (p. 3946).  
Charles Whittaker (3/19/1957) 
 In the Record, Hennings spoke in favor of the nomination (p. 3929, 3946), and noted that 
Whittaker’s nomination was approved unanimously by the ten present members of the 
Judiciary Committee out of the 15 total members (p. 3946). Carlson and Symington 
spoke in favor (p. 2909). Stennis spoke in favor (p. 3108). 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed only a Judiciary Committee 
hearing (HRG-1957-SJS-0038, Mar. 18, 1957, 38 pp.). Hennings and Symington spoke in 
favor. The nomination was reported favorably from committee without an indication of a 
vote tally (Rutkus and Bearden 2006). 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 70 in favor and 17 opposed (87 total, 13 missing).  
Potter Stewart (5/5/1959) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 7472) indicated that Allott (CO), Capehart 
(IN), Clark (PA), Curtis (NE), Javits (NY), Moss (UT), Murray (MT), Randolph (WV), 
Symington (MO), and Wiley (WI) would vote in favor, but only that Hickenlooper (IA) 
was absent.  
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 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from 
Hickenlooper on the nomination revealed no entries. 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed two Judiciary Committee 
hearing documents. Hickenlooper did not testify or appear at the first (HRG-1959-SJS-
0087, Apr. 9, 1959, 73 pp.) or the second (HRG-1959-SJS-0088, Apr. 14, 1959, 81 pp.). 
The Judiciary Committee favorably reported the nomination with three dissents, but 
Hickenlooper did not serve on the committee.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 80 in favor and 17 opposed, with 1 
uncoded (Hickenlooper). 
 
The Congressional Record indicated that the nomination was approved by voice vote (p. 6332). 
Byron White (4/11/1962) 
 Carroll spoke favorably of the nomination, but noted that one or two Judiciary Committee 
members were absent at the Committee hearing earlier in the day (p. 6331). Kefauver and 
Russell spoke in favor (p. 6331). Mansfield offered congratulations after the voice vote 
(p. 6332).  
 The nomination was reported favorably from committee without an indication of a vote 
tally (Rutkus and Bearden 2006). 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed only a Judiciary Committee 
hearing (HRG-1962-SJS-0001, Apr. 11, 1962, 30 pp.), noting that Allott and Carroll 
approved the nomination by blue slip. 
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The Congressional Record indicated that the nomination was approved by voice vote (p. 20667). 
Arthur Goldberg (9/25/1962) 
 Allott, Carroll, Cooper, Dirksen, Douglas, Humphrey, Javits, Kuchel, Mansfield, and Pell 
spoke in favor of the nomination (p. 20665, 20667). Douglas noted that he thought the 
Judiciary Committee report was unanimous (p. 20665). Thurmond opposed the 
nomination (p. 20665). Dodd, Morse, Prouty, Randolph, and Yarborough spoke in favor 
(p. 20666). 
 The nomination was reported favorably from committee without an indication of a vote 
tally (Rutkus and Bearden 2006). 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed only a Judiciary Committee 
hearing (HRG-1962-SJS-0018, Sept. 11, 13, 1962, 108 pp.). Douglas testified in favor (p. 
3). Dirkson and Douglas (p. 1) approved the nomination. Carroll (p. 69) and Pell (p. 15) 
endorsed the nomination. Long (p. 69) would vote in favor of the nomination. Keating 
favored the nomination (p. 71) as did Fong (p. 71).  
 
The Congressional Record indicated that the nomination was approved by voice vote (p. 20048, 
20054-20055, 20068, 20072-20073, 20079).  
Abe Fortas (8/11/1965) 
 Symington noted that the committee approved without a dissenting vote, and announced 
support for the nomination (p. 20054). Javits spoke favorably (p. 20068). Mansfield 
spoke in favor and noted that the Judiciary Committee report was unanimous (p. 20073). 
Williams of Delaware (p. 20072), Curtis (p. 20072), and Thurmond (20054-20055) 
opposed. Mansfield, Bass, and Tydings spoke in favor (p. 20079). 
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 The nomination was reported favorably from committee without an indication of a vote 
tally (Rutkus and Bearden 2006). 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed only a Judiciary Committee 
hearing (HRG-1965-SJS-0040, Aug. 5, 1965, 62 pp.), indicating that Gore (TN), Bass 
(TN), and Dodd (CT) testified in favor. 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 69 in favor and 11 opposed (80 total, 20 missing).  
Thurgood Marshall (8/30/1967) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 24656) indicated that present Mansfield 
withheld his vote in favor because of a pair with absent Stennis (MI), who would have 
voted against. The Record also indicated that Bible (NV), Gruening (AL), Harris (OK), 
Hartke (IN), McCarthy (MN), McGovern (SD), Metcalf (MT), Montoya (NM), Murphy 
(CA), Muskie (ME), and Nelson (WI) and would have voted in favor, while McClellan 
(AR), Russell (GA), and Smathers (FL) would have voted against. The Record only 
indicated that Byrd (VA), Fannin (AZ), Hickelooper (IA), and Jordan (NC) were absent.  
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from Byrd 
of Virginia, Fannin, Hickenlooper, and Jordan on the nomination revealed no entries. 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed only a Judiciary Committee 
hearing (HRG-1967-SJS-0014, July 13, 14, 18, 19, 24, 1967, 202 pp.). None of the four 
uncoded senators were on the Judiciary Committee or presented testimony.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 81 in favor and 15 opposed, with 4 
uncoded (Byrd of Virginia, Fannin, Hickenlooper, and Jordan). 
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The recorded roll call vote was 45 in favor and 43 opposed (88 total, 12 missing).  
Abe Fortas (10/1/1968, Chief Justice cloture vote) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 28933) indicated that present Gruening 
withheld his vote against in a pair with absent Church (ID) and Morse (OR), both of 
whom would have voted in favor. The Record also indicated that senators Aiken (VT), 
Bible (NV), Ellender (LA), and Smith (ME) would have voted against. The Record 
indicated only that Bartlett (AK), Long (MO), McGovern (SD), Morton (KY), and 
Smathers (FL) were absent. 
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from 
Bartlett, Edward V. Long, McGovern, and Morton on the nomination revealed no entries. 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed eight Judiciary Committee 
hearing documents. The first (HRG-1968-SJS-0070, June 27, 1968, 92 pp.), the second 
(HRG-1968-SJS-0017, July 11, 12, 16-20, 22, 23, 1968, 1292 pp.), the third (HRG-1968-
SJS-0064, July 24, 1968, 63 pp.), the fourth (HRG-1968-SJS-0023, Sept. 13, 16, 1968, 
124 pp.), the fifth (HRG-1968-SJS-0071, Sept. 10, 1968, 111 pp.), the sixth (HRG-1968-
SJS-0065, Sept. 11, 1968, 30 pp.), and the seventh (ID: HRG-1968-SJS-0085, Sept. 13, 
1968, 11 pp.) contained no information on the preferences of the uncoded senators. In the 
eighth document (HRG-1968-SJS-0084, Sept. 17, 1968, 24 pp.), Smathers moved that the 
Fortas nomination be approved and he voted in favor (p. 14), but Long was absent from 
the meeting (p. 14). Long and Smathers were the only two uncoded senators on the 
Judiciary Committee.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 48 in favor and 48 opposed, with 4 
uncoded (Bartlett, Edward Long, McGovern, and Morton). 
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The recorded roll call vote was 74 in favor and 3 opposed (77 total, 23 missing).  
Warren Burger (6/9/1969, Chief Justice) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 15195) indicated that Fulbright voted 
present “in view of the circumstances”, and that senators Church (ID), Cook (KY), 
Cranston (CA), Fong (HI), Goldwater (AZ), Gravel (AL), Hollings (SC), Hughes (IA), 
Javits (NY), Mansfield (MT), McIntyre (NH), Moss (UT), Murphy (CA), Pastore (RI), 
Pell (RI), Percy (IL), Prouty (VT), and Ribicoff (CT) would have voted in favor. The 
Record only indicated that Gore (TN), Hart (MI), Inouye (HI), and Metcalf (MT) were 
absent.  
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from Gore, 
Hart, Inouye, and Metcalf on the nomination revealed no entries. 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed two Judiciary Committee 
hearing documents. In the first (HRG-1969-SJS-0136, June 3, 1969, 2 pp.) the Burger 
nomination was reported favorably to the full Senate by a unanimous voice vote, but 
Judiciary Committee Hart was not in attendance at that meeting. The second (HRG-1969-
SJS-0039, June 3, 1969, 120 pp.) contained no information on the preferences of uncoded 
senators. Gore, Metcalf, and Inouye were not members of the committee and did not 
present testimony.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 92 in favor and 3 opposed, with 1 
present and 4 uncoded (Gore, Hart, Inouye, and Metcalf). 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 45 in favor and 55 opposed (100 total, 0 missing). 
Clement Haynsworth (11/21/1969) 
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The recorded roll call vote was 45 in favor and 51 opposed (96 total, 4 missing).  
Harrold Carswell (4/8/1970) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 10769) indicated that Bennett (UT) and 
Mundt (SD) would have voted in favor, and that Pell (RI) would have voted against. The 
Record only indicated that Anderson (NM) was absent.  
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from 
Anderson on the nomination revealed no entries. 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed two Judiciary Committee 
hearings. Neither the first (HRG-1970-SJS-0062, Jan. 27-29, Feb. 2, 3, 1970, 470 pp.) nor 
the second (HRG-1970-SJS-0121, Feb. 3, 1970, 69 pp.) contained information on 
Anderson’s preferences. The Judiciary Committee reported the nomination with four 
dissenting votes of unknown origin (Rutkus and Bearden 2006), but Anderson was not on 
the Judiciary Committee and did not present testimony.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 47 in favor and 52 opposed, with 1 
uncoded (Anderson). 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 94 in favor and 0 opposed (94 total, 6 missing).  
Harry Blackmun (5/12/1970) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 15117) indicated that Bayh (IN), 
Goldwater (AZ), Gore (TN), Mundt (SD), Russell (GA), and Tower (TX) would have 
voted in favor.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 100 in favor and 0 opposed.  
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The recorded roll call vote was 89 in favor and 1 opposed (90 total, 10 missing).  
Lewis Powell (12/6/1971) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 44857) indicated that Bennett (UT), 
Dominick (CO), Gambrell (GA), Humphrey (MN), Miller (IA), Moss (UT), and Percy 
(IL) would have voted in favor. The Record indicated only that Inouye (HI), Mundt (SD), 
and Stafford (VT) were absent.  
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from 
Inouye, Mundt, and Stafford on the nomination revealed no entries. 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed only a Judiciary Committee 
hearing (HRG-1971-SJS-0061, Nov. 3, 4, 8-10, 1971, 496 pp.). There were no dissents 
were from the Judiciary Committee, and Inouye, Mundt, and Stafford were not on the 
Judiciary Committee and did not present testimony.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 96 in favor and 1 opposed, with 3 
uncoded (Inouye, Mundt, and Stafford). 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 68 in favor and 26 opposed (94 total, 6 missing).  
William Rehnquist (12/10/1971) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 46197) indicated that present Mansfield 
would have voted against, but had a pair with absent Percy (IL), who would have voted in 
favor. The Record also noted that absent Smith (ME) would have voted in favor, but only 
that Anderson (NM), Bennett (UT), and Mundt (SD) were absent.  
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from 
Anderson, Bennett, and Mundt on the nomination revealed no entries for Anderson and 
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Mundt, but returned an entry (p. 46173) in which Fannin entered into the Record a 
statement by Bennett in favor of the nomination. 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed only a Judiciary Committee 
hearing (HRG-1971-SJS-0061, Nov. 3, 4, 8-10, 1971, 496 pp.). The Judiciary Committee 
voted 12-4 in favor of the nomination (Rutkus and Bearden 2006), with the four dissents 
from Bayh (IN), Hart (MI), Kennedy (MA), and Tunney (CA). Anderson and Mundt 
were not on the Judiciary Committee and did not present testimony.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 72 in favor and 27 opposed, with 2 
uncoded (Anderson and Mundt).  
 
The recorded roll call vote was 98 in favor and 0 opposed (98 total, 2 missing).  
John Paul Stevens (12/17/1975) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 41128) indicated only that Allen (AL) and 
Bayh (IN) were absent. Bayh supported the nomination elsewhere in the Record (p. 
39883).  
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from Allen 
on the nomination revealed no entries. 
 A search of LexisNexis Congressional Publications revealed two Judiciary Committee 
hearings (HRG-1975-SJS-0013, Dec. 8-10, 1975, 232 pp.) and (HRG-1975-SJS-0085, 
Dec. 11, 1975, 6 pp.). There were no dissents from the Judiciary Committee’s favorable 
report (Rutkus and Bearden 2006), and Allen did not serve on the committee or present 
testimony.  
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 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 99 in favor and 0 opposed, with 1 
uncoded (James Browning Allen of Alabama). 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 99 in favor and 0 opposed (99 total, 1 missing).  
Sandra Day O’Connor (9/21/1981) 
 The Congressional Record (p. 21375) for the roll call indicated that Baucus (MT) would 
have voted in favor. 
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 100 in favor and 0 opposed. 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 65 in favor and 33 opposed (98 total, 2 missing).  
William Rehnquist (9/17/1986, Chief Justice) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 23803) indicated that Garn would have 
voted in favor, but only that Goldwater was absent.  
 However, at the Judiciary Committee hearings, Goldwater made an opening statement in 
favor of Rehnquist’s elevation to the chief justiceship (p. 8). 
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 67 in favor and 33 opposed. 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 98 in favor and 0 opposed (98 total, 2 missing).  
Antonin Scalia (9/17/1986) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 23813) contained a misprint: 
Mr. Simpson: I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Garn] and the Senator 
from Arizona [Mr. Goldwater] are necessarily absent. I further announce that, if 
present and voting, the Senator from Utah [Mr. Garn] would each vote “yea.” 
 176 
 Goldwater was not coded as supporting Scalia on the basis of this Record entry (with an 
ambiguous “each”) because, in the Record entry for the Rehnquist nomination on the 
same day, Simpson only indicated the preference of absent Garn.  
 A search of the Congressional Record index for remarks, statements, or letters from 
Goldwater on the nomination revealed no entries. A Lexis-Nexis search of the Daily 
Congressional Record & Rules restricted by speaker on the floor to Goldwater and to the 
search term “Scalia” revealed two documents (132 Cong Rec S 12629, 132 Cong Rec S 
12378), neither of which provided information about Goldwater’s preference for the 
Scalia nomination.  
 Goldwater was not on the Judiciary Committee and did not present testimony.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 99 in favor and 0 opposed, with 1 
uncoded (Goldwater). 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 42 in favor and 58 opposed (100 total, 0 missing). 
Robert Bork (10/23/1987) 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 97 in favor and 0 opposed (100 total, 3 missing).  
Anthony Kennedy (2/3/1988) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 739) indicated that Biden (DE) and Gore 
(TN) would have voted in favor, but only that Simon (IL) was absent.  
 However, Simon did provide testimony to the Judiciary Committee that was favorable to 
Anthony Kennedy, although it stopped short of an endorsement: 
I cannot agree with all of Judge Kennedy’s opinions. In a few cases -- such as his 
expansive discussion of substantive due process in the case of Beller v. 
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Middendorf -- he has seemed to stray somewhat from the principle of judicial 
restraint which he usually follows. But even in that case he reached the correct 
result, as later confirmed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick. On the whole, his judicial record is exemplary and sound. Any attempt 
to suggest that Judge Kennedy is not within the so-called “mainstream” is 
implausible. Even those of his opinions which hay be criticized by hostile 
witnesses -- such as his comparable worth opinion and his decision upholding the 
Navy’s right to discharge homosexuals in the Beller case -- are consistent with 
results reached by numerous other federal appeals courts. The test for me, though, 
is not whether he is within some selective notion of the “mainstream”; it is 
whether he is faithful to the constitution and the limits of the judicial role. From 
what I’ve seen and read so far, Judge Kennedy should pass that more important 
test. I hope his testimony and his answers to my colleagues’ questions will 
reenforce [sic] that belief. 
 The quote was considered favorable enough to warrant coding Simon in favor of the 
nomination.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 100 in favor and 0 opposed. 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 90 in favor and 9 opposed (99 total, 1 missing).  
David Souter (10/2/1990) 
 The Congressional Record (26996-26997) for the roll call only indicated that Wilson 
(CA) was absent. 
 Wilson was not on the Judiciary Committee at the time and did not testify at the 
committee hearings. 
 However, according to the New York Times, “Senator Pete Wilson, Republican of 
California, did not vote [on the Souter nomination]. Mr. Wilson was in California 
campaigning for governor today, but he has endorsed the nomination.”65
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 91 in favor and 9 opposed. 
 
                                                 
65 Source: Richard L. Berke. 1990. “Senate Confirms Souter, 90 to 9, As Supreme Court’s 105th Justice.” The New 
York Times. October 3. 
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The recorded roll call vote was 52 in favor and 48 opposed (100 total, 0 missing). 
Clarence Thomas (10/15/1991) 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 96 in favor and 3 opposed (99 total, 1 missing).  
Ruth Bader Ginsburg (8/3/1993) 
 The Congressional Record (p. 18414) indicated that Riegle (MI) would have voted in 
favor.  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 97 in favor and 3 opposed. 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 87 in favor and 9 opposed (96 total, 4 missing).  
Stephen Breyer (7/29/1994) 
 The Congressional Record for the roll call (p. 18704) indicated that Graham (FL) and 
Wallop (WY) would have voted in favor, but contained no information on the preferences 
of Durenberger (MN) or Pell (RI). However, the Record elsewhere contained a statement 
by Durenberger in favor of the nomination (p. 18571) and a statement by Pell in favor of 
the nomination (p. 18572).  
 The unofficial sense of the Senate, therefore, was 91 in favor and 9 opposed. 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 78 in favor and 22 opposed (100 total, 0 missing). 
John Roberts (9/29/2005, Chief Justice) 
 
The recorded roll call vote was 58 in favor and 42 opposed (100 total, 0 missing). 
Samuel Alito (1/31/2006) 
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APPENDIX B 
Variable Mean Deviation Min Max 
Senator opposition 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Unfavorable seat change -0.09 1.09 -3.11 2.89 
Unfavorable median change -0.01 0.18 -0.72 0.72 
Increased ideological distance 1.16 0.79 0 4.05 
Lack of nominee qualifications -0.76 0.27 -1.00 -0.11 
Presidential disapproval 0.36 0.11 0.15 0.54 
Different party 0.51 0.50 0 1 
 
Note: Data were drawn from the nineteen Supreme Court nominations between the 1968 Fortas chief justice 
nomination and the 2006 Alito associate justice nomination. Senator opposition values were based on the 1883 
observations for which senator preferences were obtained; all other values were based on the 1900 observations for 
senators serving at the time of the confirmation or cloture roll call vote. 
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